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Abstract 
Cloud computing and distributed Grid computations in the e-science and commercial 
spheres are beginning to make accessible huge amounts of computing power with “just 
in time” availability. However, the economic models surrounding these systems are 
static and uniform, with charging models that, for web-based cloud systems work on 
a price per unit per hour basis, whilst for educational type resources, ﬁxed contractual 
arrangements and multi-year projects are more prevalent. 
The common place practice of using just-in-time capacity planning and variable pric­
ing algorithms, such as those pioneered by airlines like EasyJet, tells us that the cost 
of delivering these services and the price that should be paid for them is a much more 
complex beast. Future Grid and Cloud Computing computations will be enabled by 
participants trading resources in order to construct bundles of goods or services in 
both new commercial arenas and the more well established “e-science” experiments in 
science, engineering and, now emerging, social sciences. 
A combinatorial auction (CA) is a natural choice for determining the optimal allocation 
for a bundle of required goods and services, but the space and time dimensions that 
characterise a Grid compute cloud would appear to indicate they are incompatible. 
This thesis proposes that an analogue of a physical commodities market is more appro­
priate for distributed resource allocation and that there is a class of bundling problems 
whose complexity properties appear to make the utilisation of a CA impractical. We 
therefore compare the two techniques for resource bundling and investigate the cross­
over point, to enrich our understanding of how combinatorial auctions and distributed 
markets may be used together to improve distributed resource allocation practices. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction to the Problem Space 
1.1 Context and Motivation 
Alice and Bob are physics researchers looking to submit a large quantity of compu­
tations, perhaps processing recent experimental results. Each has different budgets, 
priorities and resource requirements and given the limited capacity of their local com­
puting cluster a decision about how to allocate the resources must be made. Ideally, 
the optimal allocation should be chosen. 
This problem arises in many resource management and procurement applications. We 
are speciﬁcally interested in Cloud computing and distributed Grid computations be­
cause new developments in the e-science and commercial spheres are making huge 
amounts of computing power accessible with “just in time” availability. However, 
the economic models surrounding these systems are static and uniform, with charging 
models that, for web-based cloud systemsi, work on a price per unit per hour basis, 
whilst for educational type resources, ﬁxed contractual arrangements and multi-year 
projects are more prevalent. 
The common place practise of using just-in-time capacity planning and variable pric­
ing algorithms, such as those pioneered by airlines like EasyJet, tells us that the cost 
of delivering these services and the price that should be paid for them is a much more 
complex beast. Future Grid and Cloud Computing computations will be enabled by 
participants trading resources in order to construct bundles of goods or services in both 
12

new commercial arenas and the more well established “e-science” experiments in sci­
ence, engineering and, now emerging, social sciences. What mechanism should we 
use to support the trading and resource allocation? 
A combinatorial auction (CA) is a natural choice for determining the optimal alloca­
tion for a bundle of required goods and services, because it guarantees to give the best 
economic outcome (Pareto optimal) for parties concerned. However, whilst the al­
gorithms have been reﬁned through signiﬁcant research the mode of problem solving 
is fundamentally NP-Hard and requires both a centralised mechanism and complete 
revelation of the participants preferences and valuations to work. 
An alternative solution would be to distribute the problem. With multiple auctions and 
trading agents we can remove the inherent single point of failure and concurrently solv­
ing a larger number of simpler, linear problems, in a predicable time-frame. However, 
distributed markets have their own failings and typically do not produce Pareto-optimal 
allocations which does make them unsuitable for some applications. 
In order to understand what makes an outcome optimal and come to an informed de­
cision as to what the appropriate solution is for a given resource allocation problem 
a greater understanding of their workings, outcomes and the relative performance of 
each is required. 
Through an empirical analysis this thesis compares the two techniques for resource 
bundling and investigate the cross-over point, to enrich our understanding of how com­
binatorial auctions and distributed markets may be used together to improve distributed 
resource allocation practises and to enable the reader to understand the parameters that 
deﬁne which technique is appropriate for a particular class of resource allocation prob­
lems. 
1.2 Introduction to the Problem Space 
We wish to determine which method should be used in order to compute the most 
appropriate allocation of a generic set of resources for a given set of circumstances 
and develop an understanding of how the different approaches available relate to one 
another. Consider three scenarios: 
13 
1. We have complete information about the preferences of the mechanism partici­
pants; we have a single point of centralised decision making; we wait an inﬁnite 
amount of time; we produce an optimal outcome. This is known as the combi­
natorial auction solution. 
2. We have incomplete preference information; decentralised decision making, a 
known (linear to problem size) amount of time to wait and we produce a subop­
timal outcome, but one which is useful because it is built out of the preferences 
expressed by market participants. This would be the problem solved by our 
distributed market, implemented as the “Multiple Distributed Auctions” (MDA) 
system. 
3. We have the trivial problem. Consider a situation of needing to allocate 30 goods 
to 10 participants. By rolling a 30 sided dice, we can, through a centralised 
decision making process allocate the resources to the participants. We have zero 
preference information, it is a very quick process and we have no information 
about the quality or usefulness of the outcome. 
There are, therefore, a number of axes, or scales: 
1. Centralised vs Decentralised Decision Making 
2. Complete preference information vs Incomplete preference information 
3. Time available / expended on determining the solution 
4. Optimal vs Suboptimal allocations (for proﬁt or utilisation) 
Not all the axes are sliding, linear scales. Decision making is either centralised or 
decentralised, with no degrees of variance between, but preferences can be incremen­
tally revealed. Time is a linear scale and we can measure the proximity and quality of 
solutions through their varying degrees of separation. 
These four axes allow us to deﬁne our problem space, give relative position to each of 
our example problems and to highlight the difference between the options. 
Consider the question of centralised vs decentralised ﬁrst: Is a ﬁnancially driven auc­
tion the best choice or should a trading market be used? Grid computing networks are 
14

potentially a major user of distributed resource allocation systems, but the problem is 
certainly not limited to that domain and there is much literature on the subject out­
side the Grid computing sphere particularly with respect to distributed algorithms. By 
way of example, the seminal 1980’s paper, “A Micro-economic Approach to Optimal 
Resource Allocation in Distributed Computer Systems” by Kurose and Simha [KS89] 
considers the beneﬁts of using an economy-based decentralised algorithm for ﬁle sys­
tem allocation. They argue that price is the ideal valuation function for a distributed 
market for two reasons: 
1. Price can ultimately be seen as a projection function from a multi-dimensional 
vector of “values” — both quantitative and qualitative — to a single value and; 
2. Secondly, in a free market, over the longer term, the price, cost and the marginal 
value that a user assigns to a good, will all converge as competition drives down 
price and makes a number of good alternatives available. 
Work on similar problems in other related areas (parallel computing, ﬁle system schedul­
ing, etc.) [ASGH95, FBK96, SH80] typically seems to focus on a simpliﬁed environ­
mental model where a signiﬁcant weakness is a lack of a free market or “real world” 
aggressiveness and competition that a ﬁnancially-based allocation environment (auc­
tion, trading ﬂoor, etc.) should emulate and we describe in our MDA implementation 
in Chapter 4. 
In our introduction, we considered three approaches to resource allocation. Of these, 
the dice throwing approach is unsatisfactory as it is neither optimal nor inclusive of 
preferences (although in some circumstances it is arguably viewed as “fair”). There are 
two relevant approaches to solving a resource allocation problem, the Combinatorial 
Auction and a Distributed Market. 
1.2.1 The Combinatorial Auction 
A combinatorial auction is an auction in which bidders can place bids on combinations 
or “bundles” of items, rather than just individual goods. They have wide applications 
for use, in auctions for logistics, radio spectrum and many other procurement scenar­
ios. 
15 
Most computational resource allocation problems are resolved through the use of a 
centralised combinatorial auction. However, this is an NP-Hard compute problem 
which has scalability limits and which runs in unpredictable time, as illustrated in 
Figure 1.1. Most solutions to this problem combine tree search with heuristics, so 
if the heuristics are insufﬁcient to prune the search tree and make the problem space 
“small enough” the algorithm might not be able to complete the search in the given 
amount of time. 
B
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e 
C
om
pl
ex
ity
 
Time 
Perfect Allocation 
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Figure 1.1: Hypothetical Projection of Complexity Model 
Looking at a simple set of bundles, we can begin to determine the possible outcomes. 
For example in Figure 1.2 each line represents a bundle, with the ﬁrst line showing that 
agent A will bid 2426 for elements 0, 2 and 3. 
Agent Budget Requirements 
A 2426 0, 2, 3 
B 1969 0, 1, 2 
C 32 0 
D 781 1, 3 
E 370 0, 1, 4 
Figure 1.2: Sample CA Bundle Data 
A CA solver will build a search tree, similar to Figure 1.3 and use it to determine the 
answer which will provide the most value for the goods on sale. It does this using a 
combination of heuristics to prune the tree and various tree search algorithms. In our 
simple example we can see that selling bundle A, comprising goods 0,2,3 for a value 
of 2426 achieves the maximum value possible for this auction. 
16 
Solution

A B C D E 
0,2,3 0,1,2 0 1,3 0,1,4

D C
2426 1969 32 781 3701,3 0 
813 813 
Figure 1.3: Solution Search Tree 
1.2.2 Problems with Combinatorial Auctions 
When trying to solve the described resource allocation problem, using a centralised 
market, a number of problems arise: 
Robustness: Distributed computer systems inherently have built in redundancy and 
scalability, as can increasingly be seen in today’s cloud computing services. As 
well as redundancy of the platform, one of the key attractions of scalable com­
puting resources is the ability to quickly increase and reduce usage through the 
advanced management tools provided. Therefore if we are to provide a robust 
environment for the execution of applications then we must equally implement 
management mechanisms which are rapid and robust. Relying on a single, cen­
tralised auctioneer to make all the resource management decisions about a plat­
form would not be a sensible or viable solution. 
Complete Information: In order to compute the solution to any combinatorial auc­
tion, the auctioneer needs to have complete information about all of the prefer­
ences for all parties (buyers and sellers) in the market. In a distributed network 
there are two constraints: (i) Communication between nodes may mean that in­
formation for all the potential buyers and sellers is not available at any single 
point in time. (ii) The structure of a distributed system means that it will encour­
age participation from buyers and sellers across multiple distributed domains. 
17

This means that for reasons of security and privacy, individual traders may not 
wish to make their full preferences known to the auctioneer. This is particularly 
true in a supplier-customer relationship, because the parties will naturally have 
different motivations and objectives in their negotiations. Note that whilst pa­
pers such as those by Sandholm [SG06] do investigate the potential for solving 
centralised problems with minimal preferences they do not achieve optimal solu­
tions and the proximity of the derived utility to the optimal depends on a number 
of variables including the number of bids in the auction. 
By way of example, the D-CIS Lab at Thales has identiﬁed two areas of work which 
demonstrate applications in which agent based systems are being used to address NP-
Hard problems in the real world where a combinatorial approach is infeasible. This is a 
paradigm they call “Actor-Agent Communities”. Firstly, they have provided decision 
support software to help manage interruptions to train schedules in the Netherlands 
railway system and secondly to environmental impact decision making in Rotterdam 
Harbour. 
Railway scheduling is a subject that has been long studied and with recent advances in 
computing power, heuristic development and search algorithms it is common place to 
ﬁnd computer systems utilised in the production of initial railway schedules. However, 
the problem of effectively managing the railway schedule in the event of a disruption 
to the network is currently unsolved. How could our work on multiple distributed 
auctions help further the developments of the D-CIS lab in reﬁning their solution to 
this problem? Firstly, the train rescheduling problem can be characterised as an NP-
Hard problem with complex heuristics which requires search to produce a solution. 
However, when managing the crisis of train schedule interruption it is potentially more 
important to provide a workable solution quickly than to provide the optimum solution 
(i.e. one with zero knock on effects to the schedule) because a single knock on effect 
in the future can be easily managed, where as a current disruption may generate much 
larger, immediate effects in the network. In an application where the optimal outcome 
is not necessary, a satisﬁcing [Sim55] solution can be obtained through the use of 
distributed auctions which may provide a speedy and useful solution. 
The question of environmental decision support in Rotterdam Harbour is a similar 
problem to which we can lend our expertise. The challenge in environmental manage­
ment is the coordination of response across a very large number of different govern­
mental agencies, all of whom have differing priorities and responsibilities, but whom 
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must play a coordinated role in responding to an environmental accident. 
Representing the available agency resources and desired actions as goods in the Trad­
ing Agents model we can package their tasks as bundles and use markets to determine 
effective strategies for collaborative team working, whilst taking into account a greater 
number of different constraints and trade offs that are imposed in such a situation, than 
would be possible if we used a centralised planning solution. 
1.2.3 Distributed Market 
In order to address these challenges and develop an empirical understanding of the 
dynamics of decentralised resource allocation systems we built a distributed market, 
called the Multiple Distributed Auction (MDA)—see Figure 1.4. Initially this was a 
uni-processor simulation of the MDA using the JASA [PMPM06] and Repast [NCV06] 
toolkits. The system begins with an ‘Oracle’ that is boot-strapped from a dataﬁle pro­
duced by the “Combinatorial Auction Test Suite” software (CATS) [LBPS00] that pro­
vides the goods and bundles needed to run the market. From this the Repast simulator 
is used to manage a multitude of Agents which participate in a number of continuous 
double auctions to buy and sell the goods in order to complete their desired bundles. 
We do not claim that the concept of distributed markets to be a new or novel idea 
and the contribution of this thesis is the comparison of centralised and decentralised 
markets. 
Researchers such as Parkes [PS04] have looked extensively at auctions and resource 
allocation mechanisms with systems such as ICE (Iterative Combinatorial Exchange) 
[LJC+08], a fully expressive iterative combinatorial auction, and Bellagio [ABC+09] a 
distributed market scheduler implemented for the Planet Lab grid computing environ­
ment. The difﬁculty that both of these works found however, highlighted in the review 
of Bellagios effectiveness [ABC+09], was that whilst having a distributed market did 
increase allocation efﬁciency there was a real problem of replicating the market’s input 
data because workloads from scheduling environments are, by nature, entirely random 
and therefore it is difﬁcult to identify the relative performance of the distributed system 
with the known body of work on centralised systems. 
We have additionally argued that it is infeasible to accurately predict the run-time 
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Trader1 · · · Traderi · · · Traderm 
CDAj · · · · · · CDA1 CDAn 
MDA Manager Oracle 
CATS File Loader 
Figure 1.4: Schematic of MDA market structure 
behaviour of distributed systems theoretically and in order to make that comparison 
and hence understand which system is appropriate for the problem the user wishes 
to solve, it is necessary to have an implementation of both systems, supplied with a 
consistent set of input data, which is what we have done. 
Although authors such as Parkes have published papers on the design and output of 
their systems, source code is not available and therefore it has been necessary to im­
plement our own system of distributed auctions. 
The market comprises an Oracle, many Traders, an MDA manager and many CDAs 
(Continuous Double Auctions): 
Oracle: responsible for handing out bundles to traders on demand. Consequently, 
varying the Oracle’s output rate constrains supply and demand in the market. 
Bundles can be requested from the Oracle and also later returned to it, if they 
cannot be purchased/sold. All transactions are reported to the Oracle, so it main­
tains information and history about the market participants. 
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Trader: responsible for retrieving bundles from the Oracle and trading them. Traders 
that fail to trade their bundle within a given number of rounds must return them 
to the Oracle—ensuring the market does not contain too many extra-marginal 
traders1. At anyone one time, anyone can be buyers or sellers depending on the 
type of the bundle received from the Oracle. Traders may also switch state— 
from buying to selling—which might happen, for example, if they decided that 
they could not acquire sufﬁcient goods to complete a bundle’s requirements 
given current time or budget constraints. 
CDA (continuous double auction): CDAs are market-places where traders can trade 
a single type of resource. The seller reduces their ask-price at each round, the 
buyer increases their bid-price at each round and an adjudicator determines when 
a sale has been agreed and at what price. Traders may withdraw from a CDA at 
any time. An MDA is a collection of CDAs. 
MDA: responsible for telling the traders which CDAs they can use to trade the re­
sources in their bundles. The MDA stores a reference to all CDAs and if a CDA 
is requested for a good type which does not already exist the MDA will instanti­
ate it. 
We have run the distributed system using the same CATS input ﬁles as used in the 
CASS [LB03] simulations and compared the output from two sets of experiments, 
which has enabled us to draw a number of useful conclusions about the operation of 
our markets. 
1.2.4 Dependencies between Goods 
If Alice wishes to purchase three goods from a market, such as a ﬂight, a hotel and an 
airport to hotel transfer she will likely wish to purchase all three goods simultaneously, 
because arguably one has no value without the other two complementary activities. 
However, representing the complementarities and dependencies between goods imme­
diately makes the problem of resource allocation signiﬁcantly more complex, indeed 
this is the problem that a Combinatorial Auction solves and we have highlighted the 
pros and cons of such an approach in Section 1.2.2. 
1Buyers who have paid less than the equilibrium price and sellers who are selling for more than the 
equilibrium price. 
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With our distributed market mechanism, in which each type of good has its own contin­
uous double auction there is no support for describing dependencies within the market 
mechanism. However, bundles of goods are passed by the Oracle to the Traders, whose 
role it is to assemble the relevant bundle of goods, through participating in multiple, 
but unrelated, auctions. 
It is therefore very likely that a Trader will purchase the goods in series and given the 
limited supply of goods, they may not be able to complete the bundle. We consider the 
impact of bundle completion in our results (Section 6.6, page 120) as it forms one of 
our key measures for the success of distributed markets. 
There are pros and cons to ensuring that complete sets of goods are assembled. It is 
a more complex problem, which increases compute time and artiﬁcially imposing a 
restriction to purchase a complete set may mean that consumers are denied the oppor­
tunity to purchase partial bundles of goods—there are many instances where owning 
some of the goods required is satisfactory. For example, Alice may ﬁnd she can hire a 
taxi locally for less money than a pre-arranged hotel transfer, we would describe this 
as a complementary solution, but which is available outside of our system of markets. 
Whilst the dependencies between goods is an important factor and one which has been 
well researched, (for example in the Trading Agent Competition, described in Section 
2.1.6, page 47) we do not think it is essential for systems to support dependencies be­
tween goods, there are advantages not too doing so and we evaluate “completeness” as 
part of this work. 
1.3 Review of Potential Solutions 
Given sufﬁcient time, the CA will ﬁnd the Pareto efﬁcient solution (deﬁned in Sec­
tion 3.2.1, page 58) to the bundling problem which provides the maximum amount of 
revenue to the sellers/providers of goods in the auction. However, we have found (as 
described in Section 6.8, page 129) that a decentralised market will trade more goods 
with greater concurrency and solve more problems in linear time, but at the expense of 
ﬁnding non-optimal solutions. 
We consider that non-optimal solutions are not necessarily a problem and we would 
characterise our solutions as “satisﬁcing”, a decision-making strategy which is dis­
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cussed in detail in Section 3.2.1 and deﬁned as [Sim55]: 
“Attempting to meet criteria for adequacy, rather than to identify an opti­
mal solution. A satisﬁcing strategy may often, in fact, be (near) optimal if 
the costs of the decision-making process itself, such as the cost of obtain­
ing complete information, are considered in the outcome calculus.” 
Can we therefore solve distributed resource allocation problems, in linear time with 
greater predictability, using a distributed system of markets? There are a number of 
questions: 
1. If we use a distributed market, what is the variance of the outcome between it 
and a centralised markets? 
2. How good or bad is the result, with respect to the completeness of bundles, 
ﬁnancial value and spend, time to complete and efﬁciency of the market? Are 
the results acceptable? 
3. What affects the overlap of goods selected to complete bundles produced by the 
different markets? 
4. Can we increase the market concurrency and/or the number of goods which are 
traded in the market, thus reducing social welfare deprivation? 
As we have discussed there are additional fringe beneﬁts associated with conducting 
resource allocation decisions in a distributed system, but ultimately, the question is can 
we deﬁne a menu of criteria which set out the best resource allocation mechanism for 
the task? 
We have chosen an empirical analysis approach for two reasons: 
1. An analytical approach to comparison seems infeasible — at least, given cur­
rent understandings of the problem — because for complexity analysis purposes 
a combinatorial auction is equivalent to a weighted set-packing problem and 
hence can be solved analytically but it is not yet possible to perform a simi­
lar (theoretical) analysis of a system of distributed software agents — with all 
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the interactions and overheads that communication and distributed intelligence 
brings. Therefore empirical techniques offer a practical route to the evaluation of 
the market system and allow analysis of ﬁnancial outcomes, market efﬁciency, 
bundle completion and participant satisfaction within a reasonable time frame. 
2. The literature is full of examples [DJ03, WPBB01] of theoretical performance 
analysis that inevitably use simpliﬁed models. The use of such models then 
distorts any understanding of the beneﬁt proposed by a system, particularly in the 
real world. Large distributed systems of autonomous objects are too complicated 
to model theoretically, but it is a desire to understand these systems that provides 
impetus and rationale for this thesis, hence we have chosen to analyse them 
empirically. 
To carry out the comparison we identify three key attributes: 
1.	 Optimality, or solution quality, whether we are maximising for buyer, seller 
or intermediary; are the participants getting the best solution that meets their 
needs? 
2.	 Time, or how long it takes to produce the solutions. 
3.	 Cost, or how “expensive” the approach is, in terms of items sold and bids com­
pleted, which may be evaluated through the economic surplus and social welfare 
produced in the system. 
We will revisit these themes throughout the discussion as we build a comparison of 
different methods for bundling resources and evaluate their pros and cons. The ap­
proaches considered are as follows: 
1. Firstly, Combinatorial Auction solver (CA), CASS, a system described and im­
plemented by Kevin Leyton-Brown[LB03]. CAs are a type of multiple-item 
market and the solver takes a set of m indivisible non-identical items for sale 
and n bids. Each bid is a pair made up of (i) a subset of the m items and (ii) a 
numeric value representing the value a bidder will pay for the bundle. The CA 
solver will attempt to optimise the outcome of the problem such that the alloca­
tion of m items across the n bids maximises the total social welfare (sum of the 
buyer and seller proﬁt) in the system. 
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This problem is known to be NP-complete and CA solvers search for the optimal 
allocation using a single, centralised auction, with complete information about 
all available bids, bidders and items. 
2. Secondly, a Multiple Distributed Auction (MDA) is a distributed system of many 
single item continuous double auctions, that is many auctions take place concur­
rently, one for each type of good being traded. A MDA distributes the bundling 
operation to the “traders” in the market, who subscribe to multiple markets and 
buy individual items with the motive of grouping them to satisfy bundle requests. 
In doing so, the MDA shifts the system objective from achieving the maximum 
valuation for the sellers (the CA objective) to maximising the number of ele­
ments traded and achieving the best price for the buyer. 
3. Thirdly, we re-factored the uni-processor MDA into a fully distributed and asyn­
chronous market where Traders may buy and sell goods across multiple Continu­
ous Double Auctions (CDAs). This was built using the AgentScape [OB06] mid­
dleware, a framework for heterogeneous, mobile agents. The use of AgentScape 
shifts the paradigm so that the agents are not tied to execute in sequence which 
enables them to act with greater autonomy increasing the competitive environ­
ment of the market. 
1.3.1 Ensuring Comparability 
Comparing a centralised system with a decentralised one is to some extent, an apples 
and oranges comparison. Both are different systems and take different approaches to 
solving the problem. However, in this context, they are both solving the same problem. 
We took two approaches to ensuring that we had a fair basis for comparing the two sys­
tems. (i) Firstly, we used the same test data as an input to all our experiments, taking 
previously published distributions from the Combinatorial Auction Test Suite [LBPS00] 
by Leyton-Brown. This provides a large set of test data with 1000 goods and 256 bids 
in 500 test instances for multiple distributions spanning a wide spectrum of difﬁculty. 
Included are results from two Combinatorial Auction type solvers, CPLEX and CASS. 
We utilised all of the distributions in our experiments, but focus our detailed results on 
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the “L2” and “Scheduling” data types. 
(ii) Secondly, we applied two economic tests to the systems to ensure that they pro­
duced consistent outputs. These were that the results produced are Pareto Optimal 
(described in Section 3.2.1) and that the mechanisms are Incentive Compatible (Sec­
tion 3.2.1). 
We believe that through maintaining consistency of the test environment and ensuring 
that all environments individually provide consistent economic properties, we have 
successfully provided a platform for the comparison. 
1.3.2 Thesis Contribution 
Typically researchers in the Combinatorial Auction space take the stance that nothing 
less than optimal is sufﬁcient and look for algorithmic improvements to their heuristics 
and search logic. On the other side of the coin, those in Grid and Cloud Computing 
look to make resource allocation decisions that maximise the utility of their clusters 
whilst the economic properties of those allocation decisions and whether or not they 
could be improved upon become a secondary concern. 
In deciding whether to use a centralised or decentralised system for conducting re­
source management activities users need to balance the trade off between utilisation, 
economic and social welfare of the system and compute time for the allocation process 
itself. 
We do not re-invent the distributed market, but propose that a distributed market pro­
vides an approach for solving more difﬁcult problems such as the job shop scheduling 
task simulated in our Scheduling distribution, because it shifts the responsibility for 
assembling a bundle of goods onto a distributed set of software agents that can grow 
linearly with demand, all of whom are focused on achieving maximum utilisation for 
their speciﬁc bundle requirement. 
Uniquely, we have developed a meaningful comparison of both approaches with a view 
to answering the question “what is the right technique for solving my resource allo­
cation problem” and we have conducted empirical experiments with both approaches 
using identical, repeatable test data.. 
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This ensures that resources are maximised to the fullest extent possible, with good ef­
ﬁciency, revenue and in a predicable time frame . Combinatorial solutions will always 
produce a Pareto efﬁcient option and maximise revenue for the sellers of goods, but 
their run times vary unpredictably based on both the algorithm used and the complexity 
structure of the problem, and they often sacriﬁce resource utilisation. 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
We have begun with a review of the problem, rationale and overview of the contribu­
tion that this work provides. The work is then placed in perspective in Chapter 2 (page 
32), considering both the Computer Science (Section 2.1, page 33) and the Economics 
(Section 2.2, page 50) view. Discussion as to what the key economic properties for 
a distributed market might be continues in Chapter 3 (page 55), including the intro­
duction of the game theory concepts of “Dominant Strategy”, “Nash Equilibrium”, 
“Satisﬁcing” and “Incentive Compatibility”. Finally we examine Social Welfare, a 
concept which can be applied to aid in decision making between multiple points on a 
Pareto optimal plane. 
We then begin to look at our implementations. Brickworld, described in Section 3.4 
(page 66) was the initial prototype, followed by the MDA system (which is used for 
most of our computation) and an experiment running MDA in the AgentScape envi­
ronment. Although the Brickworld implementation fell short of our initial ambitions 
it provided a useful learning experience for the later MDA development enabling us 
to focus on speciﬁc areas of functionality (for example resale of surplus goods and 
adoption of ZI+ trading strategy, identiﬁed in Section 2.1.6, page 49). 
Chapter 4 (page 74) examines the Multiple Distributed Auction system in detail, set­
ting out the component parts (oracle, traders, auctions), the roles and responsibilities 
for each and gives examples to demonstrate how traders complete purchases of goods 
to form bundles. MDA was built using the Repast simulator and the JASA auction 
libraries and runs on a single machine using a stepwise approach to managing all the 
trader agents. It is therefore not fully synchronous and we were keen to understand 
what would happen if we ran the system in such a scenario. We re-factored MDA 
using the AgentScape framework, discussed in Section 4.6 (page 85) but found that 
the addition of a distributed platform meant that the large quantity of messages being 
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passed between Traders caused an enormously large overhead and severely impacted 
performance. In this section we identify a number of mechanisms to further improve 
MDA in a fully synchronous environment and the rationale for doing so. 
Chapter 5 (page 100) looks at the problem of comparing the centralised (CASS) and a 
decentralised (MDA) systems and examines our approach to ensuring consistent inputs 
and test environments which enable a valid comparison. Importantly, we have iden­
tiﬁed a number of factors for comparison: hardness, time, ﬁnancial, completion and 
satisfaction and we outline those in detail. We consider what tests are appropriate and 
the source of the test data (which comes from the Combinatorial Auction Test Suite). 
To complete these experiments, we ran over 2000 test instances, each taking up to 2 
hours and from the raw data we draw some conclusions in Chapter 6 (page 108). The 
original author of the test data we use, Kevin Leyton-Brown, published run-time and 
solution values for all datasets using the “CASS” algorithm which he developed, but 
also the “CPLEX” solver, and initially we are able to draw performance comparisons 
of the four sets of experiments (MDA, our CASS, KLB’s CASS, KLB’s CPLEX) and 
look at the results in terms of runtime order of magnitude. Following on from the 
runtime experiments we examine each dataset for each of our key attributes: hardness, 
ﬁnancial, completion and satisfaction. 
We conclude that a distributed market provides an approach for solving more difﬁcult 
problems, such as the job shop scheduling task simulated in our Scheduling distribu­
tion, which ensures that resources are maximised to the fullest extent possible, with 
good efﬁciency, revenue and in a predicable time frame. Combinatorial solutions will 
always produce a Pareto efﬁcient option and maximise revenue for the sellers of goods, 
but their run times vary unpredictably based on both the algorithm used and the com­
plexity structure of the problem, and they often sacriﬁce resource utilisation. 
Having concluded the experimentation, in Chapter 8 (page 149) we return to the 
debate—which resource allocation technique is best, centralised or decentralised—and 
draw conclusions? We know from the literature that many problems can be resolved 
optimally using centralised approaches alone and some would say there is no call for 
decentralised ones given the problems of ensuring an optimal solution. 
In Chapter 9 (page 155) we look to the future and consider a number of scenarios 
in which not only the technology behind distributed resource scheduling but also the 
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knowledge of when to use it will be of beneﬁt. We also examine a number of improve­
ments for our MDA system that we feel would improve its robustness and usefulness 
in further work. 
This thesis shows, uniquely through empirical analysis, that distributed resource 
allocation systems work and that whilst there are trade offs, most notably with 
regards the ﬁscal performance of the market, there are signiﬁcant gains to be 
had, over centralised systems, in improved resource utilisation, throughput, pre­
dictable execution time and better social welfare. 
Why would we want to make those trade offs? Firstly, “best technique” is a term that 
will be appropriate only for a speciﬁc set of circumstances and whilst this is a Com­
puter Science thesis and therefore math related concepts such as maximising revenue 
might be important for some scenarios, it is important to bear in mind as we begin the 
journey that it is the wider economic properties of the markets and their participants 
which drive the need for resources. It is only within the context of human economic 
behaviour across distributed systems that we can truly understand the challenges that 
Computer Science looks to provide solutions for. 
1.5 Related Publications 
The following list includes all papers published by the author which are related to this 
dissertation. In each case my contribution to the paper is stated in accordance with 
regulation 16.1 subsection 3.v of the University of Bath regulations. 
[GOT+08] Engineering Large-scale Distributed Auctions (Short Paper) Gradwell, 
P.; Oey, M. A.; Timmer, R. J.; Brazier, F. M. T. and Padget, J. Proceedings of 
the Seventh Int. Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 
(AAMAS), ACM 2008 
We believed that the functional characteristics of market-based solutions are 
typically best observed through the medium of simulation, data-gathering and 
subsequent visualisation. We previously developed a simulation of multiple dis­
tributed auctions to handle resource allocation (in fact, bundles of unspeciﬁed 
goods) and in this paper we wanted to deploy an equivalent system as a dis­
29

tributed application. We worked with the AgentScape platform and colleagues 
in the AgentScape development team at VU University, Amsterdam. 
There are two notable problems with the simulation-ﬁrst, application-second ap­
proach: (i) the simulation cannot reasonably take account of network effects, and 
(ii) how to recreate in a distributed application the characteristics demonstrated 
by the mechanism in the simulation. We describe: (i) the refactoring employed 
in the process of transforming a uni-processor lock-step simulation into a mul­
tiprocessor asynchronous system, (ii) some preliminary performance indicators, 
and (iii) some reﬂections on our experience which may be useful in building 
MAS in general. 
The AgentScape reimplementation work described in the paper was completed 
by Michel Oey, Reinier Timmer and myself. My focus was on the MDA design 
and implementation whilst Michel and Renier focused on replacing the Repast 
engine with the AgentScape framework. The paper was jointly written under the 
supervision of Francis Brazier and Julian Padget. 
[GP07] A comparison of distributed and centralised agent based bundling sys­
tems Gradwell, P. and Padget, J. ICEC ’07: Proceedings of the ninth interna­
tional conference on Electronic commerce, ACM Press, 2007, pages 25-34 
In our ICEC paper we argued that the use of trading agents to manage the alloca­
tion and bundling of resources across computer networks is well established and 
literature to date has focused on a variety of auction and distributed market type 
mechanisms that use economic principles to determine the ”best” allocation. 
Having conducted an early empirical analysis of a number of solver algorithms, 
principally the Centralised Combinatorial Auction Solver (CASS), we had shown 
that those using bounded search techniques are typically able to solve a majority 
of cases in linear time, while there remain a number of outlier cases that are 
computationally problematic. In contrast, distributed mechanisms are intrinsi­
cally less than optimal for sellers, but demonstrate signiﬁcantly less variance in 
computation time. 
A proper understanding of the different performance properties and suitability 
of the different techniques is necessary in order to make an informed choice 
between a distributed market and a centralised auction. Consequently, we have 
completed an empirical evaluation of CASS, a centralised mechanism, against 
two distributed mechanisms: (i) Multiple Distributed Auctions (MDAs) and (ii) 
Quote Driven Markets (QDMs). Uniquely, we carry out simulations of all three 
mechanisms using a common dataset, generated by the Combinatorial Auction 
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Test Suite (CATS), providing a real basis for comparison. The main results 
presented are that distributed mechanisms deliver (i) increases in the number of 
items traded (ii) a greater proportion of bidder requirements being satisﬁed, but 
(iii) potentially less optimal bundle solutions and (iv) consistent run times with 
low overall variance when compared with centralised algorithms. 
This paper contained the ﬁrst results from our CASS and centralised MDA ex­
periments and later versions of these experiments form the bulk of results pre­
sented in this thesis. 
The work described in the paper was completed by myself and the paper was 
edited by Julian Padget. 
[GP05] Markets vs auctions: Approaches to distributed combinatorial resource 
scheduling Gradwell, P. and Padget, J. In journal “Multiagent and Grid Sys­
tems”, 2005, 251-262 
In this initial paper we introduced the concept of Grid computations and argued 
that they will be enabled by participants trading resources in order to construct 
bundles of goods or services that constitute experiments in science, engineering 
and now emerging, social sciences. A combinatorial auction (CA) is a natural 
choice for optimal resource allocation, but the space and time dimensions that 
characterise a Grid would appear to indicate they are incompatible. This paper 
proposes that an analogue of a physical commodities market seems more appro­
priate and that there is a class of bundling problem whose complexity properties 
appear to make the utilisation of a CA impractical. 
We describe our simulation environment, BrickWorld, which comprises a dis­
tributed tier of ”TraderAgents” and multiple distributed single item auctions 
(MDAs). The issues associated with the complexity of bundling are evaluated, 
in particular those arising when attempting to provide useful combinations of 
items in situations when the multi-dimensionality of the bundle would make it 
impractical to ﬁnish the NP-complete optimisation successfully in the soft real-
time setting that is the Grid. 
Finally, the evaluation strategy presented helps demonstrate that for small bundling 
problems, a single CA continues to provide a high level of performance, but as 
the complexity level of the problem increases and the problem becomes dis­
tributed a system of MDAs may prove more effective. 
The work described in the paper was completed by myself and the paper was 
edited by Julian Padget. 
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Chapter 2 
Review of Literature 
Computational markets and associated topics are studied and discussed across both the 
Computer Science and Economics literature and this thesis draws comparisons across 
that range, speciﬁcally evaluating the problem in light of both Computer Science ­
Grids, Agents, Distributed Computing and Resource Management and Economics ­
Pareto Efﬁciency, Social Choice, Social Welfare and Market Based Control. Multi-
Agent Resource Allocation (MARA) is one name given to research which spans the 
work of Computer Sciences’ Intelligent Agents and the Economics topics of mecha­
nism design and game theory. In a comprehensive survey paper on the subject [CDE+06], 
Chevaleyre et. al. suggest that Computer scientists often take the procedural view 
“how do we ﬁnd an allocation?”, whilst economists are more likely to concentrate on 
the qualitative “what makes a good allocation?”. 
The literature is wide ranging and in order to understand the state of the art in resource 
allocation and markets we need to consider work on topics including: (i) Preferences, 
(ii) Social Welfare, (iii) Complexity, (iv) Negotiation (v) Algorithm Design, (vi) Mech­
anism Design, (vii) Implementation (viii) Simulation and Experimentation and (ix) the 
interplay of theory and applications. 
In this review we found that there is a large body of work which describes both the 
design and attempted implementations of market simulations, usually with a speciﬁc 
focus. Frustratingly, there is little concrete discussion as to how these simulations 
were assembled, or what their actual performance was and therefore it is subsequently 
impossible to build comparisons or benchmarks of either their system or ours. 
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Secondly, authors appear to fall into one of two camps, those for centralised markets 
and those for decentralise and there does not appear to be a body of work devoted to 
comparing and contrasting the two viewpoints, which is a void we seek to address in 
this thesis. 
2.1 The Computer Science View 
It is important to understand the current state of the art so that this thesis may be placed 
in context and the gaps in research identiﬁed. Taking the Computer Science perspec­
tive, we have chosen to group the literature into (i) work done on market simulations, 
(ii) discussions on centralised and (iii) decentralised approaches to resource manage­
ment, (iv) market design and (v) the Trading Agent Competition; this last because it 
serves to illustrate a number of plausible solutions for distributed resource allocation. 
Empirical modelling of markets has proven to be a difﬁcult task, due to the complexity 
of deﬁning the rules for the market, the number of parties involved and the volume 
of data and trading that occurs. Attempting controlled scientiﬁc experiments in these 
areas is very challenging and Market Simulation literature shows us that a number of 
different approaches have been taken. 
Within the market modelling community there is a divide between the centralised and 
decentralised proponents. The former is characterised by an optimal, but NP-Hard 
solution whilst the latter offers a more pragmatic approach with useful (although not 
optimal) results in linear time. It is necessary for us to understand the algorithmic state 
of the art in both sectors so that we can demonstrate how our system compares. 
Finally, we consider the Trading Agent Competition (TAC) as it has provided the major 
forum for empirical research into agent and market strategies. 
2.1.1 Distributed Market Simulation Engines 
Apart from TAC and its associated toolkits there are few documented simulations of 
distributed market systems. Nimrod [ASGH95], a tool for building a specialised para­
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metric modelling system using distributed workstations is one such system that incor­
porates a distributed scheduling component. The system is interesting in that it can 
manage the scheduling of individual experiments to idle computers in a local area net­
work. The Nimrod scheduler has been used for modelling power grids, drug design 
and computer networks. However, Nimrod has not been subjected to any performance 
comparisons or analysis of the relative beneﬁts of the system when compared to others. 
Looking speciﬁcally for software agent driven approaches we are interested in Cao’s 
explanation of his PhD thesis, an Agent-based Resource Management System for grid 
computing (ARMS) in [CJS+02b, CKN01]. ARMS follows the traditional pattern of 
using agents to provide service advertisement and discovery for application scheduling 
on the Grid. One of the interesting aspects of Cao’s work is the use of a toolkit called 
“PACE” [NKP+00, CJS+02a]. The PACE environment provides a quantitatively based 
evaluation of a distributed systems performance but it is focused on the evaluation of 
parallel systems and supercomputers (e.g. those using high-speed message-passing­
interfaces for communication). Cao’s simulation was completed on a cluster of nine 
multi-processor Sun Ultra 1 workstations. The interesting highlight of this work is that 
optimal run time performance appears to be obtained at approximately 16 processors, 
although the reason for this is not discussed in detail. At a superﬁcial level, this is 
similar to our experiences with the AgentScape Platform [GOT+08]. 
2.1.2 Centralised Approaches 
The objective of a resource allocation procedure is either (i) to ﬁnd an allocation that 
is feasible (e.g. to ﬁnd any allocation of tasks to production units such that all tasks 
will be completed in time) or (ii) to ﬁnd an allocation that is optimal. 
As a good introduction Biswas describes the detail of an iterative Dutch combinatorial 
auction in [BN05]. This paper gives some useful background on how CAs may be 
modelled as a weighted set-packing problem and uses generalised Vickrey auctions, 
as described in [CSS05, Ch.1], to derive worst-case bounds for the algorithms. This 
paper is helpful in shaping our understanding of the structure of a CA and its worst-
case performance. 
Like other authors in papers such as [SCG07], Biswas supports the notion that the 
primary measure of agent performance should be total proﬁt over a simulated period 
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of activity. This is an important theme we develop later when considering how to 
measure our distributed markets. 
Sandholm has authored a great many papers on different aspects of centralised ap­
proaches to scheduling and resource allocation problems and much of his research 
builds on real world experience gained through CombineNet, a company founded to 
exploit his various algorithmic patents. Unfortunately the commercialisation of his 
work has meant that there is little detail of its practical applications. However, in his 
keynote talk at the International Conference on Electronic Commerce in 2007 [San07] 
he outlined how they have developed a new paradigm called “expressive commerce” 
and applied it to industrial procurement. The concept is that they capture a huge 
amount of heuristic information from buyers and sellers so that buy and sell require­
ments are much more expressively deﬁned using a wide range of quantitative factors 
than in previous attempts. Buy and sell requirements are algorithmically cleared using 
a centralised combinatorial auction—but in reasonable time frames, with qualitative 
factors used to prune the results. A number of developments have lead to this point. 
Early work on the CABOB algorithm [SSGL01, SSGL05] demonstrated a mechanism 
for applying pruning heuristics to give an algorithm which could solve most prob­
lems in polynomial time. Subsequently Sandholm published [San02] an “Algorithm 
for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions” which reﬁned the work 
by: (i) provably ﬁnding the optimal solution, (ii) searching a graph whilst completely 
avoiding loops and redundant generation of vertices’s, and (iii) took advantage of the 
sparseness of bids by focusing on tree-segments which are most likely to be relevant. 
These strategies meant that they produced an algorithm with provably polynomial 
run times that is arguably still the pre-eminent approach to solving resource alloca­
tion problems through a centralised decision process. However, since the system is 
commercialised we have been unable to perform any quantitative comparisons of our 
work against it, although others have demonstrated algorithms which are both prov­
ably optimal and which operate within a bound of optimality, such as Dang [DJ03] 
who presented new clearing algorithms for multi-unit single-item and multi-unit com­
binatorial auctions with piecewise linear demand/supply functions. Following a com­
plexity analysis of the algorithms (where the complexity function of the algorithm is 
O(n − (K + 1)n)) where K is the upper bound on the number of segments of price 
available) the authors were able to prove that they are guaranteed to ﬁnd the optimal 
allocation. 
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Finally, Sandholm has always taken the view, reiterated in [San02, San06] that the 
approach of compromising optimality to achieve a polynomial time solution is futile 
because one may end up with worst-case approximations and in many situations those 
would represent disastrous outcomes for the participators in the market (for example, 
a Government might auction radio spectrum at a massive discount if they did not prov­
ably have the optimal outcome, thus denying tax payers of signiﬁcant revenue streams 
and leaving the door open for allegations of corruption and incompetence). However, 
we would argue that whilst there are some scenarios where this is indeed the case, 
there are others for which the need to determine a solution to a complicated problem 
will quickly outweigh the beneﬁts of achieving the optimal solution some time in the 
future. 
Our view is echoed in work by Wolski, Plank et al [WPBB01] in their paper “Analyz­
ing Market-Based Resource Allocation Strategies for the Computational Grid” where 
they compare market strategies in terms of price stability, market equilibrium, con­
sumer efﬁciency and producer efﬁciency and ﬁnd that using a commodities market for 
controlling Grid resources gives greater price stability, market equilibrium, consumer 
efﬁciency and producer efﬁciency than previous auction based approaches. They im­
plement a number of simulations using the following constraints, which differentiate 
their work from our MDA simulations: [WPBB01] 
1. All entities except the market-maker act individually in their respective self-
interests. 
2. Producers consider long-term proﬁt and past performance when deciding to sell. 
3. Consumers are given periodic budget replenishment and spend opportunistically. 
4. Consumers introduce workloads in bulk at the beginning of each simulated day 
and randomly throughout the day. 
Having implemented the theoretical work of Smale [Sma76] as well as their own 
“Bank of G” strategy they found that an auction was inferior for resource allocation for 
all their simulations and that a commodities market offered better price stability and 
equilibrium as well as increased resource utilisation (for example, the average percent­
age of time that a CPU resource on the grid is occupied is higher under the distributed 
mechanism). Whilst the constraints they have applied to the simulation make the work 
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different to MDA, it is useful to note that others have formed similar conclusions to us 
with regards the best way to conduct distributed resource allocation. 
Parkes [Par03] has also surveyed the problem of distributed bundling and how it could 
be achieved with a multi-agent system, suggesting that the best way forward is to tackle 
the combinatorial complexity problem by distributing the processing load imposed by 
the issue across a network of agents. Rather than attempting to perfect a solution to the 
full NP-complete problem, the network solution would provide as good an approxima­
tion as could be developed in the amount of time available for completing the search 
of the problem space, in effect an anytime approach, and utilising that outcome would 
give the user a “best-efforts” allocation of resources which would have greater utility 
for them than no allocation at all. 
2.1.3 Rational Choice and Market Design 
Our work uses software agents, which are computer programs that emulate partici­
pants in a trading market with objectives to buy and sell bundles of goods. In order 
to complete these trades, the agents must make decisions, hold preferences and fol­
low a strategy to ensure that they complete sufﬁcient trades at the right price so that 
they successfully deliver complete bundles. The strategic behaviour of the software is 
modelled on human, social and economic behaviours and the development of formal 
models of this behaviour is called Rational Choice theory. 
If Rational Choice theory is the modelling and development of the Agents, then “Mar­
ket Design” or “Mechanism Design” is describing research into the design of market 
strategies and the preference elicitation of participants in those markets. Research in 
these two areas of work provides the foundation for the different mechanisms we con­
sider in this thesis. 
Herbert Simon introduces the concept of rational choice in his paper on Satisﬁcing 
[Sim55] and Shneidman and Parkes have co-authored a number of papers [SP03, SP04] 
discussing rational choice in the context of mechanism design in networks of peer to 
peer devices. Rational choice is the basis of fair decision making and it is an issue that 
occurs in theoretical economics, practical market design and grid resource scheduling. 
Shneidman and Parkes’ concern is that agents in a peer to peer trading network are not 
likely to act rationally (they may gain some advantage by not doing so) and therefore 
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we need to incentivise them to follow protocols that provide the system as a whole with 
good performance. In [SP03] they put forward a number of principles from Mechanism 
Design as a methodology to use when designing the protocols. 
The concept of nudge economics is related, and the subject became popular with the 
publication in April 2008 of a book “Nudge” [TS08] by Richard Thaler and Cass 
Sunstein. The concept behind Nudge Economics is that humans are not inherently ra­
tional beings and sometimes need a little guidance—gentle nudges—in order to make 
the best choices in a given situation or behave in the most appropriate way. From 
an economics standpoint what they say about human nature is controversial because 
this brand of economic thinking sometimes referred to as “behavioural” or “new” 
economics goes against more neoclassical economics and the economic man theory 
which claims that individuals always act rationally. It is our view that humans do make 
rational decisions (although occasionally they make a rational decision about an irra­
tional subject) and that therefore, because software agents might not, it is important 
that our market encourages (or nudges) rational behaviour. 
In the context of future Grid network technology a rational choice is one of the prob­
lems faced in developing efﬁcient mechanisms for provisioning services to clients by 
a scalable and dynamic resource allocation (matching) mechanism. The CATNETS 
project considered this in their evaluation of the Catallaxy paradigm for decentralised 
operation of dynamic application networks. Catallactics is the science behind self­
organising free market systems and the way in which there is an exchange of values 
and price negotiation and a catallaxy is a self-organising market mechanism originally 
described by Friedrich August von Hayek [vH76]. A catallaxy differs from a tradi­
tional “economy” in that the agents in the system will not have shared goals. Eymann 
et al [ERS+05] outlined the Catallactic approach to resource allocation: Firstly, a ser­
vice market in which complex services are traded on the basis of price and availability, 
whilst secondly, there is an allocation layer which assigns the purchased resources to 
speciﬁc jobs. The paper provides a helpful description of other work undertaken in the 
area of distributed markets, but the major contribution is to introduce this concept of a 
Catallaxy into Grid computing. 
The different treatments of rational choice across computational economics show that 
in designing markets one needs to be careful to ensure that we do not encourage nega­
tive behaviour when building our own markets. 
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2.1.4 Implementation of Auctions and Markets 
We have discussed previously that it is difﬁcult to build empirical simulations of mar­
kets and the following papers provide examples of previous implementations, identi­
fying some of the pitfalls and successes for us to be aware of. In addition, we have 
identiﬁed a number of desirable properties for our MDA market: (i) Mobility of agents 
and (ii) fair and stable pricing, and we can look to these example implementations and 
analytic tools to discover best practise. 
The SPAWN system [WHH+92] is the earliest known market-based computational 
system which utilised idle computing resources in a distributed network of computers 
that showed that high communication overheads lead to unstable market pricing, a 
scenario we should seek to avoid. The objective was to increase utilisation of computer 
processors, though a set of sealed-bid, second-price auctions but the project discovered 
that whilst their mechanism scaled there were price ﬂuctuations across the markets as 
the number of participants grew, due to the limited communication of information 
between SPAWN systems, which were conﬁgured only to talk to their neighbour and 
not in a full mesh. The authors recommend that this be investigated in further work 
and indeed this is something we report on later as we have been able to investigate 
the impact of communication between a large number of trading agents in our MDA-
AgentScape work. SPAWN identiﬁed two further deﬁciencies: (i) It existed as a user-
space C application and was therefore unable to offer security to the host operating 
system or the ability for processes to migrate between machines, (ii) it did not provide 
applications with robust recovery in the event of failure (e.g. due to machine failure or 
early termination of jobs due to insufﬁcient resources). 
Bredin tackled the problem of mobility [BKR98]—where agents move from one ma­
chine to another—and described a system in which mobile agents purchase resource 
access rights from host machines thereby establishing a market for computational re­
sources. The use of a market mechanism allowed precise communication about the 
quantitative utilisation of resources which gives a metric to the agents allowing them to 
distribute themselves evenly throughout the network. Through simulation they showed 
that it was possible for resource suppliers to react to agent demand and calculate an 
optimal pricing strategy and hence a proﬁtable allocation. Similarly, agents were able 
to plan their expenditure and maximise their utility. 
Chaun and Culler introduced [CC02] the concept of a performance analysis for market­
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based batched scheduling of jobs on grids using clusters of commodity work stations 
in 2002. Their modelling relied on “user-centric” performance metrics as their basis 
for system evaluation with each user having a utility function which measured value 
delivered as a function of execution time. Chaun and Culler deﬁne their utility function 
using two methods. Firstly, they ask all users to assign a utility value to each job using 
a common medium of expression (they use currency, which is convenient for a market 
based system). Secondly, they assume that a valuation is a piecewise-linear function 
which will decay linearly over time after the predicted completion time has passed (i.e.: 
the users value remains constant until the amount of time that their job would have 
taken to complete on dedicated resources has passed). The sum of these two functions 
then deﬁnes the user’s utility and is used as part of an aggregate utility calculation to 
quantify overall value delivered to end users. Through the use of modiﬁed scheduling 
software which used end-user value as their utility function Chaun and Culler were 
able to observe performance improvements of 2-5x for sequential workloads and up to 
14x for highly parallel workloads. Their work shows us that understanding end-user 
utility enables us to make more informed resource allocation decisions and increase 
throughput in our market mechanisms. 
There are two further papers of note covering this topic which add weight to the notion 
that empirical analysis of markets is feasible. Firstly, RECO: “Representation and 
Evaluation of Conﬁgurable Offers” [BKL03] describes a mechanism for representing 
bids using propositional logic and then a decision support tool helping the buyer to 
procure an optimal conﬁguration for a single good. Its limitation appears to be that it is 
restricted to the context of one buyer and multiple sellers, for a single good. Secondly, 
Rachel Bourne’s 2003 paper [BBP] described the need for intermediaries in continuous 
markets. This provided the inspiration for our Quote Driven Market (QDM) model and 
our subsequent empirical analysis of the QDM. 
The work done by Bredin, Chaun and Culler and Bourne all give us a strong basis for 
our assertion that an empirical approach to resource allocation with the objective of 
producing a “statisﬁcing” outcome is a viable and tested objective. 
Our distributed market was initially implemented both in the Repast [NCV06] simu­
lation engine and subsequently in AgentScape [OB06], a distributed agent simulation 
environment. Repast is a free and open source agent-based modelling toolkit that offers 
users the ability to create their agents as independent Java objects which will then ex­
ecute for a number of steps until completion. We used Repast as it provided an easy to 
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use simulation environment and allowed detailed step by step analysis and debugging 
of our distributed market system. AgentScape is a full agent platform, providing the 
kernel, security, mobility and message passing environment needed to excecute agents 
across a number of distributed nodes. Our implementation of a distributed auction was 
the ﬁrst for AgentScape and we discuss our refactoring of the Repast implementation 
into AgentScape in Section 4.6. There are alternative agent platforms which could 
have been used to support our development, including JADE [BPR99] and Cougaar 
[MT04]. Primarily we selected AgentScape for it’s truely distributed nature but practi­
cal factors, including existing relationships and availablity of technical support played 
guiding roles. We also found a number of indepth evaluations of different agent plat­
forms very useful, including work by Railsback [RLJ06] and an evaluation of the freely 
available java simulation libraries by Tobias [TH04], which highlighted the Repast en­
gine as a high performing environment, ideally matching our objectives for running 
simulations with large quantities of traders and auctions. Finally, a more recent survey 
by Nikolai [NM09] provides an updated (2009) overview of agent platforms. 
Security and Integrity in Markets 
Markets are susceptible to a number of attacks and interruptions, both malicious, such 
as false name bidding (impersonating other bidders) and unintentional, e.g. corruption 
of bid/shout messages during transmission between participants. In our MDA work, 
we have sought not to focus on security because this is an area that has been compre­
hensively researched and simply ensuring our markets are secure systems does not add 
useful beneﬁt to our comparison. However, it is helpful to know that in the event of 
production usage, we could implement the techniques considered below: 
Transactional Integrity: [FR95] Franklin and Reiter have designed a secure auction 
service, which is of merit because it provides a distributed platform for running 
sealed-bid auctions. The secure function of their market comes from the devel­
opment of a novel cryptographic technique that can ensure that (i) the bids of 
correct bidders are not revealed until after the bidding period has ended, (ii) the 
auction house collects payment for the winning bid (iii) losing bidders forfeit 
no money and (iv) only the winning bidder can collect the item they bid upon. 
However, they do not give much detail on their auction mechanism or its dis­
tributed properties and as a result this paper is only useful to state that such 
security mechanisms could be integrated if required. 
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Identiﬁcation of parties and protection against impersonation: In this early paper 
[SS99] from 1999 Stubblebine and Syverson considered the problem of imper­
sonation attacks on on-line auctions and the affect these have on fair negotiation. 
Using a process of notaries and a certiﬁed delivery service (but in this case there 
is no need to trust the auctioneer) they are able to present an on-line English 
auction in which bids are processed and the auction is cleared fairly. 
Secure Message Passing: If one was to consider developing a message passing sys­
tem, there are a number of plausible solutions for dealing with issues of message 
corruption, fraud, interception. There are three obvious approaches: (i) Lam-
port’s “Byzantine Generals” Paper [LSP82], (ii) Leader election style [PB99, 
RNSP97], and (iii) Chaining solutions [SP04, SP03]. 
The Byzantine Generals’ problem defends against Byzantine failure in which 
a component in the market would not only behave erronously, but also incon­
sistently. Fault tolerance in this scenario is ensured by duplicating their mes­
sages and ensuring that the different agents participating in the market execute 
an unanimous decision. 
In an agent based system a leader election is the process of designating a single 
agent as the organiser of a distributed task. The algorithm was invented for 
managing the control token in a token ring network, where all nodes need to 
communicate between themselves in order to decide which is the “leader”. The 
agents use a domain—speciﬁc algorithm to break the symmetry among identical 
nodes. 
Shneidman has done work on the rationality of self interested agents, which 
creates a potential problem of message passing: 
Imagine running an auction over a large peer to peer network. You 
are the auctioneer and have three directly connected neighbours. You 
send out an announcement advertising the auction and ask that it 
be globally propagated. You then sit back, expecting many bids, 
and are surprised when you only receive three bids one from each 
neighbour.[SP04] 
In this peer to peer scenario, Shneidman deﬁnes a mechanism where it is ben­
eﬁcial for the agents to pass the message onwards to their peers in such away 
that it continues to be passed from one agent to the next, until all agents have 
participated. The mechanism should be designed such that there is no gain from 
cheating and so that cheating can be detected where possible, with the use of 
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sanctions in the event that members do cheat. Parkes has developed this work 
[PS04] to ensure that messages are not corrupted in transmission by propos­
ing a message passing structure, in which each agent passes its bid to the next 
agent, along a chain (or tree), with the agent at each step determining the current 
winning bid by comparing the bid they receive with their own until the result 
reaches the seller. This mechanism also has the beneﬁt of linearly distributing 
the processing overhead of the allocation decision across multiple agents so that 
NP-Hard computations are replaced with a set of sorting functions, which miti­
gates one of the further problems seen with combinatorial auctions. 
2.1.5 Grid Resource Management 
The aim in Grid Resource Management is to examine how multi-agent systems may 
be used to develop a market place for the trading of computational grid resources such 
that grid scheduling is completed without the limitations of the top down approach 
(direct, centralised control, complete information, etc). 
Newly available cloud computing infrastructures, such as those by Amazon, are begin­
ning to make accessible huge amounts of computing power on a “just in time“ basis. 
However, the economic models surrounding these systems are static and uniform, with 
charging models that, for web-based cloud systems work on a price per unit per hour 
basis. Is there work being done to look at the linkage between pricing and resource 
availability? 
All grid scheduling systems work on the basis that the new task to be executed has 
to make itself known to a resource selector. In current systems, the resource selector 
acts as a gateway to the grid. It will select resources from a global directory (e.g. the 
Globus MetaDirectory Service[Pro]) and then allocate the job to one of the available 
grid nodes. Typically, job allocation is done in two stages. Firstly a job is allocated to 
a particular node on the grid and then within that node, the job will be scheduled onto 
a processor. 
Typically in grid scheduling literature the ﬁrst practise is called resource allocation 
and the second is job scheduling. Both approaches have been investigated in the litera­
ture, under the term “meta scheduling”, for example in the AppLeS project, discussed 
in [BW96] and [BW97]. AppLeS looked at “application-centric” scheduling, a con­
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cept born out of the needs of users of modern distributed Grids, where the use of 
fast networks to aggregate distributed CPU, memory, storage and data meant that a 
large meta-computer could be used, but equally, users were ﬁnding it difﬁcult to har­
ness that power because of conﬂicting end-user requirements. In the AppLeS system, 
each user of the cluster has an intelligent Application Level Scheduler (AppLeS) agent 
which implements an application speciﬁc schedule. This promotes the performance of 
the application by evaluating every resource allocation decision in terms of its impact 
on the application’s resource requirement. The AppLeS project is now ﬁnished, but 
Berman continued the research themes with the GrADS project [BCC+01] provided a 
Grid Application Development Software set, a set of software libraries to support the 
execution, monitoring and development of Grid aware applications. They developed a 
number of tools, including a simulator “MicroGrid” which allowed the emulation of a 
Grid computing environment. 
Buyya made a major contribution in his thesis [Buy02] by introducing economic tech­
niques, outlining the concept of a Grid Architecture for a Computational Economy 
(GRACE). This work also produced GridSim, a simulator for global Grid environ­
ments, Libra [SAL+04], an economy based job scheduling plug-in for GridBus and 
the GridBus project which fosters research on Grid management tools and applications 
of Grids in areas of e-Science and a taxonomy of market-based resource management 
systems [YB06] in which he comprehensively considers all of the available resource 
management systems for economy based Grid computing systems including the dis­
tributed, management control domain. His work helps us understand the deﬁciencies 
in the traditional models of grid resource management (which we seek to correct) that 
are best understood through public sector grid computing systems, which typically op­
erate on a zero settlement basis. Users give their resources for free and researchers 
connect across their networks to utilise them. Within a closed user-group, for example 
a research facility’s own “mini-grid” of computing resources, scheduling policies may 
differ but they are typically still managed by a system (e.g: Globus, GridBus) that exe­
cutes jobs on a ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-served basis or which prioritises jobs according to local 
circumstances. Consequently, availability of computational resources is systematically 
unpredictable and the various methods employed, outlined in Buyya’s description of 
Libra [SAL+04] (an economy based grid scheduler) such as ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-served, 
time slot, priority or availability-based scheduling of jobs on a grid cluster all operate 
in a top-down manner and require knowledge and direct control of all the jobs on the 
grid. 
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A system in which there are multiple entities all attempting to acquire part of one 
entity is always going to experience concurrency problems. According to [VD02], 
the meta scheduler architecture devised in the GrADS system [BCC+01] suffers from 
a deﬁciency in that if two jobs are submitted to the grid at the same time then they 
will both be processed without regard to whether the demand can be met. Leinberger 
et al., proposed a solution [LKK99] but observed that the approach is an inefﬁcient 
scheduling method for the type of computing infrastructure in which clusters have 
multiple types of independently allocatable resources such as shared memory, large 
disk farms and distinct I/O channels. Many schedulers, designed for use in single 
resource pool environments use a technique known as “back-ﬁlling” to select jobs from 
farther down the queue for immediate execution, resulting in a lower average response 
time for smaller jobs whilst guaranteeing a level of progress to larger jobs. However, 
back-ﬁlling is still subject to a phenomenon known as resource depletion when used 
in environment with multiple resource types because back-ﬁll methods typically use 
a greedy ﬁrst-ﬁt criteria in job selection. This can result in a scenario of jobs that 
have consecutive high levels of requirement for speciﬁc resources, leaving other types 
of resource under-utilised. The essence of Leinberger et al’s argument [LKK99] is 
that by developing the back-ﬁlling algorithm so that it becomes aware of the multiple 
different pools of resources, such that it keeps their utilisation balanced then it is likely 
that more jobs will ﬁt into the system overall as there will be no need to delay jobs 
if a speciﬁc resource pool is over-utilised. Leinberger showed that as the number of 
resource pools increased their “back-ﬁlled-balanced” heuristic maintained signiﬁcant 
performance gains (in general outperforming by up to 50%) over a simple back-ﬁlling 
approach. 
This shows us that when building a resource allocation model for distributed markets, 
which by their nature contain a number of pools of different resources, it will be impor­
tant for us to ensure that all of the pools are as equally balanced as possible to mitigate 
against uneven resource demands. This collision problem, of goods potentially being 
sold twice, remains a characteristic of a trading based resource allocation system. A 
trader might deliberately oversell or under-price. The problem of double-booking at 
the resource allocation level should be dealt with by market forces, that is Traders 
should be able to oversell, but, if they do so and their clients suffer they will rate the 
trader badly and therefore the trader would not do so well next time, as happens with 
airline seat reservations. 
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2.1.6 Methods for distributed resource allocation 
When faced with a speciﬁc allocation problem it is helpful to be able to determine the 
most appropriate method to be used in order to compute the optimal allocation. Is a 
ﬁnancially driven auction the best choice or should a trading market be used? Dis­
tributed resource allocation is not a problem limited to grid computing networks and 
there is much literature on the subject outside the Grid computing sphere particularly 
with respect to distributed algorithms. 
In their seminal 1980’s paper, “A Micro-economic Approach to Optimal Resource 
Allocation in Distributed Computer Systems” Kurose and Simha [KS89] consider the 
beneﬁts of using an economy-based decentralised algorithm for ﬁle system allocation. 
Kurose and Simha argue that there are two possible classes of resource allocation 
mechanisms: price-directed and resource-directed. Many existing resource allocations 
operate using a resource-directed approach. Whilst, in a closed and trusted system this 
may work effectively, it is not suitable for an open competitive environment. This is 
because, when a system is dependent on all parties developing a common valuation 
scale all valuations rely on trust and cooperation between all the participants seeking 
resources. This is in contrast to ﬁnance-based systems which can perhaps be more 
easily measured and are more widely understood. 
Price is the ideal valuation function for this setting for two reasons: (i) price can ul­
timately be seen as a projection function from a multi-dimensional vector of “values” 
— both quantitative and qualitative — to a single value and (ii) secondly, in a free 
market, over the longer term the price, cost and the marginal value that a user assigns 
to a good will all converge as competition drives down price and makes a number of 
good alternatives available. 
Work on similar problems in other related areas (parallel computing, ﬁle system schedul­
ing, etc.) [ASGH95, FBK96, SH80] typically seems to focus on a simpliﬁed environ­
mental model. A key weakness is that it lacks the free market or “real world” aggres­
siveness and competition which a monetary based allocation environment (auction, 
trading ﬂoor, etc.) should seek to emulate. 
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Trading Agent Competition 
The Trading Agent Competition succeeds in illustrating the essence of the distributed 
resource allocation problem as it deals with distributed resource bundling through auc­
tions. The competition has run in various guises since 2002 and has provided a fo­
rum for the development and discussion of many trading agent scenarios. There are 
presently three games: 
TAC Classic: The Classic game is a “travel agent” type scenario based on a complex 
procurement requirement of ﬂights, hotels and entertainment events. 
TAC SCM: The Supply Chain Management game is a Personal Computer (PC) man­
ufacturer scenario based upon the sourcing of components, manufacturing of 
PCs and sales to customers. 
TAC Market Design: The Market Design game (or CAT) is a reverse of the classic 
game. The software trading agents are created by the organisers of the competi­
tion, and entrants compete by deﬁning rules for matching buyers and sellers and 
setting commission fees for providing this service. Entrants succeed by attract­
ing buyers, sellers and making proﬁts. 
The classic Trading-Agent Competition (TAC Classic) and the supply chain scenario 
(TAC SCM) were motivated by the desire to develop automated strategies for buyer and 
seller software agents in marketplaces. The trading rules or interaction mechanisms are 
ﬁxed by the TAC Classic/TAC SCM organisers, and competition entrants compete with 
one another by creating agents that seek to trade under these ﬁxed rules. As mentioned, 
CAT is the opposite game. 
In addition, TAGA [ZFD+03b, ZFD+03a] is a redevelopment of TAC by the Agent lab 
at UMBC and provided the initial inspiration for our MDA system. The key advance 
of TAGA over TAC was that the TAGA team opened up the TAC interface and made 
it a distributed agent based system which uses web services for communication. 
TAC provides useful lessons in risk management because the travel agents must buy 
the various components: hotels, ﬂights and entertainment in separate auctions using 
separate strategies for each. This creates the risk that they may for example acquire 
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a hotel, but not the corresponding ﬂight, in which case the agent will fail. Signiﬁ­
cant work has been done on various strategies to cope with this uncertainty with the 
SouthamptonTAC [HJ02] agent achieving the highest mean score and lowest standard 
deviation in the Second International Trading Agent Competition (across 600 games). 
In that paper the authors highlight those strengths which they perceive to have been 
key. In the TAC competition, users purchase sets of ﬂights, hotels and entertainment 
activities and due to the uncertainty and unpredictability of resource availability, there 
is no optimal strategy appropriate for all situations. For this reason, the Southamp­
tonTAC agent works in “rounds” and re-calibrates the optimal distribution of goods 
to customers for each round. It uses learning techniques to determine subsequent bid­
ding actions and continues in a loop until all the rounds have been completed. One 
of the interesting factors in the TAC competition was the approach to risk adopted by 
the various agents. The authors found that risk-seeking agents would buy lots of ﬂight 
tickets early on and rarely changed their customers travel plans, which then meant that 
they performed badly when prices of subsequent activities (e.g. hotels) were high. In 
contrast, risk-averse agents do not bid, but are similarly unable to meet their customers 
travel plan requirements. 
SouthamptonTAC is broadly risk adverse and but can adapt its behaviour to take more 
risks when it ﬁnds that games are not competitive and prices are ﬂuctuating too much. 
The key point from this learning is that when dealing in an agent-driven market the 
authors argue that it is not feasible for the agent to have a single strategy and that they 
must adapt through the life of the market. 
TAC-SCM has also provided useful learning outcomes. Ketter et al [KCG+07b] present 
a predictive empirical model for pricing and resource allocation decisions. They ar­
gue that by improving the price prediction system we can build better decision sup­
port systems which act rationally on behalf of their users and their approach was 
based around a learning approach from previous work using a Markov prediction 
process[KCG+07a], predicting market prices and price trends and estimating the prob­
ability of receiving an order for a given offer price. This work, as demonstrated by its 
effectiveness in the TAC-SCM games, is helpful to us in determining potential bidding 
strategies. 
One of the problems with empirical experiments in agent communities is that of eval­
uating them. Market simulations, like the real-world are typically highly complex, 
variable and traders frequently have incomplete information. This gives rise to a very 
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large potential set of strategies and market conditions, hence making empirical anal­
ysis very difﬁcult. In [SCG07] Sodomka, Collins and Gini propose a mechanism for 
improving the statistical analysis of market simulations by controlling their complex­
ity and allowing simulations to be run with a number of controlled variables. One of 
the beneﬁts of the TAC-SCM project is that all the different participant’s implemen­
tations are made available and so it has been possible to re-run the experiments under 
controlled conditions. From this work they showed that they could perform statistical 
signiﬁcance testing with fewer games than previously possible and the additional mar­
ket control also enabled them to look at interactions in the game which previously had 
been masked by variability and noise in the markets. 
The team at Southampton have also been investigating a number of different bidding 
strategies in order to support their work in the various TAC projects and Anthony also 
looked at online auctions [AHDJ01, AJ03] focusing on how to make an agent which 
could participate in multiple auctions making purchases on behalf of a consumer. Sim­
ilarly to Sodomka, this paper discusses how they ran their agent in a simulated envi­
ronment and gave an empirical evaluation of its performance. 
Zero Intelligence Trading 
Most of the work in TAC Classic and TAC SCM focuses on having intelligence in 
the traders who are performing the buying and selling of resources. However, in his 
1997 technical report [Cli97, CB98], Dave Cliff develops the concept of “Zero Intel­
ligence Agents”, initially introduced by Gode and Sunder. The ZI Agent is one that 
acts randomly within a structured market and Cliff uniquely demonstrated that average 
transaction prices of ZI traders can vary signiﬁcantly from the theoretical equilibrium 
level when supply and demand are asymmetric, and that the degree of difference from 
equilibrium is predictable from a priori statistical analysis. Cliff follows by introduc­
ing “Zero-Intelligence-Plus” agents, whose performance is signiﬁcantly closer to that 
of humans than simple ZI traders could achieve. 
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2.2 Economics view 
We need to draw from the economics literature on themes such as Pareto Efﬁciency, 
Social Choice, Social Welfare and Market Based Control to fully understand the be­
havioural foundations of computational markets and to avoid reinventing the wheel. 
These themes identify both important behaviours that we should seek to encourage in 
our markets and justiﬁcations for those less desirable behaviours that we may observe. 
By brieﬂy understanding the origins of a few pure economic concepts we can have a 
more relevant understanding of Computational Economics which will assist us in our 
later market design discussions. 
Social Welfare was introduced by Bergson [Ber38] in a 1938 paper on Welfare Eco­
nomics, which outlined the principles and gave a precise deﬁnition of the conditions 
required to engineer the maximum economic welfare for a given scenario. The Mara 
Survey [CDE+06] says that there are many different notions of social welfare. In the 
context of an ecommerce application the aim may be to maximise the average proﬁt 
generated by the negotiating agents. However, if agents are trying to agree on some­
thing less money-orientated, such as access to an Earth Observation satellite which 
was jointly funded by its owners then the priority might be to ensure that each agents 
gets their fair share of the common resource. We discuss Social Welfare in more detail 
in Section 3.2.1 (61). 
In 1950 Arrow developed a theorem which enables us to characterise social welfare 
and gives a number of criteria which essentially shows that it is impossible to please 
everybody. This “impossibility theorem” was introduced in [Arr50] and Arrow de­
veloped this work to look at what happens if you have an economy characterised by 
the presence of asymmetric information. In 1971 he showed [AH71] that you cannot 
expect a competitive equilibrium unless you have symmetric information, giving us 
a formal economic basis for the rationale behind requiring complete information in a 
centralised decision making process. 
Herbert Simon [Sim55] introduced the concept of “satisﬁcing”, a decision-making 
strategy which attempts to meet criteria for adequacy rather than to identify an op­
timal solution. A satisﬁcing strategy may often be (near) optimal if the costs of the 
decision-making process itself, such as the cost of obtaining complete information, are 
considered. Interestingly, the term was not initially promoted as an economic idea, but 
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comes instead from administrative theory and management science, although some of 
the main concepts, e.g. the “economic man” were later reﬁned as the concept gained 
popularity. 
The concepts of Social Choice and Social Welfare from the Economics literature, as 
introduced by Arrow and Simon, are fundamental to the modern day idea of Computa­
tional Social Choice, surveyed by Chevaleyre et al. [CELM07]. This paper focuses on 
the cross over between computer science techniques which include complexity analy­
sis, algorithm design and social choice mechanisms which include voting procedures 
and fair division algorithms for combinatorial domains. Of most relevance is their 
summary of how social choice is important in distributed resource allocation and ne­
gotiation. They distinguish two types of criteria when assessing an allocation of re­
sources (i) criteria pertaining to the efﬁciency of an allocation and (ii) those relating to 
fairness considerations. These criteria make up a social welfare function which can be 
used to determine a choice when traditional economic criteria do not provide a single 
solution. The authors give some examples of efﬁciency and fairness criteria: 
Pareto efﬁciency: An allocation Pareto dominates another allocation, if no agents 
are worse off and some are better off in the former. A Pareto efﬁcient allocation 
is an allocation that is not Pareto dominated by any other allocation. This is the 
weakest possible efﬁciency requirement. 
Utilitarianism: The utilitarian social welfare of an allocation is the sum of the in­
dividual utilities experienced by the members of society. Asking for maximal 
utilitarian social welfare gives very strong efﬁciency. 
Egalitarianism: The Egalitarianism social welfare of an allocation is given by the 
individual utility of the poorest agent in the system. Maximising this value is a 
basic requirement for fairness. 
Envy-freeness: An agent is envious when it would rather get the bundle of resources 
allocated to one of the other agents, an allocation being envy-free when no agent 
in the set is envious. 
As we know, in distributed resource allocation, allocations emerge as a consequence 
of individual agents trading through a sequence of deals to exchange goods and form 
allocations. The question is whether this set of actions can converge to give socially 
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optimal outcomes and this can only be determined by evaluating the fairness and efﬁ­
ciency properties of every outcome. 
There is further interesting work in [GO96] where Greiner and Orponen look at a set 
of satisﬁcing strategies which aim to produce the optimal (minimum expected cost) 
method of running a set of experiments. This paper is helpful because the authors have 
developed previous work on satisﬁcing strategies into a generalised approach such that 
if a problem can be represented as an and-or search tree, then their algorithm “pao” 
can produce an approximately optimal solution even when not all of the preferences / 
weights in the tree are known. 
Finally, Economics and Computer Science begin to merge again with Robert Axelrod’s 
book “The Complexity of cooperation” [Axe97]. Axelrod looks beyond simple cases, 
such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma to study a wide range of issues including how to cope 
with errors in perception or implementation, how norms emerge, and how new political 
actors and regions of shared culture can develop. Whilst this is a book aimed primarily 
at social scientists, he focuses on using Agent based modelling to unearth some of the 
emergent properties of the social systems described. 
2.3 Conclusions from the literature 
From the initial days of mainframe computing and the introduction of Social Wel­
fare in the late 1930s, research into resource allocation, management and fairness for 
both centralised and decentralised systems has been undertaken in a number of ﬁelds 
throughout computer science and economics. In reviewing the literature we identiﬁed 
a two major themes: 
Firstly, there is a large body of work which describes both the design and attempted 
implementations of market simulations, usually with a speciﬁc focus. For example, the 
work by Dang [DJ03] focused on demonstrating a new clearing algorithm for multi­
unit auctions that consistently performs within a bound of the optimal solution, whilst 
a paper by Biswas [BN05] looks at worst case performance in Combinatorial Auc­
tions. Frustratingly, there is little concrete discussion as to how these simulations were 
assembled, or what their actual performance was and therefore it is subsequently im­
possible to build comparisons or benchmarks of either their system or ours. Similarly, 
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many of the scheduler implementations also focus on only a single aspect of the mech­
anism in hand. For example, ARMS [CJS+02b] focuses on service advertisement and 
discovery, whilst Nimrod is concerned with management of spare resource on idle 
workstations, again this makes comparison difﬁcult. 
Secondly, Authors appear to fall into one of two camps, those for centralised markets 
and those for decentralised. There does not appear to be a body of work devoted to 
comparing and contrasting the two viewpoints, such that each party is either content 
for the other to exist, or, of the opinion that theirs is the only solution to the prob­
lem at hand. Whilst it is true that for some types of problems a speciﬁc mechanism 
is best (e.g. when governments auction radio spectrum a combinatorial auction is the 
only sensible mechanism for doing so) there are others (ﬁnancial markets, computer 
resource scheduling, etc.) where both approaches have strong merits. We believe that 
the two ideas (distributed resource allocation and CAs) can be further developed to­
gether, because in a distributed system with few trust relationships between parties, 
a single centralised auction does not present a good solution to solving complex dis­
tributed resource allocation problems. 
The literature reviewed covers a wide spectrum of knowledge. We ﬁrstlymarketmodels 
considered the detail of both approaches, including papers on Centralised approaches 
by authors such as Sandholm and on distributed markets in Section 2.1.2 and imple­
mentations of both distributed markets and centralised ones. There are a number of 
key themes for distributed markets, mobility, performance and the selection of an agent 
platform to provide the development environment and we looked at relevant previous 
work for each, which informs Chapter 4, where we detail our development work. 
One of the aims of this thesis is to reintroduce some of the relevant economic the­
ory into market design. We need to understand the theortical decisions that need to 
be made in order to build a succesful distributed market, but also to enable a rational 
basis for understanding when centralised and de-centralised systems should be used, 
which is where our tour of economics demonstrates its importance. Papers cover­
ing Social Welfare, Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem and Satisﬁcing, three important 
concepts in building our distributed system and the comparison thereof have been re­
viewed in Section 2.1.3. We also identiﬁed some ”must have“ efﬁciency and fareness 
criteria—because by using the same metrics that economists use we can be sure we 
have developed an effective market. These are (i) Pareto efﬁciency, (ii) Utilitarianism, 
(iii) Egalitarianism and (iv) Envy-freeness, discussed in Section 2.2 on page 50. 
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Having identiﬁed the economic concepts and the work that introduced them, in Chapter 
3 we begin with a discussion of Models and Algorithms to to apply our knowledge to 
the problem of resource allocation. 
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Chapter 3 
Discussion of Models and Algorithms

3.1 Introduction to Market Models and Approaches 
In this chapter we will explore the economic models we have used to structure our 
approach for solving the bundling problem. This allowed us to develop a prototype 
distributed auction with the same economic foundations as a centralised Combinatorial 
Auction, ultimately implemented as our Multiple Distributed Auction (MDA) system, 
which is explained fully in Chapter 4. 
Comparing centralised and decentralised systems could be perceived as an apples and 
oranges comparison. However, both types of market are solving the same problem— 
that of how to produce a resource allocation according to speciﬁc criteria. We have 
built a platform to support the comparison of these two techniques which uses a com­
mon test data set from the CATS suite and derives a base line from the widely available 
CASS solver. We consider why these two tools provide a sound basis for the genera­
tion of data for comparing the two approaches. 
We begin with a discussion of the economic properties necessary for a sound mar­
ket and review the Vickrey-Clarkes-Groves mechanism as a template for our market 
designs. 
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3.2 Auctions and clearing techniques 
3.2.1 Key Economic Principles 
There are a number of key economic principles which come together in market design 
to ensure that all participants receive the optimal outcome from the market. We brieﬂy 
describe them as follows: 
Dominant Strategy 
A strategy for buying or selling goods is considered dominant if, regardless of what 
any other players do, the strategy earns a player a larger payoff than any other. It 
will therefore always be better than any other strategy for any proﬁle of other players’ 
actions. 
The concept of a Dominant Strategy is important in market design because it ensures 
the participant is going to maximise their outcome from the mechanism. Therefore, 
in developing our markets, we need to ensure we encourage use of the participant’s 
Dominant Strategy. 
Nash Equilibrium 
The concept of Nash Equilibrium was proposed by John Nash in 1950 in his work 
“Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games” [Nas50]. 
“The concept is an n-person game in which each player has a ﬁnite set of 
pure strategies in which a deﬁnite set of payments to the n players corre­
sponds to each n-tuple of pure strategies, one strategy being taken for each 
player.” 
i.e: Alice and Bob are in Nash Equilibrium if Alice is making the best decision she can, 
taking into account Bob’s decision, and Bob is making the best decision he can, taking 
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into account Alice’s decision. However, to make the best possible decision each party 
will need to understand the others preferences and strategy for their decision making 
process; this is known as “full revelation”. 
A Nash Equilibrium is important because it means that the expected average payoff for 
the participants in a mechanism is at least as large as that which would be obtainable 
by any other strategy. 
Satisﬁcing 
Satisﬁcing is a decision-making strategy which derives an adequate, rather than an 
optimal solution. A satisﬁcing strategy may often, in fact, be (near) optimal if the 
costs of the decision-making process itself, such as the cost of obtaining complete 
information, are considered in the overall cost calculations. 
Herbert Simon combined the terms “satisfy” and “sufﬁce” to promote the term “satis­
ﬁcing” [Sim55, Bro04]. He drew inspiration from humans, as we are usually able to 
maximise the outcome of a decision: (i) we rarely know all the relevant probabilities 
for different options/outcomes available to us, (ii) we are often unable to make deci­
sions to a sufﬁcient level of precision and (iii) humans become old and their memories 
unreliable, corrupting our basis for decision making! 
However, despite only being partially rational in their decision making, most humans 
are relatively successful, and Simon concluded this was because we treat goals as 
something not to be maximised, but as a constraint. We therefore always try to meet 
the minimum level across a speciﬁc set of goals, but thereafter, we may arbitrarily 
apply our focus to other goals, not necessarily that which will maximise our beneﬁt 
from the decision. 
“The most common application of the concept in economics is in the be­
havioural theory of the ﬁrm, which, unlike traditional accounts, postulates 
that producers treat proﬁt not as a goal to be maximised, but as a con­
straint. Under these theories, a critical level of proﬁt must be achieved 
by ﬁrms; thereafter, priority is attached to the attainment of other goals.” 
[Sim55] 
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Wikipedia states that “Simon, once explained satisﬁcing to his students by describing a 
mouse searching for cheese in a maze. The mouse might begin searching for a piece of 
Gouda, but unable to ﬁnd any would eventually be satisﬁed and could sufﬁce with any 
piece of cheese, such as cheddar.” (From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Satisficing 5-Apr-2009) 
Incentive Compatiblity 
When placing their buy or sell offers, we need to encourage participants to tell the 
truth, so that the market maker, who makes the allocation decisions in the market, has 
the best chance of making an economically sound decision. This property is deﬁned 
as being “incentive compatible”. Assuming there is no price collusion or false name 
bidding in the market, a second price auction is an example of mechanism that is 
incentive compatible (Chapter 1 of ”Combinatorial Auctions” [CSS05] provides an 
excellent overview of auction types). 
“In mechanism design, a process is said to be incentive compatible if all 
of the participants fare best when they truthfully reveal any private infor­
mation asked for by the mechanism.” 
It is worth noting that there are different degrees of incentive compatibility. For ex­
ample, in some games truth-telling can be considered a dominant strategy (as long as 
everyone else will tell the truth). 
Pareto Optimality: Optimal allocation for whom? 
As Wellman, Walsh et. al discuss in [WWWMM98] “If there is some way to make 
some agent(s) [economically] better off without harming others, it should be done. A 
solution that cannot be improved in this way is called Pareto Optimal.” 
“Pareto optimality, is an important concept in economics with broad 
applications in game theory, engineering and the social sciences. The term 
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is named after Vilfredo Pareto, an Italian economist who used the concept 
in his studies of economic efﬁciency and income distribution. 
Given a set of alternative allocations of, say, goods or income for a set 
of individuals, a movement from one allocation to another that can make at 
least one individual better off without making any other individual worse 
off is called a Pareto improvement. An allocation is Pareto efﬁcient or 
Pareto optimal when no further Pareto improvements can be made. This 
is often called a strong Pareto optimum (SPO). 
A weak Pareto optimum (WPO) satisﬁes a less stringent requirement, 
in which a new allocation is only considered to be a Pareto improvement 
if it is strictly preferred by all individuals (i.e., all must gain with the new 
allocation). The set of SPO solutions is a subset of the set of WPO solu­
tions, because an SPO satisﬁes the stronger requirement that there is no 
allocation that is strictly preferred by one individual and weakly preferred 
by the rest (i.e., no individual loses out, and at least one individual gains). 
A common criticism of a state of Pareto efﬁciency is that it does 
not necessarily result in a socially desirable distribution of resources, as 
it may lead to unjust and inefﬁcient inequities.” (From http://en. 
wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareto_efficiency 17-Dec-2008) 
Let us consider the attraction of Pareto optimality. Given the choice between optimal 
and non-optimal allocation, the former is likely to be selected as more desirable, yet in 
many real world situations optimal allocation is rarely achieved and it is often deemed 
preferable to have some slack in the system. 
Additionally, one problem with Pareto optimal solutions is that they may not be so­
cially just. I.e. if Alice and Bob are in a market, the Pareto optimal solution may be to 
give all the goods to Bob, but this may be socially unfair on Alice. 
Why does this happen? The problem is that for the Alice and Bob market we are unable 
to tell their true preferences exactly as they are expressed incompletely. This means 
that the auctioneer making the allocation decision for Alice and Bob has an element of 
his search space of possible solutions which is incomplete and may preclude him from 
identifying the best possible allocation. 
When considering the Pareto efﬁciency of the Alice and Bob market, we may ﬁnd 
that there are multiple Pareto efﬁcient outcomes (all goods to Alice, all goods to Bob, 
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Nor share the goods) and this means that we have not found a sole Pareto superior 
outcome—rather, we have a Pareto frontier. 
How do we resolve this issue? In order to make a choice between the different Pareto 
efﬁcient outcomes the market will need a further ranking mechanism. The question 
arises: “optimal for whom?” because in this instance, true Pareto optimality at any 
social expense is not that which is required. A better solution would be one which is 
Pareto optimal and which maximised the social welfare of the participants, the ﬁnal 
economic principle which we consider in Figure 3.2.1. We can visualise the problem 
in Figure 3.1. 
Good X 
M 
Z 
N 
D 
E 
SI 
Good Y 
Figure 3.1: Visualisation of Pareto and Social Optimality converging 
The graph shows two lines. MN is a social utility frontier, that is the range of utility 
values that are considered to be Pareto optimal. Point D indicates a scenario where 
production and consumption are efﬁciently matched, whilst point E lies inside the 
social utility frontier and indicates inefﬁciency. Although all the points on line MN are 
Pareto efﬁcient, only point Z identiﬁes a scenario where social welfare is maximised, 
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with line SI representing the social injustice that the allocation might cause and point 
Z lying at the intersection of a Pareto optimal solution and minimum social injustice. 
We can relate this back to market design, by arguing that in the commercial auction 
space the aim should be to achieve the outcome with the highest overall utility for the 
seller, bearing in mind that on some days, a trader who makes one sale is better off than 
one who makes none, and one of the problems presented by Combinatorial Auctions is 
that they are unable to provide us with solutions to our markets without complete and 
truthful information about all parties preferences, as we shall see in our discussion of 
Vickrey Auctions in 3.2.2. 
What happens if there is no interception of the pareto optimal and social welfare func­
tions? In this case we have an allocation which is economically inefﬁcient, similar to 
point E and therefore the buyer or seller is unlikely to want to participate. If there are 
multiple intersections to the two lines then we have deﬁned a function that produces 
multiple equivilent outcomes. This would not however be considered a well formed 
social welfare function—in order to become well formed, the criteria used must en­
sure that the system is able to make a selection between possible outcomes in order to 
maximise the social welfare of the decision. 
Social Welfare 
Welfare Economics is concerned with understanding the social impact of economic 
decisions and can be used to ensure that these decisions do not create unnecessary (or 
unwanted) social injustice. 
In our discussion of Pareto optimality, we concluded that we required a ranking func­
tion which would permit our resource allocation algorithm to rank the outcomes such 
that we would have optimal social welfare. This notion is described in the literature as 
a Bergsonian Social Welfare Function, invented by Abram Bergson in 1938 with the 
objective: 
“to state in precise form the value judgements required for the derivation 
of the conditions of maximum economic welfare” [Ber38] 
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However, we can observe that it is difﬁcult to create Social Welfare Functions which 
produce fair and qualitative rankings because the comparison of utility is an inexact 
science. Consider the following problem: Alice and Bob both consider themselves to 
be “happy”. Who is the most happy, or are they equally happy? We cannot tell be­
cause happiness, or indeed utility, or indeed welfare/well-being does not have cardinal 
properties (Is happiness an 8 or a 10?). 
This thought-experiment is the basis of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem[Arr50], which 
provides four reasonable criteria that no consistent Social Welfare function can satisfy: 
Unrestricted domain: This means that the Social Choice Rule must be able to incor­
porate any pattern of individual preferences. 
Pareto principle: This means that the chosen outcome must be Pareto efﬁcient. 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: This means that no set of rankings is af­
fected by a change in another set of rankings. 
No dictator: This means that no single individual can decide the outcome. 
Therefore, given incomplete information and a single point of decision making, it is 
possible to determine a number of Pareto-efﬁcient outcomes, but not a single Pareto-
optimal outcome. To determine that, we would have to have a Social Welfare function 
to evaluate the various options, which is not possible in a single decision maker based 
mechanism, as established by Arrow’s Impossibility theorem. 
The ability to produce an allocation whilst adhering to the criteria given above is one 
of the key beneﬁts of using distributed markets, and it is important for us to revisit 
these properties as we progress through the thesis. 
3.2.2 Vickrey-Clarkes-Groves Mechanism 
A Combinatorial Auction is essentially a weighted set packing problem [BN05] which 
is known to be NP-hard. There are various ways of characterising and solving this 
problem which we reviewed in detail in Section 2.1.2, but a key mechanism often 
referred to as an architectural starting point is the Vickrey Auction. 
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The book “Combinatorial Auctions” has an intriguing chapter title: “The Lovely but 
Lonely Vickrey Auction”[CSS05, Ch.1]. The Vickrey Auction is a sealed-bid auction 
where bidders submit their bids without any knowledge of how the other participants 
are bidding. It was invented by William Vickrey in 1961. 
The Vickrey Auction focused on auctions which sold a single, indivisible good. It is 
a second-price sealed-bid auction, where the winner pays the amount of the second 
highest winning bid. It is said to be “incentive compatible” in Mechanism Design if 
all of the participants fare best when they truthfully reveal their private information— 
typically the value of the good to them to bid truthfully. However, if the bidder has a 
demand for more than one of the good, then this approach will cause them not to bid 
their true valuations for the goods. 
A modiﬁcation to the Vickrey Auction to support multiple goods and to maintain the 
incentive compatibility of the market was therefore needed. Two further mechanisms 
by Clarke and Groves can be combined to provide these features and make a system 
known as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism in which the winner pays the 
second highest price bid. 
The key elements of the VCG mechanism are: 
Dominant Strategy: In a VCG, reporting their true valuation is a dominant strategy 
for a bidder. This means that they will get the best (most proﬁtable) outcome by 
following that strategy. It also means that the cost of running the auction is less 
(for the bidders) because they no longer have to invest energy into determining 
the strategies of other bidders and working out how to compete with them. 
Scope of Application: It is possible in a VCG to set ﬁlters and rules without affecting 
the economic properties. 
Average Revenues: The VCG mechanism guarantees that the average revenues from 
the system shall not be less than any other efﬁcient mechanism. This means that 
it has been designed so as to ensure there are no drawbacks to using it for the 
buyers and/or sellers. 
The key downsides to the mechanism are: 
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Low Seller Revenues: Non-Monotonicity: “better” bids don’t entail higher revenues 
because the seller’s revenues are non-monotonic with regard to the sets of bid­
ders and offers. Consider bidders A, B, and C, and two goods, Y and Z. A bids 
£2 for the package of Y and Z. B and C both bid £2 each for a single item (bid £2 
for Y or Z), as they really want one item but don’t care if they have the second. 
Now, Y and Z are allocated to B and C, but the price is £0, as can be found by 
removing either B or C. If C bid £0 instead of £2, then the seller would make 
£2 instead of £0. Because the seller’s revenue can also go up when bids are 
increased, the seller’s revenues are non-monotonic with respect to bids. 
Collusion: Losing bidders can collude to force pricing down and reduce proﬁt. 
False-name bidding: A bidder can bid multiple times, using different aliases, in order 
to get better pricing and increase their chance of success. 
The VCG is important for solving resource allocation problems because it is the ma­
jor market mechanism in use which gives the relevant economic and game-theoretic 
properties for a market that is Pareto-optimal and maximises social welfare. However, 
it has some serious limitations which impact its usefulness in the purest form, as we 
now explain: 
Ausubel and Milgrom [CSS05, Ch.1] characterise the VCG as a “lovely and elegant 
reference point—but not as a likely real-world auction design. Better, more practical 
procedures are needed.” They propose further designs to tackle the deﬁciencies stated 
above, including an iterative auction procedure combined with an ascending proxy 
bidding procedure known as the “Clock-Proxy Auction” [CSS05, Ch.5]. This process 
is very similar to the one currently adopted by the EBay auction house. 
In order for our comparison to be valid, we need our MDA mechanisms to exhibit 
identical economic properties and we review our compliance in Chapter 4. 
With regards the CASS solution, it is provably optimal: It ﬁnds a solution that max­
imises the social welfare as do the widely known BidTree and CPLEX solvers. How­
ever, there are no published veriﬁcations of the algorithm but we judge its accuracy 
from the wide publication of papers which reference it and from private communica­
tion with the author, Leyton-Brown, on this subject: 
It’s possible that there will exist solutions that tie (i.e., that yield the same 
64 
SW with different bids); in this case, the different methods could ﬁnd 
different sets of bids. I’ve done experiments conﬁrming that CASS really 
does ﬁnd the optimum, checking against CPLEX (I’ve never been given 
code for BidTree or CABOB). So have others, e.g., Craig Boutilier. As far 
as I know these results haven’t been published. (Source: Email received 
August 6, 2008) 
3.3 Distributed Market Models 
There are many algorithms for solving combinatorial auction type problems in the 
literature, where it is generally accepted that the optimal solution to a resource alloca­
tion problem may be found using a combinatorial auction and although the theoretical 
cost is NP-hard, even relatively naı¨ve solvers like CASS [LB03] can handle many 
problems quite rapidly, while the most sophisticated services like those available from 
CombineNet [San07] can process most problems quickly thanks to a combination of 
a range of clever heuristic techniques and specialised bidding languages that help to 
reveal more about bidder preferences. 
However, this line of research poses a new problem, that of comparison, and it is this 
that Kevin Leyton-Brown set out to solve when he created the Combinatorial Auction 
Test Suite (CATS) in 2000. 
Given that in this work we are building a comparison of a centralised auction system 
and a decentralised market system, if one conceptualises a discrete space of algorithm 
complexity then there are a number of steps available as we shift in the market on 
an axis of complete information held in the auctioneer to minimal information and 
a second axis from one auctioneer to many, comprising of: (i) Entirely centralised 
combinatorial auction, then (ii) An agent based distributed market, with synchronous 
rounds, and ﬁnally (iii) An agent based market with asynchronous trades. 
We believe it is necessary to consider these axes of resource allocation techniques 
because there are three reasons to dissent from the view that combinatorial auctions 
are the only solution required for resource allocation and that it is therefore a solved 
problem: 
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1. In many practical situations, the resources and the bidders are distributed, so 
that the centralised mechanism that is the necessary property of a combinatorial 
auction is inappropriate [PS04]. 
2. Runtime: An anytime (sub-optimal) algorithm with predictable runtime may be 
preferable to an optimal algorithm with an unpredictable runtime. One approach 
to this is [DJ03], which describes an anytime polynomial algorithm that guar­
antees to be within a bound of the optimal, such that each step of the algorithm 
reduces the bound. 
3. Finally, for the sake of resilience (another aspect of timely delivery) the potential 
single-point-of-failure that is intrinsic in CAs may also be undesirable. 
In order to complete a valid comparison, our experimental approach has been to use 
a common dataset, produced by the CATS algorithm, as the input into all of the sim­
ulations. We have also sought to maintain a comparable execution platform, with 
comparability of processor type and execution environment. 
Throughout the period of this work, we have considered a number of different frame­
works, test platforms and simulation systems and document them in detail in the fol­
lowing pages. They are: 
1. Brickworld - our initial simulation 
2. MDA - Multiple Distributed Auctions, implemented in Repast 
3. MDA AgentScape - The MDA system, implemented in AgentScape 
3.4 Brickworld - Initial design concepts 
BrickWorld was an exploratory prototype model of a distributed combinatorial pur­
chasing system which utilises multiple distributed single item auctions (MDAs). Whilst 
the particular method of implementation was ultimately unsatisfactory, it provided 
helpful insights into the implementation of markets and was a key part of the evolution 
of our designs. 
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Inspired by Lego Bricks which usually have a high level of (multi) dimensionality, in 
terms of colour, shape, dimension and applicability to different situations we coined 
the term “BrickWorld” to represent a market that traded “Bricks” which act as tokens 
representing the many different and complex selection criteria that both a Combinato­
rial Auction (CA) and a distributed bundling system should be able to handle. 
Where real world traders are able to purchase goods for resale from a wide variety of 
markets they are often able to increase margins by providing value-added services or 
combinations of goods otherwise previously unthought-of, or which may be tricky for 
an individual to acquire. The TraderAgents in BrickWorld took on a similar role in 
that they assemble bundles to order and speculatively. 
We investigated a number of issues: 
•	 Where do traders get their budget from? Can they go into deﬁcit? 
•	 Can traders take positions on their goods? 
•	 How do traders make decisions about what to buy or sell? 
•	 How to manage message passing in a distributed environment—would the over­
head kill the efﬁciency gains of the system? 
•	 Longevity of goods in the market place and how to handle perishable goods. 
3.4.1 Brickworld Development 
We developed a Java Remote Method Invocation (RMI) based AuctionServer to which 
AuctionClients connect. An AuctionClient can either be a BrickFactory (which gener­
ates Bricks available for sale) or a Participant, who will attempt to purchase bricks. 
The design and implementation was such that any number of auctions could be held 
concurrently and a single “Auction” would handle the sale of a single Brick. Thus a 
Participant in the market would have to participate in a reasonably large number of 
auctions in order to assemble a collection of different bricks. The system facilitated 
the synchronous updates of all the traders who were monitoring an auction. 
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Traditional search systems attempt to provide solutions through the use of heuristics to 
prune their search trees. One mechanism for pruning is to ﬁlter elements based on their 
attributes. A key improvement of BrickWorld over other trading systems is that it was 
designed such that the multi-dimensionality, (i.e. number of attributes) of the objects 
being traded is not a signiﬁcant factor in the time taken for the optimum allocation to 
be made. This beneﬁt arises because Brickworld is a distributed market and solutions 
are not determined using a centralised search algorithm. Bricks had many attributes, 
initially having Colour, Weight, Height, Length and Width. 
We focused on two types of auction, the Sealed Bid and the Open Cry auction. Brick-
World was structured so that an Auction has to implement a number of key elements of 
functionality (as deﬁned in the BrickAuction interface). This means that any number 
of different types of auction mechanisms can be implemented and simply “slotted in” 
to the BrickWorld system as required. 
The Sealed Bid auction is one which implements a ﬁrst price sealed bid auction, such 
that the item is put up for sale, all bids are received before a ﬁxed (pre-announced) 
point in time and then the highest bid is determined and announced as the winner. 
The Sealed Bid auction was used as a simple harness to test the code and so the next 
development was the more complex OpenCryAuction. 
The OpenCryAuction class is designed to run continually. Clients connect to the auc­
tion at any time and begin to observe the auction item. The auction runs for a set 
amount of time and every observer is notiﬁed if the auction item changes (i.e. typi­
cally if the value changes). At the end of the auction the winner is computed (i.e. the 
highest bidder) and the auction closes. 
3.4.2 Auction closing and Settlement 
We were keen map to the experience of traditional human led markets and auctions 
to our simulation as much as possible and a big issue was that of when to close the 
auction. 
In a real world auction the auctioneer is able to observe the auction room and all the 
potential bidders nearly simultaneously. Even if the auctioneer has to handle telephone 
bids, a human has sufﬁcient sensory input that they can (with a small margin of error) 
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determine if there will be any “last minute” bids either in person or via other means 
and thus execute the classic “going going gone” auction ending. 
In electronic computer driven auction mechanisms that discretion is not available and 
there needs to be a ﬁrm ﬁxed end point. However, this leads to a syndrome of gazump­
ing in which many bids are submitted in the ﬁnal and closing stages of the auction, with 
bidders attempting to ensure that they do not expose any of their internal valuations to 
the competition. Ebay exhibits excellent examples of this behaviour. 
From initial implementations of ﬁxed markets with deﬁned closings, we chose to reﬁne 
the implementation of BrickWorld and our subsequent MDA implementation so they 
operated as series of multiple continuous double auctions, each dealing with a single 
type of good. Rather than closing at a speciﬁc time the markets continue to make the 
good available until sold, with buy and sell shouts being made until pricing converges 
and a successful trade is completed. 
Our simulations are implemented using electronic tokens that represent actual goods. 
As such it is envisaged that in a real implementation, an authorisation message would 
be passed back to the Grid Scheduler which can then complete the service delivery. A 
separate system is required for the passing of goods, or authorising access to services 
following from the auction. 
This focus on “tokens” also helps deal with market liquidity issues, as in an MDA sys­
tem a trader can become insolvent and there is potential for value to become “locked”. 
In the absence of a Bona Vacantia 1 system for the gathering of assets of the deceased, 
suppliers with sold, but unredeemed vouchers may decide to resell them after an ap­
propriate period. 
We also brieﬂy evaluated the issues surrounding the security and robustness of the 
market and how these issues might be mitigated. For example in a computer system 
one bidder might launch a denial of service attack on another to stop their bids being 
received, or indeed, the auctioneering software may be hijacked and replaced with a 
“corrupt” auctioneer whom favoured one particular bidder. Whilst these things can 
happen in real life, a computer network makes it much easier for them to occur and 
much harder to observe. We look at various related works in Section 2.1.4, page 41, of 
1Bona Vacantia literally means vacant goods and is the legal name for owner-less property in the 
UK which passes to the Crown. 
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our literature review and feel that in order to ensure integrity in the market mechanism 
it would be important to ensure such strategies are implemented in any production 
system. 
3.4.3 Evaluation Strategies 
A number of derivative works from this thesis have been published and we are contin­
ually challenged on the question of comparing the effectiveness of two very different 
approaches. 
On the one hand CA is a single auction with complete knowledge that, given enough 
time will compute the optimal allocation given the bidders’ preferences and a small 
enough problem. On the other the MDA is a system of distributed auctions that are 
connected indirectly by the simultaneous participation of bidders in more than one 
auction and that will result in the creation of many bundles that the trading agents view 
as saleable. CA appears to offer mathematical certainties while MDA offers possible 
solutions, although MDA has an undeniable advantage in one aspect in that it appears 
to be scalable. In ﬁgure 1.4 there is a point at which it is no longer feasible to compute 
the outcome of a bundling problem using a CA, but where it would be possible still 
to determine an outcome through the use of a distributed trading system. Below that 
point, the use of perfect information would mean that a CA could determine the Pareto 
Optimal solution and therefore the trading system should be expected to achieve a 
similar result. Beyond that point, an allocation can be achieved, but may not be Pareto 
Optimal. 
An analytical approach to comparison seems infeasible, at least, given current un­
derstandings of the problem so empirical techniques must be adopted to evaluate the 
performance of the system in terms of the optimality and speed with which it bundles 
but also the allocations achieved. 
By using identical request feeds to a CA and MDA (through the use of CATS), from 
which they will produce bundles, a cluster analysis to observe the proximity of the 
solutions may be achieved. The results should be useful even with ZIP-style agents 
[CB98] because the structure of the resource allocation process (i.e. centralised or 
decentralised) will have signiﬁcant impact on the bundles assembled. 
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The ﬁrst step in evaluating the two techniques was to compute a base line performance 
model of the currently available solvers, such as LPSolve 2, CASS [LB03] and those 
implemented by Dang [DJ03]. This empirical analysis produced some interesting re­
sults, in that, whilst the performance model for a CA is anticipated to be NP-Hard, we 
actually ﬁnd that through improved use of search heuristics, many of the computations 
are able to complete in linear time, whilst a few problems take a very long time to 
compute. 
Secondly, we developed the need to understand the performance model of a distributed 
agent scheduling system, which resulted in the implementation of our MDA system. 
In moving toward the use of empirical evaluation techniques our results will become 
subject to the vagaries of the computational environment that is being used. To this end 
the agent based systems are being measured using not only auction rounds and time, 
but also clock ticks, as suggested in work on comparisons of distributed constraint 
optimisation problems (DCOPs) by Mailler [Mai05]. 
In evaluating MDAs, the following metrics were adopted: 
•	 Firstly, the performance model of the agents bidding for items is considered. 
From previous work by TAC participants and others [DF03, HJ02, AHDJ01, 
KKD+04, TDTY04] shows that the performance of the auctions can be improved 
by heuristics and domain speciﬁc knowledge. However MDAs operate in multi-
domain environments and it is important to understand the performance of a 
suitably non-domain speciﬁc agent and measure its ability to join and monitor 
auctions, manage spending and assemble bundles of goods for which there is a 
market within a speciﬁc time frame, so that we can understand generic trading 
performance. 
•	 Secondly, monitoring the auction and following a number of important metrics, 
such as (i) number of nodes, (ii) auctions, (iii) bids, (iv) bidders, (v) time for 
auctions to complete (vi) and length of queues for items awaiting auction. 
•	 Thirdly, determining the quality of the result obtained by the trading system 
allows us to determine the level of effectiveness of the process which is particu­
larly useful when the complexity of the bundling problem lies above the level of 
results achievable with a CA. 
2LPSolve is available at http://lpsolve.sourceforge.net/ 24-04-2009 
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Finally there is a need for a CA to complete in “reasonable time” because one of our 
objectives is to produce resource allocations which are not just good quality, but are 
also relevant to their requestors. To deﬁne reasonable, the bundle request data has a 
range of simulated deadlines against which the bundling system’s speed can be tested. 
3.4.4 Conclusions from Brickworld 
The Brickworld implementation fell short because it was not feasible, with a single 
developer, to develop a complete and robust auction system from the ground up in 
the time available and we felt that it would be more advantageous to utilise existing 
similation frameworks, such as Repast and AgentScape so that our development time 
could focus on the auction logic. 
However we were able to identify a number of elements in our development which 
allowed us to build a more successful MDA system. These included (i) the market 
closure, settlement and handover process, (ii) integrity of the market and (iii) an evalu­
ation strategy.We also identiﬁed a number of areas for further investigation, including: 
•	 Whilst BrickWorld would work effectively on the basis of “just-in-time” or­
dering it is also intended to investigate pre-emptive purchasing strategies. It is 
clearly desirable for a TraderAgent to be able to deliver resources required with 
minimal delay, whilst undesirable for the agent to purchase too many advance 
resources without customer commitment for their purchase. In the MDA system, 
we adopted the ZIP trading strategy to manage this process, implemented in the 
JASA libraries [PMPM06]. 
•	 If a TraderAgent ends up with surplus capacity then it would make sense for the 
trader to be able to sell their surpluses to other traders in the same set of auctions, 
a function we implemented in the MDA architecture. 
•	 There is no reason to restrict resale as there is no motive to hoard resources, nor 
to sell them at a loss. Feedback and re-entry mechanisms for an MDA system 
need to be considered in future work. 
•	 We could increase the robustness and security frameworks in the BrickWorld 
system, for example, to include protocols and architectures derived from work by 
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Franklin and Reiter [FR95], Stubblebine and Syverson [SS99], and we propose 
that this be considered in future work. 
Finally, we have identiﬁed that there needs to be consideration of an optimisation tech­
nique which would be borrowed from functional programming: memoization [Mic68]. 
Consequently, instead of computing the optimal allocation each time it would be possi­
ble, over time, to look it up. It might even be acceptable to return a previous allocation 
if the preferences were close enough to an earlier case (subject to some proximity 
bound on the distance from optimality and to analytical continuity). At this point it 
becomes apparent that the CA has acquired some market memory too and that within 
acceptable deviation from the optimal solution the results of the two approaches could 
be largely indistinguishable — except that the MDA approach will continue to function 
as the complexity of the bundling problem increases, whilst a CA will not. 
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Chapter 4 
The MDA, or Multiple Distributed 
Auction system 
We have developed a resource allocation system that uses Multiple Distributed Auc­
tions (MDA). We will outline the simulation system and test models and describe the 
economic and algorithmic properties of the systems and software used. For MDAs 
we consider both the centralised (MDA) and decentralised (MDA-AgentScape (MDA­
AS)) implementations in the context of these economic properties and demonstrate 
how they provide a sound basis for comparison. 
4.1 MDA Trading System Architecture 
It is well known that clearing a CA over bundles of heterogeneous items is an NP-Hard 
task. In contrast, trader agents in an MDA operate in multiple single-item auctions, to 
achieve resource allocation, even under circumstances of incomplete preference infor­
mation. 
The MDA vision, as shown earlier in Figure 1.4, is that a user (ClientAgent) composes 
their request for computing resources, specifying a number of different components 
that will be needed (for example, a data set, a software package and an amount/type of 
CPU). The request will probably also contain other restrictions, such as cost, quality of 
service, time to delivery and the level of completeness required, for example whether a 
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partial answer is acceptable. The request is then handled by the following components, 
which communicate with each other through Remote Method Invocation (RMI) and 
Web Service interfaces: 
•	 The ClientAgent issues a call for tenders, using an order-board style mechanism, 
which is met by a number of TraderAgents. As well as considering the quotation 
responses on the basis of price, ClientAgents may also consider the ability of the 
TraderAgent to deliver the necessary requirements (E.g. on the basis of a rep­
utation model managed by the Auction house.). The ResourceAuction contains 
a reputation model for the resource providers, which could then be used by the 
TraderAgents to present an indication of their ability to deliver. 
•	 In order to meet the requirements of the ClientAgents, TraderAgents purchase 
items from a collection of continuous double auctions (CDAs) that take place 
on several MDA system nodes. Nodes are interconnected and Traders are free 
to monitor and enter auction processes, placing bids as required to meet their 
clients requirements. 
•	 The TraderAgents are proﬁt-motivated and their objective is simply to acquire 
resources, combine them and sell them to ClientAgents. TraderAgents will be 
limited in that they may not trade insolvently overall (if they do become insol­
vent, they have failed and will die), but they will inevitably acquire resources 
that they cannot then sell. 
•	 Traders can adopt different fulﬁlment models, either speculating on client de­
mands and purchasing in advance or waiting for a requirement to arise, and then 
attempting to create a suitable bundle to match. 
•	 When the MDA environment is running, the Seller will take resources for sale 
and feed them to the auctions. They can then monitor the resources absorbed 
by the market and report those back to such as operate in multiple single-item 
auctions to achieve effective resource allocation without any of the optimality 
guarantees of a CA. 
The MDA system should be completely distributed and traders discover, monitor and 
purchase items from a large number of different auctions. Each node in the sys­
tem therefore supports the necessary functionality to support self-registration by other 
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nodes, so that a web of nodes can be deployed and then navigated via Traders and 
Clients. 
We set out to create a distributed market mechanism for solving bundling problems. 
That is, given a requirement for a number of Buyers Bn, to purchase multiple tuples of 
goods from the overlapping set X,Y,Z,P,Q can we successfully provide a mechanism 
that allows the buyers to make their purchases within a Socially Optimal manner? 
Recall also that a key objective for us is to be able to compare MDA critically with 
the centralised system. Consequently, the MDA is derived from the same problem 
speciﬁcation and operates on the same datasets. 
Finally, we sought to build a resource allocation system which could handle scenarios 
with (i) incomplete data and (ii) communication complexity in a more robust manner. 
This speciﬁcally meant that we required a solution which was completely decentralised 
with no single points of control or decision making, hence a system of distributed 
auctions. 
4.2 Overview of MDA 
For simulation purposes our implementation builds a centralised source of knowledge, 
the “Oracle”, that processes the bid request ﬁles produced by CATS [LBPS00]. We are 
utilising two CATS datasets (L2, Scheduling) in our work and each distribution is used 
to produce a set of available bids and items which are distributed to the traders. From 
a random starting position, the agents (implemented using JASA) then buy and sell the 
goods, through many rounds, until the market stabilises and the level of trade tends to 
zero, indicating that none of the available items matches the bids being requested. 
In our development, we observed that the market environment initially experienced a 
high level of activity as buyers had complete budgets and full procurement require­
ments whilst similarly, sellers had complete stocks and therefore there was a high 
degree of requirements matching. As time passed the ratio of trades per time incre­
ment was reduced, the market stabilised and we observed that after all of the goods 
had been traded approximately twice there was minimal new trade. Therefore, after 
ensuring that the market has stabilised by ensuring all goods have passed through the 
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market once, the simulation then continues for as many ticks again as have already 
passed before we close the market. 
We developed the MDA as a distributed type of multiple item auction, whereby the 
system runs one continuous double auction for every class of good (thus eliminating 
the need to bid for combinations of goods in a single auction and greatly simplifying 
the market for both traders and auction managers). An MDA has the following core 
components, shown diagrammatically in Figure 4.1: 
MDA Manager: The MDA manages the auctions and is responsible for telling traders 
where (i.e. which CDA) they can trade their resources. It holds pointers to all 
CDAs and if a CDA is requested that is not available then it will be created by 
the MDA. 
CDAs: A continuous double auction where a resource is traded. Only one type of re­
source can be traded by a CDA and for every CDA there will be a corresponding 
resource type. CDAs are created by the MDA Manager. 
Goods: These are the units that are traded. They are simply an identiﬁable reference 
to a resource, and the corresponding price information. 
Oracle: Responsible for handing out bundles to traders on demand. As such, vary­
ing the Oracle’s output deﬁnes the supply (and demand) in the market. Bun­
dles can be both requested from the Oracle and returned to it (if they cannot 
be purchased/sold). All transactions are reported to the Oracle, so it maintains 
information and history about the market participants. 
Trader: Responsible for retrieving bundles from the Oracle and trading them. Traders 
who fail to trade their bundle within a given number of rounds must return them 
to the Oracle and request a new bundle — ensuring the market does not contain 
too many extra-marginal traders.1 At any one time, Traders can be buyers or 
sellers depending on the type of the bundle received from the Oracle. Traders 
can switch state (from buying to selling) and each time a trader receives the next 
bundle to process from the Oracle it determines which role it should play, based 
on the quantities speciﬁed in the bundle (positive quantities indicates a need to 
sell, negative a need to buy). A Trader does not intentionally speculate on goods 
and they will not purchase more goods than they need to complete a bundle. 
1Buyers who have paid less than the equilibrium price and sellers who are selling for more than the 
equilibrium price. 
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Figure 4.1: MDA Instantiation Flow
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SubTraders: A Trader is responsible for assembling a bundle of goods. To do this, 
it participates in many CDAs, through a mechanism of SubTraders. These are 
agents that have the task of buying or selling a single good within a speciﬁc price 
range. 
The combination of one Oracle, one MDA and an array of traders and CDAs makes up 
an MDA market. These components come together to create a Repast Model, which 
enables the collection and management of statistics and the control of the simulation. 
The input into the model is the common dataset generated by the Combinatorial Auc­
tion Test Suite (CATS). CATS generates a set of goods, and a price, for each bundle. 
A sample data ﬁle is reproduced in Figure 4.2: 
goods 5 
bids 15 
dummy 0 
0 1211656 0 3 # 
1 851593 2 # 
2 3927158 0 1 2 3 # 
3 665147 3 # 
4 2957271 0 1 3 # 
5 2077835 1 2 3 # 
6 4026591 0 1 2 3 4 # 
7 660628 0 1 # 
8 1580815 0 3 4 # 
9 2052298 0 1 2 # 
10 996370 3 4 # 
11 2806870 0 1 4 # 
12 2810633 1 2 3 4 # 
13 2752827 0 2 3 # 
14 334974 0 # 
Figure 4.2: Sample CATS Data File 
Each row show in Figure 4.2 describes a bundle. The ﬁrst ﬁeld is an integer serial 
number, the second the value bid for it, and the remaining ﬁelds are then the actual 
elements of the bid. For example, line 6 gives a bid value of 4026591 for the bundle 
of elements 0,1,2,3,4. 
Each good can only be sold once, and therefore we can simply determine that the 
maximum value achievable from this set of bundles would be bids 1, 3 and 11, for 
total revenue 4323610 selling all of the available goods (0,1,2,3,4). 
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From this, you can see that for each bid, only each bidder’s public valuation is ex­
pressed. CATS does not give us any indication of the bidder’s private valuation, or 
indeed, any reference to public or private valuation from the seller of the goods. This 
is understandable, because for a combinatorial auction all the auctioneer must do is 
maximise the monies earned from selling the bundles, which it does by choosing the 
maximum public valuations from the buyers 
However, for a continuous market, such as the MDA, there will be many rounds of 
bidding and the opportunity for both buyers and sellers to vary the price. Therefore, 
we must construct the public and private valuations required for buyers and sellers, 
and our approach for doing this has been as follows: 
•	 Open the ﬁle, and loop through the lines until we ﬁnd the ﬁrst line that has a 
bundle description. 
•	 Loop through the line. Get the bid value and all the elements in the bundle. 
•	 For the buy bundles, the budget price for the goods is set to be the total buy value 
for the bundle, divided by the number of goods (i.e. it is shared equally.) 
Then create the sales bundles. Get all the resources from the resourcesRe­• 
quired.keySet(). Create a new bundle, and give it one single item. Set the private 
valuation of the sell bundle to be the average maximum budget available (i.e: 
set it arbitrarily high, so it can be negotiated down, but not too high that the 
negotiation process takes for ever). 
Once the bundles have been read from the ﬁle and the different valuations have been 
computed, they are boot-strapped into an “Oracle”. The Oracle class is then responsi­
ble for instantiating the auctions, traders and keeping track of which goods have been 
sold. 
4.2.1 Use of JASA 
JASA [PMPM06] is an auction simulator developed by Steve Phelps. It allows re­
searchers in agent-based computational economics to run trading simulations using a 
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number of different auction mechanisms. JASA provides base classes for implement­
ing simple adaptive trading agents and is extensible, so that new auction rules can 
easily be implemented. 
JASA is implemented as a set of extensions to Repast [NCV06] which is an agent 
based modelling environment, designed for running simulations of a large number of 
agents. Repast is implemented as a single Java Virtual Machine, in which each agent 
is represented as an object, with each object having a step function that is called se­
quentially by the master Repast process. Agents are synchronised through an artiﬁcial 
time mechanism and complete one “round” or action per call of the step function. 
Our MDA works on a system of Shouts, which can either be Asks, or Bids. Ask 
messages come from Sellers, whilst Bids come from Buyers and we made use of JASA 
in two ways: 
•	 Our CDAAgent class is an extension of JASA’s RandomRobinAuction class and 
has the KContinuousDoubleAuctioneer as a class attribute. The RandomRobin-
Auction class provides infrastructure needed for managing the auction, such as 
(de)registering new traders, notiﬁcation and requesting of bids and asks, etc. 
The KContinuousDoubleAuctioneer class implements the rules for the CDA, 
i.e. matching the bids and asks and deciding which shouts should be cleared. 
•	 Our SubTraders, are subclasses of JASA’s ZITraderAgent class. The traders 
“intelligence” level is deﬁned by the strategy they use and we have chosen to 
use the Zero Intelligence Plus strategy. 
4.3 Trading Strategy 
JASA provides a choice of two trading strategies: (i) Random Constrained Strategy 
(often referred to as Zero Intelligence Constrained (ZI-C) in the literature[GS93]), 
which is a trading strategy in which the agent bids a different random markup on our 
agent’s private value in each auction round; and (ii) Zero Intelligence (ZI) strategy, 
as outlined in work by Cliff and Bruten [Cli97, CB98]. Agents of this type have a 
ﬁnite trade entitlement, which determines how many units they are able to trade in 
a given trading period. As our objective was to utilise as simple and widely accepted 
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strategy as possible, ensuring our focus was on the market structure, we evaluated both 
but focused on the ZI strategy. In our implementation, we developed ZITraderAgents 
who become inactive once their intitial trade entitlement is used up, with their trade 
entitlement being restored at the end of each day. 
There is a disadvantage to using ZIP agents, which is that they must know what the 
current bid or offers are before they can decide whether or not to raise or lower their 
price. This presents an inherent scalability problem because an agent must track all 
the transactions for the auctions they are a participant in. However, in any distributed 
system where there is a common auction system this will be a necessary bottleneck. In 
our MDA implementation, we found that there was signiﬁcant overhead in the transfer 
of messages between Agents in a distributed system, but that these could be mitigated 
by intelligent message routing, which we considered in detail in Section 4.6.10 
4.3.1 Social Welfare in Trading 
We considered in Section 2.2 that Social Welfare—the process by which we consider 
factors beyond moneytary value—was important in our trading process as it provides a 
mechanism where by traders may determine between two equal bids. Recall if a trader 
wishes to sell good X to Alice or Bob and both place bids on the same pareto efﬁcient 
plane, then the trader will use a social welfare function to determine whether to sell to 
Alice or Bob. 
In our implementation,having adopted the ZI traders the focus is on using that strategy 
and multiple rounds of bidding to try and ensure that all bids received are different. 
However, if they are not then we have limited information from our CATS data to 
differentiate buyers and determine which buyer to select. Therefore, in our Trader-
AgentImpl and ZIPTraderAgentImpl classes we use a simple algorithm to select the 
buyer based upon historic trades and the number of rounds taken to complete trades (a 
buyer would be prefered if they have traded with greater quantity and less rounds). 
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4.4 Algorithms in Pseudo Code 
Expressed in pseudo-code, the buyer and seller processes are speciﬁed in algorithms 1 
and 2. 
Algorithm 1 processbuyer 
1:	 Trader buyTrader = Oracle.get next trader() 
2:	 Bundle bundleToBuy = Oracle.get buy bundle() 
3:	 for good in bundleToBuy do 
4: cda = Oracle.get cda(good) 
5: while good.is not sold() do 
6: good.set price(bundleToBuy.get Budget()/bundleToBuy.get num goods()) 
7: cda.place bid(buyTrader(good)) 
8: while buyTrader.offer(good) = cda.get counter offer() do 
9: if good.get price() = buyTrader.offer(good) then 
10: cda.clear auction(good) 
11: end if 
12: end while 
13: end while 
14:	 end for 
15:	 Oracle.return bundle(bundleToBuy) 
16:	 Oracle.update success(bundleToBuy, self) 
The Repast based MDA simulation uses a synchronous step model and at every step 
(or round) the following three sub-steps are performed sequentially: 
1. All Traders check the status of their current bundle. If the bundle has not yet 
been fully assembled and trades are ongoing, nothing is done. If the bundle has 
been fulﬁlled or has failed (the Trader has given up), they acquire a new bundle 
from the Oracle. 
2. All auctions perform one round.	 A round consists of asking all participating 
traders to send in a shout. Any matches will be reported to the corresponding 
traders in the next sub-step. 
3. All Traders receive any trade results and the data on fulﬁlled or failed bundles is 
collected. 
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Algorithm 2 processseller 
1:	 Trader sellTrader = Oracle.get next trader() 
2:	 Bundle bundleToSell = Oracle.get buy bundle() 
3:	 for good in bundleToSell do 
4: cda = Oracle.get cda(good) 
5: while good.is not bought() do 
6: good.set min price(bundleToSell.get Budget()/bundleToSell.get num goods()) 
7: cda.place shout(sellTrader(good)) 
8: while sellTrader.offer(good) = cda.get counter offer() do 
9: if good.get price() = sellTrader.offer(good) then 
10: cda.clear auction(good) 
11: end if 
12: end while 
13: end while 
14: end for 
15: Oracle.return bundle(bundleToSell) 
16: Oracle.update success(bundleToSell, self) 
4.5 Conclusions from the MDA System 
From our initial implementation of the MDA system, we learned the following lessons: 
•	 Repast is a good choice for building a uni-processor simulation of a multi-agent 
environment. It provides an excellent framework and supporting infrastructure 
which allowed us to quickly implement a lock-step simulation with good tools 
for tracking auctions, statistics gathering and visual progress monitoring. 
•	 We built a system which was able to complete a large number of trades and 
assemble bundles in linear time. However, our initial experiments focused on 
bid-throughput and trading, without evaluating the bundle allocations proximity 
to optimal. In further experiments, we needed to develop an understanding of 
the bundles produced. 
The MDA system is not without limitations, the most signiﬁcant being the original 
implementation was built with a number of the Repast concepts deeply embedded, 
most signiﬁcantly the “step” function and therefore the simulation was built on a cycle 
of (i) execute market, (ii) collect data. This approach has no impact on the market 
operation, but it massively increases the run time of the overall system because after 
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each round of the market we sequentially poll all of the agents in the system to col­
lect market data and statistics and in doing so, pause the market. In completing our 
experiments, we found that the largest amount of elapsed time for the MDA system 
was taken up with dataﬁle loading, preprocessing and statistics gathering and that the 
distributed markets did not require very much time (proportionally to overall run time) 
to execute). Thus our measurements of end-to-end run time contain a large amount 
of non-auction time (note that a similar issue is present for measurement of combina­
torial auctions, so the comparison remains valid) which would potentially confuse a 
comparison of the core allocation systems. 
4.6 MDA Re-factoring in AgentScape 
Having developed the MDA simulation in Repast, we wanted to expand the investiga­
tion and implement a fully asynchronous mechanism in which the traders and markets 
were not controlled by an iterative step cycle and could act according to independent 
market events. We identiﬁed a number of limitations in the Repast approach and areas 
for additional investigation: 
•	 Speed: In doing our Repast-MDA experiments, we found that a lot of the end 
to end run time was being absorbed by the “system” processing of reading ﬁles, 
enumerating over agents and logging results. A much smaller proportion of it 
was spent in the market mechanism. We wanted to improve the platform so that 
it was lighter weight and agents could spend more time in the market and auction 
states and less time reporting performance. 
•	 Concurrency: We wanted to introduce just enough concurrency, so that more 
than one agent could make trading decisions at once. 
•	 Communication: Distributed systems embody signiﬁcant communication over­
heads, and with the Repast stepped approach, agents spent most of their time 
waiting to be called. In a distributed system where agents operated continuously, 
the relative placement of processes and resources would acquire a signiﬁcance 
that was not present in the Repast simulation. We needed to understand how 
much time was spent in communication, synchronisation and trading respec­
tively. 
85 
We have therefore re-factored the Repast simulation to constrain the concurrency. We 
introduced the AgentScape [OB06] platform to build the asynchronous system. 
Agent Platforms such as Jade 2 are focused on the development of many agents within 
a single environment. In this work, we have focused on a comparison of distributed and 
centralised systems (with the agent based system being the distributed component) and 
hence the distributed features and support for inter-host migration within AgentScape 
caused it to be a highly attractive agent platform for us to adopt. 
The major beneﬁt of AgentScape is that it allows us to take advantage of the mobility 
platform it provides to enable agents to migrate to the host they do most processing 
on, so that the majority of communication messages are local, reducing the impact of 
additional messaging overhead required to facilitate a distributed architecture. 
AgentScape was initiated in early 2000 and consists of a “kernel” layer, on-top of 
which AgentScape agents can be launched. The system of middleware then facilitates 
communication, mobility, security, fault tolerance, distributed resource and service 
management. Initial versions of the AgentScape kernel were implemented in C, but it 
has since been reimplemented in Java, which is what we used for our developments. 
In the Java implementation, an AgentScape kernel is invoked on each host computer, 
in a separate Java Virtual Machine (JVM). Each kernel environment is registered with 
the LookupServer, which tracks the location of all AgentScape Kernels and the Agents 
located within them. AgentScape has a number of key concepts as show in Figure 
4.33: Firstly, Agents and Objects are the two basic entities. These reside at a Location. 
Agents can pass messages between each other through the kernel, typically serialised 
Java objects to support a form of Remote Method Invocation (RMI). Additionally, 
AgentScape supports migration of agents from one AgentScape kernel to another. To 
support this, agents are serialised down the kernel communication path and unpacked 
at the other end, before being re-invoked. A more detailed description of AgentScape 
can be found in [OB06] 
2Jade is available at http://jade.tilab.com.

3With thanks for Benno J. Overeinder for the ﬁgure.
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Figure 4.3: Model of AgentScape middleware environment 
4.6.1 Using AgentScape for distributed auctions 
AgentScape is ideally suited to the development of a distributed environment, such as 
our auction platform. It contains a number of building blocks (i) agents, which are the 
active entities of the system, containing the “business logic” for the application. These 
are hosted at (ii) locations which provide the environment for them to exist and can 
be found via the lookup service. Finally, AgentScape provides (iii) services which are 
external software systems hosted by the AgentScape middleware that provide access 
to things like external web services which are wrapped and presented as Web services, 
using SOAP/WSDL generated dynamic interfaces. 
Agents in AgentScape are deﬁned according to the weak notion of agency (as deﬁned 
by Genesereth and Ketchpel in [GK94]) and have the following characteristics: (i) Au­
tonomy: agents control their own processes; (ii) Social ability: ability to communicate 
and cooperate; (iii) Reactiveness: ability to receive information and respond; (iv) Pro-
activeness: ability to take the initiative. Through the kernel, they may (i) communicate 
with other agents, (ii) migrate from one location to another location, (iii) create and 
delete agents and (iv) control service access. We should note that all operations of 
agents are modulo authorisation and security precautions, a framework for which is 
provided by the Agentscape middleware e.g., an agent is allowed to start a service if it 
has the appropriate credentials (ownership, authorization, access to resources, etc.). 
Finally, a location is a place in which agents and services can reside. More precisely 
stated, agents and services are supported by agent servers and (Web) service gateways 
(respectively) which belong to a location. From the perspective of agents, agent servers 
give exclusive access to the AgentScape middleware. Similarly, service gateways pro­
vide access to services external to AgentScape. 
This suite of components provided by the Agentscape middleware made it ideal for 
our implementation of a distributed version of the MDA. 
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4.6.2 MDA Distributed Architecture 
As described in Section 4.2, the centralised MDA implementation runs the simulation 
sequentially. In each round, all auctions run in a single thread of execution. How­
ever, in a distributed system, all processes that have no direct effect on each other 
can often be executed in parallel. In the case of the MDA model, each auction could 
in principle run in parallel which would lead to both improvements in the ﬂuidity of 
the market (with a greater volume of transactions being completed) as well as gen­
eral performance improvements, with a signiﬁcant reduction in the amount of time 
spent on synchronisation of and data capture from the trader agents. The move to this 
architecture also allows us to reﬂect on the actual intended deployment scenario and 
demonstrate scalability and the impact that physical distribution has on the operation 
of the MDA. 
However, just distributing the application does not automatically mean that it will nat­
urally scale and beneﬁt from running on multiple hosts. The application has to be 
carefully divided into agents so that these can perform most of their work without re­
quiring too much coordination. If agents can do most of their processing independent 
of others, a lot of work can be done in parallel. 
In order for the results of the distributed MDA to be comparable with the centralised 
one, the notion of rounds as described at the end of section 4.4 must still be kept. 
However within each round the autonomy of the agents, which are now able to bid in 
parallel, lead to improved performance. 
In the distributed MDA, the three steps done during each round in the synchronous 
step model from section 4.4 will still be used, and are executed sequentially. However, 
within each step, the actions can be done in parallel. In other words, in step 1, all 
Traders can check their progress simultaneously; in step 2, all auctions can run one 
round in parallel; and in step 3, all Traders can process the trade results in parallel. 
This combination of constrained asynchronous execution has the advantage that the 
simulation still has the notion of ‘rounds’, and thus producing results that are compara­
ble to the sequential version, while allowing for the maximum amount of concurrency 
within each round. 
In an agent system, typically the work is divided among several agents, which all 
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perform a part of the work. By using Agentscape to distribute agents over multiple
hosts we were able to spread the load of the application across multiple servers.
4.6.3 Re-factoring for asynchronous operation
Our initial Repast based simulation operated on a “clock-tick” basis, with Repast call-
ing a “step” function on every object at every tick, which in turn caused the agent’s
logic to advance, for example by placing another bid in the market.
However, in the Agentscape model, there are many different agents operating across a
number of hosts and this requires an asynchronous approach to operation, with every
agent acting independently, therefore we re-factored the framework so that the actual
Trader code from our Repast implementation could operate effectively in the new en-
vironment.
Oracle Bundle Trader
Buy Sell
CDA
Success Failure
Unwind Trade
Log
Profit
Log
Loss
Figure 4.4: Visualisation of MDA bundle flow
We highlight below, for the purposes of ensuring a valid comparison, how the MDA
system works in both a synchronous and asynchronous environment.
4.6.4 Initial set-up of the market
The overall flow of bundles is visualised in Figure 4.4 on page 89. The MDA-Agentscape
system starts by loading the Agentscape environment in all the relevant machine in-
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stances and setting up the initial bundles, traders and CDAs. The ﬁrst action is to read 
in the CATs data ﬁle, using the BundleReader and this is a centralised process for both 
the AgentScape and AgentScape-MDA operations. 
The BundleReader reads each line of the CATs ﬁle containing the list of resources 
and the funds for the complete bundle. Identical Java objects are used for goods to 
be bought and sold, with negative quantities indicating a buy request for a good and 
positive quantities indicating a good for sale. The bundles of requests to buy are created 
ﬁrst, with the quantity for each resource being set at -1, subsequently a new sell bundle 
is created with quantity +1. A Buy request bundle will contain multiple good elements, 
whilst a sell good “bundle” will only contain a single good. These bundles are then 
added to the Oracle and the price is calculated. The price for sell bundles are initially 
set to be the average maximum price available (total budget/number of goods for sale) 
as the price can then be negotiated down. 
4.6.5 Startup and Bootstrap Process 
Having read the bundle, the market is started up: 
AgentScape: The ZIPTraders are started by the Oracle with an initial bundle (to buy) 
or good (to sell). They then run for a ﬁxed maximum number of rounds. If no 
trade has been made in that time frame, the ZIP agent returns the bundle to the 
Oracle who can make it available to the market at a later point in time. 
AgentScape-MDA: In the asynchronous market, the Market Manager mechanism and 
Oracle are instantiated during initial setup and remain resident whilst the system 
waits for traders. When a trader joins, it requests a bundle and will then request 
the location of the relevant CDA market for that good. Having joined the mar­
ket, the trader can begin trading as soon as the counter trading party becomes 
available in the CDA. 
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4.6.6 Auction Clearing Process 
Once trading has commenced the auctions will begin to match buy and sell shouts and 
clear goods. 
AgentScape: Buyers enter auctions and place “bid” shouts for the goods that they 
want in the relevant CDAs. Similarly, sellers place “ask” shouts for the available 
goods. A parent trader agent is responsible for managing the (dis)assembly of 
the whole bundle and will dispatch sub-traders to negotiate for a speciﬁc good 
in the relevant auction. Traders will try for up-to 20 rounds to complete the 
purchase or sale, before giving up and returning the bundle to the Oracle. If an 
“ask” shout matches the “bid” then the Oracle is informed of the successful trade 
and the sub-traders close down and report success to their parent trader agent. 
When there is a matching buy and sell shout, the auctioneer will clear the auction 
round. If they do not match, then everyone monitoring the auction is told, and 
participants may submit a lower/higher ask/bid respectively. 
AgentScape-MDA: The asynchronous process is similar, except that whilst the buy­
ers will continue to try for 20 rounds (tests in Gislin Kamda’s MSc report showed 
this to be the optimal number) the sellers will keep selling until they have sold 
the item. The CDA remains open for as long as the AgentScape platform is 
running (although there may be no items available to buy). 
4.6.7 Returning bundles 
In a distributed system of continuous double auctions where each sub-trader was as­
signed a single good it would be possible for that sub-trader to continue attempting 
to trade until the end of the market process. However, in the Repast model, as imple­
mented, sub-traders cannot keep their good beyond the end of each “step” and therefore 
all goods need to be returned to parent traders. 
AgentScape: The sub-traders keep their bundles for 20 rounds, which is the length 
of time each step in the market lasts for. Partial bundles are generally only buy 
bundles (sell bundles have a single resource only so they either trade completely 
or not at all). 
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AgentScape-MDA: Buyers seek to produce whole bundles and when a buyer cannot 
complete the purchase of all the goods in a bundle after a given number of rounds 
(20, as in the synchronous market), the Bundle should be returned to the Oracle 
and the funds associated with it will also be returned and subtracted from the 
trader’s balance. As implemented, we do not penalise the trader for this, beyond 
reversing the trades and decrementing the proﬁt gained, but this remains an op­
tion for future work. Every time the Oracle gets a good to sell from the return 
process (i.e. one which was purchased in a partial bundle), the Oracle will go 
through the bundle again and invoke a new seller agent to resell the good. 
4.6.8 Market stop condition 
AgentScape: The Repast simulation continues to poll all traders until all of the goods 
have been taken at least once. It then continues to run the market for the same 
number of ticks again, to give the market time to process any outstanding bids 
or partial bundles. 
AgentScape-MDA: The asynchronous market does not run for a speciﬁc number of 
ticks or time intervals, therefore, the market mechanism is instantiated and runs 
perpetually. Traders can join and leave the market as required. A CDA continues 
to operate for the life of the AgentScape platform. 
4.6.9 CDA clear conditions 
AgentScape: At every Repast step, the CDA attempts to clear the market and deter­
mine if there are matching bids. 
AgentScape-MDA: At every shout in the market, the CDA will look to see if there 
are matching bids and attempt to clear the market. The CDA can only begin the 
process if there is at least one buy and one sell bid in the market (with corre­
sponding buyer and seller trading agents). 
Once the auction clears ZIPTraders who monitor but are not successful are notiﬁed 
and they can then submit fresh bids. 
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4.6.10 Messaging Overhead 
Two key issues arose during our implementation of the MDA market in AgentScape: 
(i) The high overhead of AgentScape messaging between nodes. 
(ii) The inefﬁciency of the sequential processing model in Repast which meant that 
the relative concurrency available in Agentscape could not be fully exploited. 
In order to make a smooth transition from the existing application to the distributed 
MDA version, all distributed objects are encapsulated in an agent class. The objects 
are then accessed by the Agent Proxy, meaning that every single method call between 
auctions and (sub) traders is translated into a remote method invocation, so method 
invocations are sent using the AgentScape messaging service. The original application 
is not really aware of any distribution of the objects, because this is done transparently. 
Even though the proxies help to distribute the objects, it makes the entire application a 
lot slower, because all invocations are now sent over messages. In the sequential MDA, 
the cost of a method call can be neglected, but for a distributed system this is much 
more costly, because sending an invocation request and waiting for a message with the 
result has a much higher latency. This is especially noticeable for a high number of 
invocations. 
Analyzing this message trafﬁc provided insight into which agents communicate the 
most, and offered a ﬁrst means to improve performance. It is possible to reduce mes­
sage trafﬁc by caching method results whenever possible. Another approach is to 
group method invocations that are often used subsequently, as a single invocation is 
more efﬁcient than multiple invocations. These optimisations generally do not require 
restructuring of the application and as such are easy to apply. 
Other attempts at reducing the number of messages involves more structural changes. 
For example, in the MDA application it can be observed that certain agents commu­
nicate only with certain others. For example, each resource (sub) trader mostly only 
communicates with a single auction object. Moving the resource trader to the same 
node as the auction is executing on, allowing it to perform its work locally to the auc­
tion saves a lot of network based messaging. 
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Another issue that involves a lot of messaging is polling. In the sequential MDA, 
traders poll the auctions for results of their sub-traders on every round. A notiﬁcation 
scheme, where the auction notiﬁes the traders whenever results are available removes 
a signiﬁcant proportion of messages. 
4.6.11 Synchronisation Coordination Overhead 
In order to ensure comparability of results from both the centralised and decentralised 
systems both use a single manager for keeping track of rounds. On each round, every 
agent runs its part of the round, after which it waits for the next round. 
This means that in the distributed MDA a large amount of time is spent waiting. Even 
though auctions can run in parallel, they cannot continue working on a new round until 
all others are ﬁnished with the previous round. 
Having to synchronise is not problematic if the costs of doing so are relatively small 
compared to the amount of work that has to be done by the agents. In this application, 
however, the average time for an auction to process shouts is less than the time it 
takes to send and receive a message. For example, when running an auction with a 
lot of agents, each time a bid is received a message is sent to the agents participating 
informing them of the new bid and giving them the opportunity to update theirs. 
A larger grain size (i.e. if the messages contained more information/work) would 
reduce the impact of the messaging. This could be obtained by allowing traders and 
auctions to perform multiple steps at once. However, in the current design traders 
check the status of their bids in all of the auctions they participate in for every round. 
This operation allows them to maintain accurate control of funds, but it restricts the 
auctions and traders to performing only a single round at a time. 
If the amount of work done by each individual agent is what demands most of the 
processing time, then distribution would be more successful. However, in the MDA 
simulation the cost comes from having to perform work for many individual agents. 
All agents have to be coordinated, though each individual agent performs relatively 
little work. 
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4.6.12 Evaluation of Agentscape-MDA 
The software engineering challenge we faced in our Agentscape-MDA system lies in 
how to scale that demonstrator up into a system comprising many more agents running 
over multiple machines. We took an incremental approach, re-factoring the MDA 
system into a distributed system, but it is clear that we did not go far enough in our 
work because it seems that whilst increasing the size of the agent platform does not 
impact on the market dynamic in the system, it does impact massively on the runtime. 
Testing Objectives 
In our experiments there are two variables. Firstly, we can expand the number of 
servers running the Agentscape environment, to test the effect of the inter-environment 
communication. Secondly we have run multiple datasets on both environments, to 
determine the runtime performance of the systems relative to each other. 
Our objectives in testing were to consider the impact of the overhead imposed by the 
communication between nodes, which we can demonistrate by increasing the number 
of nodes in the system and monitoring runtimes and market throughput. 
We would anticipate that increasing the number of processor nodes would increase the 
CPU available for the system, but that adding more nodes will distribute the problem 
more sparsely and hence increase the amount of inter-node communication. 
The second objective was to run a number of simulations using the L2 dataset, to com­
pare both the overall runtimes and market throughput of the Agentscape and Repast 
simulations. 
In our AgentScape simulations the experiments used 400 trading agents. 
Initial AgentScape Results 
Our AgentScape simulations were run on both a single computer and on multiple com­
puters. When communicating locally, the inter-agent method calls pass directly be­
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tween Java objects. When the agent is remote, AgentScape uses the custom RMI mech­
anism to faciliate communication between agents running on different AgentScape 
platforms. 
(Bid Throughput is deﬁned as the total number of bids traded in the market simulation.) 
Run A — 1,2 and 4 AgentScape Environments: 
No of Environments Runtime (min:sec) Bid Throughput 
1 20:46 18469 
2 50:53 17015 
4 74:08 16253 
Run B — 2,4,8,16 AgentScape Environments:

No of Environments Runtime (min:sec) Bid Throughput 
2 43:52 18469 
4 61:18 19202 
8 72:33 17368 
16 81:26 16232 
Run C — a single Repast Environment 
No of Environments Runtime (min:sec) Bid Throughput 
1 0:59 18354 
We are also able to show equivalence, across both the four AgentScape environments 
and the Repast environment, as the number of bundles traded, completed and unful­
ﬁlled across the market are consistent for all iterations of the experiments, as shown in 
4.5. 
It can be seen from these tables that all experiments produce similar market throughput. 
Additionally, all experiments run to completion within the same number of “ticks” 
(clock cycles). 
The key difference between all our runs is that the runtime in AgentScape is much 
greater than the Repast runtime, and that the AgentScape runtime is greatly extended 
as the number of processors increases. 
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Figure 4.5: MDA Bundles Traded - Repast and AgentScape 
AgentScape Implementation Evaluation 
MAS software development is characteristically evolutionary and a common starting 
point is a proof-of-concept system running on a single machine utilizing an agent plat­
form or even a simulation framework. The software engineering challenge lies in how 
to scale that demonstrator up into a system comprising many more agents running over 
multiple machines. A large-budget solution might throw away the demonstrator and 
rewrite from the ground up, but there are many risks with this approach as well as 
high costs. An alternative approach, that is the subject of this paper, is to refactor the 
demonstrator into a large-scale system, taking advantage of the incremental nature of 
the changes applied and regression testing to create conﬁdence in the process and the 
outcome. 
We have pursued this approach and developed a system to support large numbers of 
agents participating in large numbers of auctions on geographically distributed ma­
chines. However, from our initial experiments, it seems that whilst increasing the size 
of the agent platform does not impact on the market dynamic in the system, it does 
impact massively on the runtime. 
This dramatic increase in runtimes is due to the large number of messages that are 
passed between trader agents, all of which need to be serialised and sent through the 
AgentScape message system. The amount of communication that is required to keep 
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the agents busy is simply too much with respect to the amount work that each individ­
ual agent needs to perform. The CPUs sit idle for too long while waiting for messages. 
In this particular simulation, it would have been better to utilize multiple CPUs on 
a shared-memory memory machine (such as a single multi-core machine), thereby 
reducing the latency from message sending whilst still distributing the work over mul­
tiple processing units. 
However, the choice to constrain the asynchronous nature of the distributed simulation 
by keeping the notion of rounds, did make it possible to compare the results with the 
centralized simulation. Unfortunately, this choice also meant that a lot of synchro­
nization was necessary among traders and auctions, which lowered the overall perfor­
mance. A fully asynchronous simulation would probably show better performance. 
Another lesson learned was that placing agents on hosts must be done with care. Plac­
ing agents that communicate a lot close together (i.e., on the same host) improves the 
performance of the simulation considerably. For example, sub-traders, that try to ac­
quire a single resource at an auction on behalf of a trader, should be placed on the same 
host as the auction. Unfortunately, there are also agents that cannot be easily placed 
together. For example, the traders themselves cannot be placed at auction’s location, as 
the trader has to interact with many different auctions to acquire a bundle of resources, 
and auctions are best placed at different hosts to take advantage of parallellism. 
In conclusion, it has proved to be difﬁcult to optimise the speed of the MDA market 
simulation by distributing over multiple hosts, while still respecting the synchronisa­
tion contraints from the original Repast simulation. Synchronising agents is very time 
consuming due to the amount of messaging involved. 
An alternative approach to reduce the communication overhead, without the need to 
change the structure and algorithm of the simulation, is to use a shared address space 
for all agents. For example, running the simulation with multiple threads on a single 
(multi-core) host would not require RMI communications but would still beneﬁt from 
running auctions and traders in parallel. 
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4.7 Conclusion - the MDA System 
The MDA system has been built to provide a distributed market mechanism for per­
forming resource allocation. It takes input from CATs generated test dataﬁles, extrapo­
lates them and uses intelligent agents to trade in a series of continuous double auctions 
to complete a resource allocation. 
As well as using an approach of distributed decision making to resource allocation, we 
have implemented MDA using both the single-host repast simulator and a multi-host 
Agentscape based simulator and shown that there are signiﬁcant engineering chal­
lenges to be considered when running a multi-agent system with a high volume of 
transactions in a networked environment. 
However, the use of a distributed market mechanism has provided us with a reliable 
way to simulate resource allocation in an environment with no centralised single point 
of control and that allows us to begin looking at the question of which resource man­
agement technique is the most appropriate for any given situation and how the out­
comes produced by centralised and decentralised systems compare. 
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Chapter 5 
Experimental Approach 
In evaluating our experimental approach we need to consider a number of areas. Firstly, 
we must address and understand the differences and similarities in the centralised and 
decentralised system and subsequently conﬁrm that there is a sound basis for compar­
ison. With that established we then identify four metrics which provide measures for 
comparison. Next, we consider the structure of our experiments and the make up and 
selection of test data, before concluding with a discussion on the structural integrity 
and validity of the two software algorithms, CASS and MDA. 
Having evaluated the approach, we turn to the actual experiments and describe the 
speciﬁc simulations completed and results captured. 
5.1 Comparison Problem 
We have previously discussed the problem of comparing two systems—one centralised, 
one decentralised, but it is beneﬁcial to recap on why the comparison is both valid and 
useful in the context of discovering the most appropriate resource allocation mecha­
nism for a given set of circumstances. 
We achieved our comparison using a common set of inputs (from CATS dataﬁles) and 
then producing the same outputs—a list of which bidders had ’won’ their goods and 
the corresponding costs and values. 
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Some will argue that a centralised system is not solving the same problem as a decen­
tralised system but we disagree. Whilst they do use entirely different methods, they 
begin with the same data and objectives and end with outcomes that are objectively the 
same, in that an allocation formed from preferences is completed. 
It is accepted that to achieve a Pareto optimal allocation you must have complete pref­
erence information for all market participants, which is the situation with a centralised 
mechanism. With a distributed system, participants will only release as much pref­
erence information as is necessary. In this scenario, the market will achieve a set of 
outcomes each of which is Pareto efﬁcient (no goods can be reallocated to make any­
one better off, without disadvantaging others) however, it is impossible to know which, 
if any of these are the Pareto optimal solution. However, as discussed in Section 3.2.1 
(page 58) we do reach a point on a Pareto frontier and in a market mechanism, all 
further optimisations must optimise on the basis of social welfare. 
5.2 Factors for comparison 
We have identiﬁed the following factors for comparison: 
Hardness: In “Combinatorial Auctions” [LBS05], KLB presents “Gross hardness” 
ﬁgures for a range of CATs distributions and we reproduce that graph, of runtime 
orders of magnitude, in Figure 6.1. We are able to perform a similar analysis of 
our own data, along with that from KLB’s CPLEX and CASS simulators. 
Time: The Combinatorial Auction runs as a single-shot process and has a deﬁned 
end point. We are therefore able to easily determine the amount of actual time 
(which can be scaled relative to different CPU speeds) taken to compute so­
lutions. In the MDA, run time measurement happens differently, because the 
market mechanism runs continually, however, there is a speciﬁc amount of time 
between starting with a fresh dataset of goods and bundles in the market and the 
point at which the traders in the market will have either (a) successfully com­
pleted their bundles or (b) concluded that they will not be successful and will 
have ”given up”. In our MDA simulations, we looked at the completion rates 
after 500 rounds, as after that point we determined that the market was largely 
inactive. 
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Financial: Each bundle has an assigned value and the object of the Combinatorial 
Auction is to maximise the revenue earned by the sellers through the sale of 
bundles which obtain the highest set of purchase prices. For the MDA, we ex­
trapolate the CATS bundle prices to give individual goods a buy/sell price (by 
uniformly splitting the available overall price) and so for each bundle we can 
measure the distance between the total sale price of all goods sold (potentially 
for sets of incomplete bundles) and the total available budget. This allows us to 
determine the “under-spend” incurred through only purchasing partial bundles. 
Efﬁciency: Building on our discussion of the behavioural properties of computation 
markets in Section 2.2 (page 50), in which we considered that a combination 
of pareto optimality and social welfare maximisation deﬁned “efﬁciency” we 
shall speciﬁcally deﬁne market efﬁciency for this analysis as being the total 
value of trades undertaken. In the CASS environment many of the bids are not 
met because they do not represent a Pareto optimal solution, however, that also 
means that there is value available to sellers which is not “unlocked”. Poten­
tially it would be possible to generate more value for sellers by complementing 
the complete bundles sold as part of a Pareto optimal outcome with the sale of 
goods from partial bundles, thus giving us a social welfare beneﬁt in our “value 
of trades” measurement. 
Completion: In the Combinatorial Auction, the mechanism is such that it ﬁnds the 
optimum solution for complete bundles. Bidders either receive all of their re­
quested goods, or none of them. The MDA on the other hand is a linear process 
and bidders buy their goods sequentially with no certainty that they can com­
plete the bundle. Therefore at the speciﬁc point in time when the mechanism is 
stopped there will be a mixture of partial and complete bundles. In our model, 
each good within the bundle has equal value and no preference is attached to 
any speciﬁc good. Therefore we propose to measure completion as a percentage 
score of the number of goods out of the total desired bundle obtained at the point 
the market snapshot is taken. 
Satisfaction: We have presented criteria which allow us to make quantitative com­
parisons of the solutions we have computed from our CASS and MDA solvers. 
In order to provide a statistical comparison it would be helpful to have a sin­
gle, combined metric by which we can measure the relative performance of the 
different approaches. We have deﬁned this parameter as “satisfaction” and con­
sider it to be the product of underspend and the completion ratio for the bundle. 
Expressed algorithmically, we say: 
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$satisfaction = $underSpend ∗ $completionPercentage 
The rationale for this is as follows: 
•	 If I complete my bundle, I am happy. If I purchase it cheaply, I will be 
happier than if it has a high cost. If I get 100 percent completion for a high 
underspend value, then I will have a high satisfaction rating. 
•	 If I get 50 percent of the goods desired for lots of money, I will have a very 
low underspend value which will be divided by 50 percent, giving me a 
very low satisfaction ratio. 
•	 If I get 50 percent of goods desired for little money, I will be reasonably 
satisﬁed, so my high underspend value will be divided by two thus taking 
the downside of an incomplete bundle into account. 
Through the use of these variables we will be able to develop a quantitative analysis of 
the relative merits of the centralised and decentralised approaches and we shall explore 
these themes in more detail when considering the results of our experiments. 
5.3 Construction of Experiments 
We used the Combinatorial Auction Test Suite (CATS) for the generation of test data, 
and in particular, data published by Kevin Leyton-Brown (KLB) [LBPS00], as the 
basis for our comparison. 
KLB produced “empirical hardness-models” as researchers ﬁnd it very useful to be 
able to predict how long an algorithm will take to solve a particular problem instance. 
This will allow the user to decide how to allocate computation resources and whether 
a complete or approximate algorithm should be used. 
KLB published test data for a number of different hardness models from two different 
sources. The ﬁrst, published along with the initial wave of algorithms for solving the 
Winner Determination Problem (WDP) are known as L1 (and L2) through L7. These 
were criticised in several ways, perhaps most of all for lacking economic justiﬁcation, 
a signiﬁcant criticism because a combinatorial auction is a weighted set packing prob­
lem and if the data upon which algorithms lacks any connection to the combinatorial 
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auction domain it is reasonable to ask whether the algorithms also have any connec­
tion. 
On the other hand, these datasets do have published work associated with them and 
given that a core principle of our comparison is that we are able to compare our results 
against work by others, we are keen to include them. 
Therefore, we selected the L2 dataset, produced using the Weighted Random distri­
bution from Sandholm [1999], which chooses a number of goods g from [1,m] and 
assigns the bid a price drawn uniformly from [0,1]. We made the selection based 
on recommendations by KLB in [LBNS02] in which he considered the percentage of 
dominant bids generated over a number of runs and was able to identify which dis­
tributions were trivially easy (L1 and L5). L2 was less trivial and hence we adopted 
it. 
Concerns the original datasets (L1 to L5) were trivially easy to solve lead KLB to 
develop a new version of his CATS systems which consisted of a number of distri­
butions paths, regions, arbitrary, matching and scheduling. These seek to model real 
world situations, for example Paths models an auction of transportation links between 
cities, whilst Regions models an auction of real estate. We choose to work with the 
Scheduling distribution as that models a distributed job-shop scheduling domain, with 
bidders requesting an XOR’ed set of resource-time slots to satisfy their speciﬁc dead­
lines. The scheduling distribution, therefore, had the most in common with our dis­
tributed market problem. We were also interested to determine how our model fared 
with a harder distribution and so we have conducted limited experiments with the 
Arbitrary dataset, but we lacked sufﬁcient computing power to develop a complete set 
of a results. 
5.4 Structure of Test Data 
We also need to consider how big our test dataset should be. Most researchers ﬁx their 
problems in terms of the number goods and the number of bids and indeed, problem 
size is a reasonably well understood parameter of hardness. However, KLB showed 
that whilst it was easy to ﬁx the number of goods, it is much more difﬁcult to keep the 
number of bids constant. One of the main problems is the need to ensure that there are 
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no dominant bids in the test data. KLB deﬁnes the concept of dominant bids as being: 
Bid i is dominated by Bid j if the goods requested by i are the same or a 
superset of goods requested by j and the price-offered by i is smaller or 
equal to the price offered by j.[LBNS02] 
One can see that if a set of bids contains those which are offering less money for 
more goods, then they should be automatically excluded as they do not contribute to 
the hardness of the dataset in any way. Indeed, most solvers (e.g. CPLEX) employ a 
polynomial-time reprocessing step to ﬁlter them out ﬁrst. 
Each of the test datasets is generated as a bid-graph, and KLB built the distributions 
using 30 features, which group into 5 broad feature areas: (i) Bid and Good node 
statistical features for the links between bid and good nodes, (ii) Bid Graph structural 
features, such as edge density, path length, (iii) Linear Programming based features 
(these make it harder for the CPLEX solver), (iv) Price based features, and (v) Problem 
Size features. 
We choose a ﬁxed problem size of 256 goods, 1000 non-dominated bids, with 500 
instances of the problem as these were pre-produced by KLB along with associated 
results computations. Based on KLB’s results the “L2” and “Scheduling” datasets 
looked feasible but non-trivial to compute using the CASS and MDA systems. We 
have also conducted limited investigation with the “Arbitrary” dataset, but this is a 
much harder problem set to solve, containing problem instances between 2 and 5 orders 
of magnitude harder, as shown in Figure 6.1. 
For the majority of graphs therefore, we plotted 2000 test instances, 500 each for the 
L2 and Scheduling distributions for both CASS and MDA systems. Each test instance 
is a bid for a bundle of goods and each of these bundles has characteristics which 
we examined, typically through aggregate measures (such as standard deviation and 
variance). 
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5.5 Calibration of timings 
During the course of the PhD a number of different computer systems were used to test 
programs and calculate the solutions and many early results were computed using the 
Oxford National Grid Service Cluster a set of 64 dual CPU Intel Xeon 3.06 GHz server 
nodes and individual experiments were computed on two departmental workstations, 
which contained high spec Xeon processors. 
Subsequently all calculations were recomputed using the Aquilla cluster at University 
of Bath, which provided 50 quad CPU Intel Xeon 2.8 GHz server nodes and graphs 
shown in Section 6.3 are all computed consistently on this platform. 
In order to calibrate early results to the ﬁnal “aquilla” computations, timings were 
converted via multiplication to the number of clock-ticks executed on the various CPU 
models (according to CPU speciﬁcation), such that the comparison was consistent 
regardless of speed of actual execution. 
5.6 Veriﬁcation of accuracy of CASS 
KLB initially used the commercially available CPLEX solver to determine his solu­
tions, but then went on to propose his own solver, the Combinatorial Auction Solution 
Solver (CASS). CASS is provably optimal: It ﬁnds a solution that maximises the so­
cial welfare for a particular scenario and its answer can be compared directly to other 
algorithms, such as BidTree [SSGL05] and CPLEX. 
As we know from our earlier discussion on Pareto optimality and social welfare op­
timisation, it is possible that a frontier might exist with a number of complementary 
solutions (i.e.: that yield the same social welfare with different bids). In the published 
literature there appears to be an implicit assumption that the solutions that CASS pro­
duces are identical to the ones that, say, CPLEX or BidTree produced. Whilst there 
can, of course, be only one answer, with respect to the value of the solution, a Pareto 
frontier represents a number of different combinations of goods and there does not ap­
pear to be any published work comparing the different combinations of outcomes for 
centralised solvers. 
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In email correspondence with KLB (August 2008), he said 
“CASS is provably optimal, so are BidTree and CPLEX. It’s possi­
ble that there will exist solutions that tie (i.e., that yield the same Social 
Welfare with different bids); in this case, the different methods could ﬁnd 
different sets of bids. I’ve done experiments conﬁrming that CASS really 
does ﬁnd the optimum, checking against CPLEX (I’ve never been given 
code for BidTree or CABOB). So have others, e.g., Craig Boutilier. As far 
as I know these results haven’t been published.” 
It is unfortunate that there is no published analysis of the possible different solution 
sets, however on the basis that KLB’s work has been widely scrutinised, published and 
produces the same ﬁscal (if not component) output as other solvers, such as CPLEX, 
we feel conﬁdent that it provides an excellent basis for comparing the MDA solution. 
One further disadvantage for the CASS is that whilst KLB has published raw test data 
and his run times and optimum solution values (i.e. the amount CASS spends) for 
the bid problems he presents, he has not published the solutions or details on which 
bids won the process. CASS is deterministic and we assume, that our execution of the 
CASS algorithm with the same data gives us the same optimal value (which we have 
checked) from the same winning bundles (which we cannot check), but in faster time 
(our CPUs are newer and run faster, so this is to be expected). 
5.7 Conclusions 
We have outlined the two market mechanisms that we wish to compare and given a 
detailed overview as to how we will complete the comparison. Importantly, we have 
identiﬁed our metrics hardness, ﬁnancial, completion, efﬁciency, time and satisfaction 
which allow us to highlight the relative performance of the two mechanisms. 
Having developed a comparison framework, we then considered the test data, selecting 
the L2 and Scheduling datasets. It is important to ensure that neither the test data nor 
the models shall trivialise the problem. We examined MDA in detail in Chapter 4 and 
here we have considered problem of dominant bids in the test data and the accuracy of 
the CASS system. 
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Chapter 6 
Experimental Results 
6.1 Introduction 
Through the use of our key metrics (i) Hardness, (ii) Time, (iii) Financial Performance, 
(iv) Efﬁciency, (v) Completion and (vi) Satisfaction we are able to evaluate the differ­
ent facets of market performance delivered by the two algorithms, CASS and MDA, 
in an objective manner. We have already identiﬁed in our earlier discussion that both 
algorithms are useful and perform well in different circumstances. Through drawing a 
comparison we are able to identify the characteristics they exhibit that allow us to give 
recommendations, based on empirical research, as to when the use of each mechanism 
is more appropriate. 
In examining the data we were able to observe patterns and characteristics that we 
felt were unusual or inconsistent, but typically related to our preconceptions about the 
“hardness” of the distribution sample set. Therefore, to ground our results in context, 
we begin with an analysis of KLB’s previously published results using the CPLEX 
combinatorial auction solver software. 
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Figure 6.1: Gross Hardness, 1000 Bids/256 Goods, Graph by KLB 
6.2 Examining Hardness 
In “Combinatorial Auctions” [LBS05], KLB presents “Gross hardness” ﬁgures for a 
range of CATs distributions and we reproduce that graph in Figure 6.1. This ﬁgure 
shows the results of the same 500 runs for each distribution on problems with 256 
goods and 1,000 non dominated bids, indicating the number of instances with the 
same order-of-magnitude runtime—that is log10(runtime). These experiments were 
run on a cluster of Pentium III Xeon 550-Mhz machines and took over a CPU-year to 
gather. Many of the distributions are shown to be easy for the CPLEX solver and the 
ﬁrst reaction might be to suggest that scheduling, with approximately 80% of outputs 
having runtime that is one class faster than the L2 results shown, would be to suggest 
that L2 is “harder” for CPLEX, and indeed, KLB conﬁrms this: 
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“We can see that several of the CATS distributions are quite easy for 
CPLEX, and that others vary from easy to hard. It is interesting that most 
distributions had instances that varied in hardness by several orders of 
magnitude, despite the fact that all instances had the same problem size.” 
The test samples developed by KLB (matching, scheduling, paths, regions, arbitrary) 
are considered realistic, so KLB goes on to consider whether the distributions that 
are considered “easy” can be made harder and he concludes in [LBNS06] that this is 
indeed possible. 
However, problem hardness is not the only interesting property for a distribution and 
KLB goes onto say 
...this evidence suggests that realistic bidding patterns may often lead to 
much more tractable winner determination problems than the hardest un­
realistic distributions such as Uniform/L3. This is good news for those 
who hope to run practical combinatorial auctions. 
We agree with this analysis—and have gone further to suggest that real world problems 
have different characteristics to the theoretical models typically used in combinatorial 
auction analysis. But KLB’s work (Figure 6.1) might lead the casual reader to assume 
that a problem which is hard for one solver (in this case CPLEX) is also hard for 
others that try to solve the same problems in the same manner—we even went so far 
in previous work [GP07] as to state that 
In terms of difﬁculty, KLB has shown that the majority of L2 problems 
have a runtime of approximately 1 order of magnitude greater than Schedul­
ing, when computed using KLB’s CASS solver. We therefore consider L2 
to be more difﬁcult to solve. 
In trying to understand our results we looked to see how our runtimes compared to 
KLBs CASS experiments, but ﬁrst, we realised the need to address a more fundamental 
question—how do KLB’s CASS results compare to his CPLEX results? 
Firstly, we wish to deal with the outcomes of CASS and CPLEX. Both algorithms 
produce identical optimum solution values (the data is public and veriﬁcation is trivial), 
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and although we cannot verify which bundles are selected (that data is not published) 
we assume it is identical, given the identical solution values. 
Figure 6.2: CASS and CPLEX Gross Hardness for L2 and Scheduling (KLB Results 
Only) 
In Figure 6.2 we extract KLB’s values for the runtime of the L2 and Scheduling 
datasets using CPLEX and CASS algorithms. A visual comparison of this data in 
3D form, as shown in Figure 6.3, shows that the CPLEX ﬁgures provide the same 
order of magnitude as previously illustrated in Figure 6.1. This graph shows us that 
CPLEX ﬁnds the Scheduling distribution (S-KLB-CPLEX) very easy, with all results 
sitting within magnitude order zero. L2 (L2-K-CPLEX) is considered a little harder 
for CPLEX, with nearly 90% of solutions sitting within order 1 and 10% in order 2. 
However, when we compare KLB’s runtime results for the CASS algorithm they are 
different and we see the CASS runtime for the Scheduling distribution (S-KLB-CASS) 
is spread widely across orders 1,2,3 and 4 (whereas 100% of the results are in order 
1 for CPLEX) suggesting that CASS ﬁnds the Scheduling distribution much harder to 
solve than CPLEX, whilst, for L2 (L2-K-CASS), CASS ﬁnds it marginally easier to 
solve than CPLEX, with 100% of results found in order 1 (CPLEX has only 80% of 
results in order 1). 
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The difference in these results, such that we might consider them to produce “opposite” 
results suggests the intriguing notion that different algorithms and approaches will ﬁnd 
different aspects of a distribution difﬁcult. CPLEX employs a number of complex 
preprocessing steps before initiating a branch and bound search whilst CASS uses an 
approach of (i) structuring the search space to eliminate conﬂicting bids, (ii) pruning 
the space to eliminate parts of the bid-tree that will not achieve more revenue than 
the current best allocation, through use of an overestimate function and (iii) ordering 
heuristics to capitalise on the structured approach and improve performance. 
If we add in our MDA runtime results we can see that MDA, as one might expect, 
demonstrates different characteristics. Figure 6.3 shows us the runtime, again using the 
same log10(runtime) value, but now with the four datasets (CPLEX by KLB, CASS by 
KLB and ourselves, MDA by ourselves) across both L2 and Scheduling distributions 
for comparison. 
Figure 6.3: Gross Hardness of L2 and Scheduling Distributions 
We can draw several insights from this data. Firstly, our execution of the CASS envi­
ronment is typically an order of magnitude faster than that of KLB, which is simply 
an artifact of processor speed improvements. Secondly, we see that MDA ﬁnds L2 
marginally harder than Scheduling, a pattern that is similar to CPLEX, but different to 
CASS which as discussed, has a wide distribution of runtime orders of magnitude for 
the CASS-Scheduling results. 
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6.3 Time

Figure 6.4: CASS and MDA Time vs Number of Goods Sold 
With some understanding in place of the performance characteristics of the different 
distributions and their relative runtimes we turn to evaluate actual values, shown in 
Figure 6.4. This graph shows us the number of goods sold in the market, along with the 
time taken to do so. Time is presented in seconds and all experiments were conducted 
on the same hardware and operating system environment to ensure comparability. 
The number of goods sold has been computed by calculating the composition of the 
bundles which form part of the ﬁnal solutions generated by each algorithm. There is 
a maximum of 256 goods available. CASS runs either to completion, or until 10800 
seconds, our “wall time”, whilst MDA runs for 500 rounds and we record its ﬁnal 
position at the 500 round mark. 
Figure 6.4 has a logarithmic time scale of actual execution time, which shows us that 
for the MDA algorithm the amount of time taken to complete 500 rounds is very much 
a consistent result for all problems as the time elapsed is due to the market process, 
rather than the size or complexity of the problem. Much more variable is the number 
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of goods sold showing us that it is the structure of the problem that deﬁnes whether or 
not we can obtain a high level of goods sold. For CASS, ﬁgure 6.4 illuminates ﬁgure 
6.3 showing that all of the L2 instances are solved very quickly, whilst most of the 
Scheduling instances are actually unsolved and, for those which are, there is a large 
variance on the number of goods used in the solutions. 
Looking at runtimes in isolation has told us that our MDA system provides more pre­
dictable run times (experimentation showed us that 500 rounds is a sensible number 
and extending the runtime does not improve the solution) but the CASS algorithm is 
much more variable. For some problems L2 is faster and uses a greater number of 
goods. We need to consider these results in the context of the value and efﬁciency of 
the result, to draw further conclusions. 
6.4 Financial 
In a Combinatorial Auction (implemented as CASS) each bundle has an assigned value 
and the objective is to maximise the revenue earned by the sellers through selecting 
combinations of goods into bundles that obtain the highest set of purchase prices. 
For a Distributed Auction (implemented as MDA), buyers are in control of making 
purchases and will tend toward their lowest price. (We extrapolate the CATS bundle 
prices to give individual goods a buy/sell price through uniformly splitting the available 
overall price) and so for each bundle we can measure the difference between the total 
sale price of all goods sold (potentially for sets of incomplete bundles) and the total 
available budget. This allows us to calculate the total spend for the bundles completed, 
deﬁned formally as the sum of buying prices for all goods bought in a bundle. Figure 
6.5 can be compared with ﬁgure 6.4 and represents the total spend per problem for the 
same set of data instances and number of goods sold. Unfortunately, it is very difﬁcult 
to meaningfully represent the three values, Spend, Time and Number of Goods Sold 
in a single graph, however, we can see that spend increases with the number of goods 
purchases and there are no instances in either algorithm where the entire budget is 
being spent on a small number of goods. This creates some conﬁdence in the correct 
functioning of the algorithms. 
Comparing MDA and CASS results, we see that MDA is spending less on goods (over 
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Figure 6.5: CASS and MDA Actual Spend vs Number of Goods Sold 
all and per good) than CASS, particularly for the Scheduling distribution, but also for 
the L2 distribution. This again is evidence of the two different strategies (markets 
maximise for buyers, auctions for sellers) working effectively. 
CASS utilises 100% of the available funds for a bundle because it simply looks for 
bundle offers that will maximise the gross revenue to the sellers. However, there are 
some problems where the optimum sellers revenue can be obtained without having to 
purchase all of the available goods. We can see this in Figure 6.6, with the CASS 
algorithm producing a high level of good utilisation for L2, but quite poor good utili­
sation for the Scheduling results which hit the wall time (approximately 30%). MDA 
has higher good utilisation for Scheduling, but fares worse for L2, consistent with the 
results we saw in Figure 6.5. 
We know that CASS will always spend 100% of the available budget for a bid, so 
considering just the MDA results, we looked to see what percentage of the budget had 
been spent on purchasing goods. We would consider an algorithm to be very successful 
if lots of goods are bought for a low budgetary amount. Figure 6.7 shows that MDA is 
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Figure 6.6: CASS/MDA runs - Number of Goods Sold 
particularly successful for the Scheduling distribution with most of the test instances 
having solutions using over 80% of available goods, for less than 35% of available 
budget. With L2, the distribution of the goods sold value is much more widely spread 
across the tests. Whilst this graph does leave open the question of why MDA on L2 
achieves such a varied number of goods sold across such a varied amount of spend it 
does show us that for the upper bound of results, MDA only increases the spend on 
goods as the number of goods increases (i.e. it never pays large sums of money for 
small numbers of goods). 
By encouraging the traders to spending a low budgetary amount, we are encouraging 
strong behaviour from Buyers and lower prices for Sellers than would be achieved in 
a Combinatorial Auction. A distributed market where buyers are bidding for single 
items will only be able to force higher prices if demand for goods outstrips supply. 
If it did and prices rose then we would expect to see behaviour similar to the CASS 
results shown in Figure 6.5 with higher unit prices and a concentrated total spend. 
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Figure 6.7: MDA Budget Spent vs Number of Goods Sold 
6.5 Efﬁciency 
This leads us to the question of market efﬁciency. In ﬁnancial markets a market is 
considered to be efﬁcient if it channels funds to those ﬁrms and organisations with the 
most promising investment opportunities, operating costs are as low as possible and 
the price represents all new and relevant information. In this context the focus is on 
the price of trades and speciﬁcally measures market efﬁciency as being the sum of 
total value of trades undertaken. In the CASS environment many of the bids are not 
met because they do not represent a Pareto optimal solution. However, that also means 
that there is value available to sellers which is not “unlocked” and potentially it would 
be possible to generate more value for sellers by complementing the complete bundles 
sold as part of a Pareto optimal outcome with the sale of goods from partial bundles. 
Considering Figures 6.8 and 6.9 we can see for both distributions, Scheduling and L2, 
both MDA and CASS have nearly equal efﬁciency for very hard problems, with a direct 
convergence in L2 (when sorted by Efﬁciency, we see that both datasets converge for 
instance 500). However, in L2, MDA is shown to be much more efﬁcient for a larger 
proportion of the test data than CASS and it is important that we also consider run time, 
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because whilst the efﬁciency does converge for both distributions, the MDA algorithm 
achieves those results in much faster time, as we discussed in Figure 6.3. 
Figure 6.8: CASS and MDA Efﬁciency for Scheduling data 
We have deﬁned efﬁciency as the total sum of monies spent on goods acquired, divided 
by the number of goods acquired. Therefore, if the efﬁciency value is low, less money 
is spent per good (and ultimately more money is available to purchase further goods). 
When comparing CASS and MDA for the scheduling distribution (ﬁgure 6.8), we see 
that overall, MDA is more efﬁcient, but as efﬁciency becomes less (cost per good 
increases) the results for CASS and MDA converge, showing that, for the worst case 
scenario MDA does not spend more per good than CASS. 
The result for L2 (Figure 6.9) is more striking, with CASS always having a fairly high 
cost per good, but little variance in the average cost per good. The MDA solution 
has fewer results, because there are some problems for which MDA has no solution 
deﬁned (as can be seen on the 0-50 results in Figure 6.9), but for many solutions, the 
cost per good, or efﬁciency, is much less. The average cost per good grows steadily, 
until MDA and CASS solutions converge for the ﬁnal dataset, showing again that MDA 
is certainly not less, and in many cases more efﬁcient. 
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Figure 6.9: CASS and MDA Efﬁciency for L2 data 
The efﬁciency ﬁgures are reinforced by a second set of results, those of the number of 
goods sold. In Figure 6.5, our graph of the total spend vs number of goods sold; we see 
that MDA is able to spend a signiﬁcant fraction less than CASS. Interestingly, for the 
Scheduling distribution, all of the solutions solved by MDA have a fairly high number 
of goods sold (>200), whilst those solutions determined by CASS have a much wider 
spread from 10-250. However, the L2 distribution reverses this trend, with MDA 
results being spread widely, and CASS results being tightly clustered. Our runtime 
results give a hint as to why this behaviour exists, with our Scheduling problems being 
completed quickly by MDA, and L2 taking several orders of magnitude (as shown in 
Figure 6.3) longer. 
This suggests that when a problem can be solved quickly by MDA, it may not be done 
so for signiﬁcant extra savings on costs per good, but it will be solved with greater 
efﬁciency than CASS achieves. On problems such as those in L2 which a solver like 
CASS has traditionally found easy, MDA achieves better cost efﬁciencies but does take 
longer. With CASS the spend is higher and the time is shorter. 
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6.6 Completion 
We deﬁne “Completion” as the percentage of the goods in a speciﬁc bundle purchased 
as part of the overall solution. Later, we can look at aggregate completion values, 
where we statistically analyse all of the completion values per test instance and per 
bundle. 
To consider completion, we have looked at how many goods are traded, how many 
bundles are traded and which goods form those bundles. Each of 500 dataﬁles for the 
two distributions of CATS problem contains approximately 256 goods and 1000 bids 
for those goods. We have computed these problems using both available algorithms, 
CASS and MDA, which produces solutions, in the form of winning bids and a list of 
goods that were successfully traded to make up the bids for bundles of goods. 
CASS always solves problems by ensuring it can allocate 100% of the goods required 
for those bundles that it wishes to trade, whereas MDA operates sequentially, with 
many agents buying goods and therefore partially completing the bundles. Some bun­
dles are completed to 100%, but on average the percentage of complete bundles is 
much lower. We can observe that for the scheduling distribution, it is typically lower 
than for the L2 distribution. 
The second important factor is the extent to which there is overlap between the goods 
that form the MDA and CASS solutions. This balance, of which goods, how many, for 
how much (ﬁnancial result) and in what time, are the factors that combine to complete 
our understanding of the problem space. 
6.6.1 Number of Bundles 
We deﬁne the concept of a “touched bundle” which is a bundle that has some goods 
(>1) completed by either the MDA or CASS solver algorithms. We can therefore look 
at how many touched bundles there are per solution, what the percentage completion 
of those touched bundles is, giving us a representation of how many goods are sold 
and how many bundles are completed. Both MDA and CASS frequently complete 
different bundles and with CASS the bundles touched are always 100% completed. 
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Figure 6.10: Number of Touched Bundles per Solution 
Firstly, we wanted to look at the makeup of bundle completion for each of our 500 
test instances, shown in Figure 6.10. For L2, we see that the majority of test instances 
have only one bundle (475/500) in the CASS generated solutions, whilst the CASS 
Scheduling solutions have a wider spread of completed bundles. For MDA, we ﬁnd 
that there is a wider spread of number of bundles per solution and even more so for 
Scheduling, which has a very wide spread of bundles per solution. There are a maxi­
mum possible 1000 bundles in every CATS data ﬁle (for 256 goods) and so it would 
seem that if the algorithm is touching 250 bundles then the number of goods and the 
associated bundle completion ratio will be quite low. This appears to be consistent 
with Arrows Impossibility Theorem [AH71] as introduced in Section 2.2. 
Whilst the bidders who seek those bundles ﬁnd great satisfaction in that result, it is not 
representative of the satisfaction levels from the whole system and additionally, it is 
possible for MDA to trade a greater number of goods, across a wider range of bundles. 
In order to draw a comparison therefore, we need to compare the two systems in respect 
of the combined selection of bundles touched in their market processes. 
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6.6.2 Individual Bundle Completion 
We have looked at how many bundles were touched for each solution which gives 
us some sense of the results spread, but we must look deeper and consider how the 
individual bundles are made up. Firstly, we consider the individual bundle completion 
ratio. We have computed the percentage completion rate for each individual bundle. 
For CASS, this is always 100%, as the CASS solver only produces solutions with 
complete bundles. MDA gives us information on actual goods traded and which bundle 
they were part of and by comparing those with the CATS dataﬁle, we can count the 
percentage of goods in the bundle purchased. All goods are considered equal. 
Figure 6.11: Standard Deviation and Variance for L2 
In Figure 6.11 for the L2 data and Figure 6.12 for Scheduling we have derived the 
minimum, maximum, mean, standard deviation and variance for the set of completed 
bundles for each data ﬁle in the two distributions. For both sets of the data the ﬁrst 
ﬁfth of data has a much higher degree of variance and a much less consistent mean 
and standard deviation, an artifact, we believe, of the distribution used by CATS to 
generate the test data (each sample instance is computed through a separate run of the 
algorithm, so this is not a “warm up” phenomenon). 
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Figure 6.12: Standard Deviation and Variance for Scheduling 
Looking at the ﬁgures, we see that there is a very high maximum and very low min­
imum, demonstrating that for all problems there are some bundles with near 100% 
completion and some with 0%. On average (mean) we see that L2 has a higher com­
pletion ratio than Scheduling data, however we also observe that for both we have 
high variance and that our standard deviation value is very close to the mean value. 
This shows a very wide spread of results and indeed, that none of the actual bundles 
complete with the mean percentage. This is information is replicated in Figures 6.13 
and 6.15 which show an almost wall-like effect illustrating a very wide, but consis­
tent spread of bundle completion. Indeed, it seems that looking at average data can 
be mis-leading. For example, we know that CATS source data is random, so it would 
seems unlikely that the percentage bundle completion should be so similar. However, 
we notice from the actual data (Figures 6.13 and 6.15) that there is simply a very wide 
spread of results, which derives from the randomness of the CATS data. 
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6.6.3 Which Bundles are traded? 
Looking at ﬁgures in aggregate is not actually that useful then, as it only serves to show 
us that all datasets are consistently random! We need to consider the composition of 
the actual raw data. For our L2 data, Figure 6.14 introduces completion into the mix 
and shows us which of the touched bundles are included in the solution for each test 
instance. Each point on the graph represents a speciﬁc bundle of goods (with the Z axis 
representing the 1000 possible bundles). This is therefore a plot of the raw data behind 
Figure 6.10 but it now includes the percentage of the goods that bundle completed. 
Figure 6.13 allows us to compare CASS and MDA results, with the CASS results 
forming a ﬂat plane across the 100% completion level. For CASS we see a wide 
distribution of which bundles are used in solutions, but note that the density of bundles 
(represented by points on the graph) is reasonably sparse which correlates to our run 
time (Figure 6.3)—all the solutions are solved quickly and with a small number of 
bundles, indicating a quick, efﬁcient search. 
Figure 6.14 shows us, for each of the 500 L2 test instances computed by the MDA 
algorithm, which bundles formed part of the solution (Z axis) and what percentage of 
the goods requested in those bundles were successfully bought. The graph shows a 
small number of bundles achieving 100% completion and a much narrower spread of 
bundles per test instance. 
For our Scheduling data Figure 6.15 again shows a similar wide spread of goods per 
bundle, but in line with the difference in the distributions structure, we see that MDA 
is able to increase the number of bundles utilised for some solutions and that CASS 
too has a similar wide distribution of goods used across all of the test instances and an 
increased density over L2. There is a much wider overlap of bundles in the solution 
between MDA and CASS, which helps alleviate one of our concerns, which was that in 
the L2 data, MDA is only handling the ﬁrst 12 bundles for each solution, is potentially 
an artifact of an algorithm deﬁciency. However, as the same algorithm with a different 
data set behaves differently, we conclude that the limited range of L2 bundles used by 
MDA in its solutions is an artifact of the data. 
We need to recall our runtime ﬁgures to understand this behaviour and introduce a 
Figure, 6.16 which compares the number of bundles touched in a solution, with the 
runtime of the experiment. We can contrast this “number of bundles” ﬁgure, with a 
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Figure 6.13: Completion vs Selected Bundles for L2 Tests 
reprint (shown to the right) of Figure 6.4 showing “number of goods”. Returning to 
the question, why do we see a greater overlap in which bundles are “touched” by the 
two trading processes for the Scheduling distribution but such a small cross over for 
L2? We propose that this is related to the extent to which both algorithms spend time 
examining all the bids—in the CASS model, this means the search space is relatively 
small. We can see, in terms of run time that L2 solutions for CASS take a small and 
concentrated amount of time, whilst CASS runs on the Scheduling data has a very wide 
distribution of runtimes, with many searches having to stop at our wall time. This wider 
spread of both run times, and the associated bundles touched and goods sold matches 
the huge amount of variance we get with other CASS results (such as ﬁnancial) and our 
own MDA results. MDA run times are of course shorter, being related to the amount 
of time it takes for 500 rounds of the market, but we see a wide distribution again of 
the number of bundles touched for Scheduling, but not for L2. These graphs also show 
that CASS-L2 completed all runs within a very short time scale, but found solutions 
using a low number of bundles, illustrated with a low density of points in Figure 6.13, 
whilst CASS-Scheduling is again, higher. Finally, recall from ﬁgure 6.2 that deriving 
solutions for the problems takes longer in Scheduling than it does in L2. The greater 
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Figure 6.14: Completion vs Selected Bundles for MDA-L2 Tests 
spread of solutions, for example, here make explicit reference to features of the plot 
illustrated in Figure 6.15 for scheduling over L2 supports that theory and the higher 
percentage completion suggests that MDA works well as a solver on more complex 
problems because the overhead of the market process is outweighed by the complexity 
of the problem. 
It is argued that CASS produces optimum value and 100 percent completion, so there­
fore we do not need to consider the other goods or bundles left over, making the con­
cept of touched bundles meaningless. However, optimum seller revenue and high com­
pletion rates for some bundles is not necessarily the best, or most suitable outcome for 
a particular problem space and we can see that the other elements of our comparison, 
such as speed, satisfaction and efﬁciency come into play depending on the properties 
of the problem space. 
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Figure 6.15: Completion vs Selected Bundles for Scheduling Tests 
6.7 Satisfaction 
We have examined, in some depth a number of factors: (i) Hardness, (ii) Time, (iii) Fi­
nancial, (iv) Efﬁciency and (v) Completion . Through looking at all of these elements 
individually we have been able to draw correlations in data and understand the per­
formance characteristics of the two algorithms, CASS and MDA and the two datasets, 
L2 and Scheduling. However, whilst this analysis gives us a menu of criteria which is 
helpful in making future choices over which algorithm to use for solving a particular 
problem, it does not universally answer “which is best”? 
In order to complete the statistical comparison it would be helpful to have a single, 
combined metric by which we can measure the relative performance of the different 
approaches. We suggest that parameter is “satisfaction” and consider it to be the mul­
tiple of ﬁscal spend and the completion ratio for the bundle. The rationale can be 
illustrated as follows: 
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Figure 6.16: CASS and MDA Time vs Number of Bundles in Solution 
•	 If I complete my bundle, I am happy. If I purchase it cheaply, I will be happier 
than if it has a high cost. If I get 100 percent completion for a high underspend 
value, then I will have a high satisfaction rating. 
•	 If I get 50 percent of the goods desired for lots of money, I will have a very low 
underspend value which will be divided by 50 percent, giving me a very low 
satisfaction ratio. 
•	 If I get 50 percent of goods desired for little money, I will be reasonably satisﬁed, 
so my high underspend value will be divided by two thus taking the downside of 
an incomplete bundle into account. 
In Figure 6.18 we show our satisfaction ratings against the spend on all bundles in 
the ﬁnal solution, for each test instance. The ﬁgure shows a number of interesting 
elements, ﬁrstly, that for the CASS results, because we are essentially multiplying 
the percentage of goods used in the sold bundles by 100%, the satisfaction increases 
linearly as spend increases against the offset provided by the goods used value. We 
see again, the tight-bounding of the L2 results and the wider spread of the Scheduling 
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Figure 6.17: CASS and MDA Time vs Number of Goods Sold 
results. 
For MDA satisfaction, the results are more interesting. We know that the percentage 
of goods purchased (out of all requested purchases) is much more variable for MDA 
solutions, but because, overall, the number of goods sold is greater than for CASS 
solutions and the ﬁnancial spend on goods is lower for the distributed market approach, 
satisfaction ratings start higher and are not related directly to spend. 
6.8 Conclusions 
All measures of this sort are open to interpretation and arguably, the satisfaction graph 
is an alternative representation of Figure 6.5, which shows CASS and MDA Actual 
Spend vs Number of Goods Sold. However, this data, when taken in context with the 
other aspects and assessments we have presented serve to illustrate that both distributed 
markets and combinatorial auctions have valid uses and different properties which 
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Figure 6.18: Budget Spent vs Satisfaction 
make them suitable for different applications. 
The question of “what makes a distribution hard?” has much literature devoted to it, 
and one of the obvious mechanisms, given that a combinatorial auction is an NP-Hard 
problem, is to consider the timing requirements for solving individual problems. How­
ever we discovered (Figure 6.3) that when comparing KLB’s published CPLEX and 
CASS results CASS found the L2 distribution easier than CPLEX but the Scheduling 
distribution was considerably harder (with a much wider spread of runtime magni­
tudes). Our MDA results had more consistent run times, as the MDA algorithm ran 
for 500 iterations of the distributed market and so for MDA, and increase or decrease 
in time was only due to ﬂuctuations in the volume of trades for each round and so 
the different distributions have a much smaller effect on timings than can be seen on 
CASS and CPLEX results. Returning to the question of hardness, it seems to us that 
time itself is also not a strong measure of difﬁculty and that improvements and differ­
ences in algorithms and test data distributions, even within two combinatorial auction 
solvers, can lead to differences in reporting performance. 
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Unfortunately, despite exhausting many thousands of hours of compute time, we were 
not able to run all the CASS experiments for our 1000 test results to completion. This 
introduced a wall effect which we could see clearly in our runtime comparisons. The 
effect of having a wall in the CASS algorithm is that it is unable to complete the 
searching of its result tree and may produce suboptimal answers. Looking at runtimes 
in isolation however, we concluded that MDA was more predictable. 
The next test was that of the ﬁnancial performance of the markets. Comparing MDA 
and CASS results, we saw that MDA spent less on goods (both overall and per good). 
This was markedly noticeable (Figure 6.6) for the Scheduling distribution, but was 
also prevalent in L2 and is evidence of the two strategies (markets maximise for buy­
ers, auctions for sellers) working effectively. Finally, we noted that MDA’s linear 
approach to good purchasing means that it will never pay a large sum of money for 
small numbers of goods—which can be important in situations where it is necessary 
to purchase bundles with very large numbers of goods. 
One of the trade-offs presented by the two approaches is whether or not to maximise 
utilisation of goods, or revenue. We considered market efﬁciency, deﬁned as the total 
value of trades taken. For both distributions, Scheduling and L2, both MDA and CASS 
have nearly equal efﬁciency for very hard problems, with a direct convergence in L2. 
However, in L2, MDA is shown to be much more efﬁcient for a larger proportion of the 
test data than CASS and it is important that we also consider run time, because whilst 
the efﬁciency does converge for both distributions, the MDA algorithm achieves those 
results in much less time. 
The notions of time, ﬁnancial outcome and efﬁciency are all useful tests to help us 
understand how our markets are performing, but ultimately, if the resource allocations 
produced are of no use, the price and time taken does not matter. We therefore looked 
at the issue of bundle completion and how many goods are traded, how many bundles 
are traded and which goods form those bundles. 
Looking at the spread of bundles per solution, we found that MDA traded a wider 
quantity of bundles for both the L2 and Scheduling datasets and to a lower level of 
bundle completion. We observed a completely random spread of bundle allocations 
in both CASS and MDA solutions, reﬂecting the random nature of the good alloca­
tions in the original CATS data. We also concluded that when dealing with a random 
set of preferences, against which there is no standard distribution, we would ﬁnd high 
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statistical variances for aggregate measures such as the mean percentage of goods pur­
chased to complete a bundle. We found it more appropriate to consider the raw data 
and look at which goods speciﬁcally were traded and for the Scheduling dataset we 
found there was a considerable overlap between bundle selection by CASS and MDA, 
whilst for L2, the MDA solutions all utilised the initial goods in the test data (elements 
0-12) whilst CASS solutions were much more incomplete, again, the two mechanisms 
showing different approaches to managing data, with CASS failing to compute solu­
tions with many goods whilst MDA attempts to complete a larger number of bundle 
requests, spreading goods resource thinly, but maintaining good utilisation. 
These graphs also show that CASS-L2 completed all runs within a very short time 
scale, but found solutions using a low number of bundles, illustrated with a low density 
of points in Figure 6.13, whilst CASS-Scheduling is again, higher. Finally, recall from 
Figure 6.2 that deriving solutions for the problems takes longer in Scheduling than it 
does in L2. The greater spread of solutions illustrated in Figure 6.15 for scheduling 
over L2 supports that theory and the higher percentage completion suggests that MDA 
works well as a solver on more complex problems because the overhead of the market 
process is outweighed by the complexity of the problem. 
Finally, we utilised an aggregating metric which attempts to capture a potential buyers 
satisfaction with a set of results. Through combining spend and completion measures 
we showed that because, overall, the number of goods sold under MDA is greater than 
for CASS solutions and the ﬁnancial spend on goods is lower for the distributed market 
approach, satisfaction ratings start higher and are not related directly to spend, which is 
an important approach if, as a buyer, you are attempting to maximise your purchases. 
Looking at our test data from the six dimensions we are conscious that, for any spe­
ciﬁc measurement it is difﬁcult to identify the pros and cons of our two approaches— 
distributed markets and combinatorial auctions. 
However taken together we contend that a distributed market provides an approach for 
solving more difﬁcult problems, for example the job shop scheduling task simulated by 
our Scheduling distribution. They ensure that resource usage is maximised, with good 
efﬁciency, revenue and in a predicable time frame. Combinatorial solutions will always 
produce a Pareto efﬁcient option and maximise revenue for the sellers of goods, but 
their run times vary unpredictably based on both the algorithm used and the complexity 
structure of the problem, the result being that resource utilisation is often sacriﬁced. 
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Chapter 7 
Further Experiments 
7.1 Introduction to Further Experiments 
Kevin Leyton-Brown (KLB) saw that many researchers had proposed algorithms for 
determining the winners of a combinatorial auction, which itself gives rise to the prob­
lem of how to evaluate, compare and therefore improve the algorithms in an objective 
manner. It is this problem that he sought to solve in his PhD thesis [LB03] and he 
outlines the most recent version of the Combinatorial Auction Test Suite (CATS) in 
[CSS05, Ch.18]. We selected the L2 and Scheduling distributions from the available 
data in order to produce the comparisons and experimental results in this thesis, be­
cause they most closely represented the structure of the resource allocation problem 
genre that we were focused on providing solutions for. 
CATS provides a number of legacy datasets, denoted by “L”. These were introduced for 
comparability and are derived from work by Sandholm [San02], de Vries and Vohra 
[dVV03], Anderson [ATY00], Boutilier [BGS99] and Fujishima [FLBS99]. These 
legacy distributions had variances in the model used to calculate the number of goods 
(is it uniform across samples, a normal distribution, a decaying distribution); which 
goods are selected for the bundles (is it done randomly, or are all used); and how 
are the prices for each bundle in the distribution set (randomly, linearly or normally)? 
However, these distributions all suffer from weaknesses and particularly contain large 
numbers of non-dominated bids which makes them empirically easy to solve and a 
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poor choice for computational benchmarking 1. 
Leyton-Brown looked to tackle the weaknesses in the legacy distributions and pro­
posed model distributions which were derived using a range of different techniques in 
order to represent a number of sample problems: 
Paths: Problems related to the purchase of a set of connecting points, such as lo­
gistics or sales people routing, network bandwidth allocation, or railway track 
scheduling. 
Regions: A class of problems in which goods derive complementarity from their 
adjacency, such as sale of real estate, drilling rights in oil ﬁelds or radio/telecom 
spectrum auctions. 
Scheduling: The scheduling distribution deals with the classic job-shop scheduling 
problems, whether in factories or grid computing environments each user has a 
job requiring some amount of machine time and a deadline by when it should be 
completed. 
Arbitrary: A general model of arbitrary relationships where the complementarity is 
not as obvious as physical adjacency, but instead might be related to the pro­
duction of a larger unit. Example problems would include the purchasing a 
collection of electrical components, a set of collectible antiques or the right to 
emit a quantity of industrial pollutants (carbon emissions trading). 
Matching: There are a number of real world domains where complementarity be­
tween goods arises because of time related considerations and therefore they 
must be matched together. As an example, development of an effective mecha­
nism to sell take off and landing slots in corresponding airports by combinatorial 
auction is currently an unsolved problem. 
We have attempted to compute the results for CASS and MDA for the extra four data 
distributions discussed, but present them in summary, for discussion, rather than in any 
detail or in support of the main arguments of this thesis. We do that for the following 
reasons: 
1We use L2 because it is the most widely examined legacy distribution and therefore provides a 
recognisable distribution for comparison 
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(i) The structure, make up and “shape” of the distributions of goods is one of the 
key factors that affects the complexity of computing the solution, for both the 
MDA and CASS algorithms and it is not possible to fully understand their results 
without in-depth reference to the explanation of each of the distributions given in 
[CSS05, Ch.18], and it is not practical to reproduce that here. 
(ii) Computing the additional data required months of computation time (signiﬁ­
cantly longer than estimated) and due to various practical problems in regards 
access to facilities, the results arrived towards the end of the production of this 
thesis document. 
(iii) Trying to compare and contrast the results from six data distributions and two 
algorithms presents signiﬁcant data visualisation challenges that would require 
signiﬁcant effort to resolve, for which time was not available. 
(iv) In the context of this thesis, where our objective has been to determine the most 
appropriate method to be used in order to compute the best allocation of a generic 
set of resources and to develop an under-standing of how the different approaches 
available are related to one another, we feel that an in-depth analysis of the two 
datasets (L2 and Scheduling) is more than sufﬁcient to explore the characteris­
tics of MDA and CASS and that whilst these results conﬁrm and support the 
discussion in Chapter 6 they do not enhance it. 
Therefore, in the remainder of this Chapter, we present a range of information and 
supporting notes for future discussion. 
7.2 Hardness 
Hardness of the distributions is considered to be related to the runtime order of mag­
nitude and KLB produced his version, shown as ﬁgure 6.1 (page 109) which we have 
emulated in Figure 7.1. This graph shows the runtime, by Log10 order of magnitude 
for all distributions computed and shows us that CASS typically ﬁnds the new distri­
butions take an order of runtime longer to compute (frequently hitting our wall clock 
time) than they do with CPLEX. MDA still runs for it’s standard amount of runs. 
The new distributions can be considered “hard”, particularly arbitrary, matching and 
135

Figure 7.1: Gross Hardness Distributions 
regions, as KLB’s own results shown in Figure 7.2 show, with a large percentage of 
the solutions shown in the runtime class 5. 
To repeat our previous analysis, we have reproduced KLB’s published CPLEX solu­
tions in Figure 7.3, which in comparison to the CASS results 7.2 reinforces the point 
that CPLEX and CASS have different performance characteristics (despite solving the 
same problem). 
7.3 Number of Goods/Bundles 
For the runtime vs number of goods or bundles sold graphs we have split the visual­
isation of the data and show CASS and MDA results separately. Additionally, when 
reviewing the graphs in this section, the concentration of data points is an indicator of 
the number of instances of a problem that were solved by the algorithm in the time 
allowed. As with our main results, we computed 500 test solutions for each data dis­
tribution. 
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Figure 7.2: CASS Gross Hardness (KLB Results Only) 
(i) The CASS graph in Figure 7.4 shows a thin spread of results for arbitrary and 
regions data, suggesting that for these there are few instances with good sold and 
that many of the computations reached the wall clock time without completing. 
(ii) The Paths data on ﬁgure 7.4 is shown to have a very narrow time spread. When 
compared to ﬁgure 7.5 we see that whilst goods are traded, bundles are not com­
pleted in the ﬁnal solution, suggesting that CASS ﬁnds the problems hard to 
compute. 
(iii) The scheduling distribution has the widest distribution of solutions completed 
across the time window showing the random nature of the problem. 
(iv) The matching distribution is only present at the top level of the “wall column” 
in both ﬁgure 7.4 and ﬁgure 7.5, suggesting that many goods and bundles are 
utilised in these problems, but at the expense of a lot of computing time. 
The two MDA ﬁgures compare number of goods sold (ﬁgure 7.6) and the number of 
bundles in computed solutions (ﬁgure 7.7). 
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Figure 7.3: CPLEX Gross Hardness (KLB Results Only) 
(i) L2 data shows a low number of bundles completed, a high number of goods sold, 
suggesting good completion ratios. 
(ii) Scheduling data shows a wide spread of bundles but a narrow time window, sug­
gesting all problems are of similar hardness to solve. The vertical spread is sim­
ilar for MDA and CASS. 
(iii) Regions data shows a sparse number of bundles and no goods sold by MDA, 
suggesting that the MDA algorithm is not suited to solving these problems in a 
short number of rounds. 
(iv) Matching data shows a high number of goods sold and bundles computed in 
a short time frame, suggesting MDA is a good solution for solving Matching 
problems. 
(v) Paths, as with Regions, we do not have Paths data for goods/bundles sold. 
(vi) Arbitrary data shows that a small number of problems did complete, but that 
arbitrary problems take longer than the time available to compute, as can be seen 
for the CPLEX and CASS hardness in Figure 7.1 
138 
Figure 7.4: CASS Time vs Number of Goods Sold 
7.4 Actual Spend 
The actual spend graphs in ﬁgures 7.8 and 7.9 illustrate the amount of monies spent 
by the traders in buying the goods (for MDA) or the cost of the goods selected (for 
CASS) in order to compose their bundles. 
(i) For the spend graphs, being in the top left hand corner would be the optimum 
position (high good utilisation, low spend) 
(ii) The CASS graph (ﬁgure 7.8) shows that CASS is optimal fgor Paths and Arbi­
trary, whilst the MDA results in Figure 7.9 suggest it can solve Matching and 
Scheduling problems more easily. L2 is solved well on both, with marginal im­
provements in the number of goods sold (but not spend) in CASS. 
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Figure 7.5: CASS Time vs Number of Bundles in Solution 
7.5 Efﬁciency 
The efﬁciency graphs use our calculated efﬁciency ratio, which is the solution spend 
divided by the number of goods bought as a comparison factor. 
(i) MDA did not produce results for the number of goods bought for Paths, Arbitrary 
or Regions, and therefore does not have MDA efﬁciency values. 
(ii) For Paths data, we see that efﬁciency increases in line with the number of goods 
sold for CASS. 
(iii) The CASS arbitrary data indicates that there is high efﬁciency, but for a small 
number of problems—arbitrary problems are hard to solve! 
(iv) Scheduling has a wide spread of efﬁciency values, but MDA appears to sell more 
goods for similar efﬁciency than CASS. 
(v) L2 has poor efﬁciency on CASS and is more efﬁcient under MDA. 
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Figure 7.6: MDA Time vs Number of Goods Sold 
(vi) The Matching distribution problems are solved with a high degree of good utili­
sation by MDA, but there are minimal problems solved under CASS. 
(vii) Regions data is not visible on either graph with the underlying data suggesting 
that no regions goods were solved. 
7.6 Satisfaction 
Figure 7.12 and 7.13 show our satisfaction metric and solution spend. 
(i) For all the CASS data sets, we see that satisfaction and spend rise linearly to­
gether, against both logarithmic axis. This tells us that for all CASS based algo­
rithms high levels of satisfaction can only be obtained with similarly high spends. 
(ii) CASS ﬁnds the Paths and Scheduling distributions “easiest” to produce good 
solutions for whilst regions and arbitrary are the most difﬁcult. 
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Figure 7.7: MDA Time vs Number of Bundles in Solution 
(iii) With the exception of L2, all MDA results have much tighter clustering and 
a number of horizontal plateaus (on a logarithmic scale) suggesting that MDA 
scales linearly with the complexity of the problem space being solved. 
(iv) For the L2 distribution, MDA derives higher satisfaction for lower spend. 
(v) For Matching distribution, the problems are clustered into two regions, but with 
linear increase in spend for MDA, rather than logarithmic for CASS. 
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Figure 7.8: CASS Actual Spend vs Number of Goods Sold
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Figure 7.9: MDA Actual Spend vs Number of Goods Sold
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Figure 7.10: CASS Efﬁciency vs Number of Goods Sold

145

Figure 7.11: MDA Efﬁciency vs Number of Goods Sold
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Figure 7.12: CASS Solution Spent vs Satisfaction

147

Figure 7.13: MDA Solution Spent vs Satisfaction
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions 
8.1 Review of Contribution 
Our objective has been to determine the most appropriate method to be used in order 
to compute the best allocation of a generic set of resources and to develop an under­
standing of how the different approaches available are related to one another. 
Our motivation for this work stems from a need to make complex resource allocation 
decisions for distributed environments in a predicable amount of time, a motivation 
driven from needs we see illustrated in applications such as computer based Grid net­
work management, response to train schedule disruptions and other multi-agent plan­
ning scenarios. 
We also sought to examine the perceived wisdom of the combinatorial auction liter­
ature, in which many excellent theoretical papers have concluded that (almost to the 
extent that other mechanisms are not required) virtually all resource allocation prob­
lems can be solved using a centralised approach and that the NP-Hard characteristics 
of the combinatorial auctioneer are, for all practical purposes, mitigated through the 
use of careful development of heuristics and domain speciﬁc knowledge. 
We believe that further advances in distributed computing and agent based technology 
will continue to present challenges for centralised approaches, both because of the im­
practicalities of encoding complete domain knowledge and perhaps more importantly, 
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we want to take advantage of the beneﬁts of having a decentralised approach to deci­
sion making with no single point of command and control. Future systems will need 
the ability to perform useful resource allocations when only incomplete preferences 
and domain knowledge are available or forthcoming. 
We developed an empirical analysis of a distributed market system and uniquely com­
pared it to a centralised combinatorial auction solver “CASS” developed by Kevin 
Leyton-Brown in his thesis [LB03] using measures of hardness, ﬁnancial, completion, 
efﬁciency, time and satisfaction, that are described in detail in Section 5.2. 
Overall, we demonstrated that a distributed market provides an approach for solving 
more difﬁcult problems, such as the job shop scheduling task simulated in our Schedul­
ing distribution, and the distributed approach ensures that resource utilisation is greater 
than that in a centralised system, with good efﬁciency, revenue and decisions gener­
ated in a predicable time frame. Combinatorial solutions will always produce a Pareto 
efﬁcient option and maximise revenue for the sellers of goods, but their run times vary 
unpredictably based on both the algorithm used and the complexity structure of the 
problem, and they often sacriﬁce resource utilisation. 
8.2 Grounded in Economics 
A further important component of this thesis is that the rationale and market structure 
for the decentralised mechanism is and should be, grounded in both Economic theory 
and the reality of market economics. Writing this conclusion in early 2009, one cannot 
but help observe that the real world experiences gained from living with markets has 
demonstrated that they demonstrate what happens when a large decentralised group of 
intelligent stock brokers utilise that uniquely human trait of making rational decisions 
about irrational behaviour and cause previously unforeseen, even unthinkable, waves 
of market disruption with massive knock-on effects, and the examples therein give a 
great opportunity for a thought experiment based evaluation of MDA. 
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8.2.1 Thought Experiment - Fiscal Markets 
The ﬁnancial system crash of 2009 is a good example of both the need for and the 
impact of decentralised markets. Previously, banks across the world lent money to 
each other on the basis that (i) at any given point in time, in respect of cash ﬂow, 
some would be in surplus and some in deﬁcit and (ii) banks with large cash deposits 
needed to ensure they gained maximum possible returns for their clients and lending to 
other secure banks who could lend on that money through products such as mortgages, 
loans etc. that paid a reasonable rate of interest was a sensible way to ensure maximum 
return. 
In 2009 bankers began to understand that their colleagues had large and potentially 
undeﬁnable risks associated with their lending portfolios and that the inter-bank loans 
may not be repaid. Suddenly banks were no longer considered “as safe as houses” and 
this myth was compounded when the US Government declined to bail out Lehman 
Brothers causing it to become bankrupt. Overnight there was a unanimous withdrawal 
from the wholesale lending markets as it was now seemingly impossible to trust that 
another bank was credit worthy and, as we know, the world’s supply of credit evapo­
rated over night. 
This is a fascinating story, but what is the relevance to MDAs? Firstly, the whole­
sale credit market is made up of many autonomous players—banks, who join and exit 
the market as they please and where each has their own set of criteria, objectives and 
decision making processes. Secondly, there are many types of credit products, with 
different values, lengths, credit scores, etc. Thirdly, market operation is now a contin­
uous process operating across multiple jurisdictions. The wholesale credit market is, 
therefore, very similar to our MDA and could be accurately modelled as one. 
Could we use a series of Combinatorial Auctions to manage the wholesale credit mar­
ket? Firstly, whilst it might be possible to run a continuous cycle of clearing operations 
as the number of products and participants grew non-linearly we would ﬁnd issues with 
compute scalability and decision speed. 
Secondly, consider the problem of ensuring all decisions were scrutinised by a single 
impartial auctioneer. There would be signiﬁcant political issues of ensuring impartial­
ity in a global system and it would also be logistically complex (impossible?) to have 
all participant revealing complete preference information about their purchase. The 
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logistics issue is worth further investigation. Whilst it is not beyond the bounds of 
technology for ten or even twenty thousand banks to send electronic data into a single 
reporting point it would be difﬁcult for them to work out complete preference infor­
mation without knowledge of the buying participants. Particularly because ﬁnancial 
lending has signiﬁcant risks attached, it is often the case that the price of the deal is 
easy to conclude and that the lenders view of the risk will improve during the negoti­
ations as they increase familiarity with the buyer, a process which, in a market, would 
be implemented through a number of rounds of bidding and negotiation. In an MDA, 
both buyer and seller would be present in a single good-speciﬁc market with the po­
tential for many rounds of one on one trading at which each can modify their position. 
In a combinatorial auction all buyers and sellers would need to express preferences 
centrally and await their outcome, a process that makes it impossible to express buyer 
speciﬁc preferences, or conduct rapid negotiations with speciﬁc buyers. Finally, the 
ability to alter preferences rapidly is of signiﬁcant beneﬁt, especially when third party 
interactions (in this case, Government bailouts and press speculation) will have a direct 
impact on lending availability and criteria. 
Combinatorial Auctions do however have beneﬁts in this scenario and there is sig­
niﬁcant attraction for the providers of credit to ensure that they receive the optimal 
allocation (and hence maximum proﬁt) for their funds, but a very important criteria in 
ﬁnancial lending is the social welfare factor understanding who the funds are sold to, 
which cannot be guaranteed in a blind auction. 
8.2.2 MDA for real world problems 
How then would the credit markets have fared in 2009 with the use of an MDA type 
mechanism? Well ﬁrstly, we can assert that they already do use a decentralised real-
time set of continuous markets, likely in part due to the original design goals of our 
ﬁnancial system that sought to protect us from systemic risk of having a centralised 
decision process and the difﬁculty in having a politically impartial auctioneer in a 
multi-national market. We believe that the ﬂexibility of this structure did in some 
part facilitate the safe, but rapid withdrawal of parties from the trading arena when 
conﬁdence collapsed and it has similarly allowed participants to re-enter on their own 
terms (timescales, risk, etc.). 
With regards performance, we know that MDA would not have produced optimal value 
152

for the sellers of funds but we demonstrated in Figure 6.4 that it would have facili­
tated an increase in the number of contracts sold, with a corresponding increase in our 
market efﬁciency measure. Note that most of the fees for sellers in ﬁscal markets are 
transactional and therefore related to volume, so potentially, earning more money from 
fees and less from interest is more beneﬁcial to the sellers of this market. This is an 
interesting example of a scenario in which the producers of product who trade in the 
market have different objectives to the manufacturers of the goods they represent and 
highlights the difﬁculty of designing the correct market structure so that it incentivises 
the most desirable behaviour. 
How would the system have worked if decision making was centralised? Assuming, 
given the constraints we have outlined, that it was indeed possible to build such a 
mechanism with good performance then a continuous cycle of combinatorial auctions 
would enable high quality lending to occur against well deﬁned criteria. However there 
are two characteristics of the centralised market system that would potentially cause 
difﬁculty in the recent turbulent times. Firstly, a combinatorial auctioneer requires 
complete information about parties preferences in order to determine the optimal out­
come and as mentioned, often negotiations for ﬁnancial products require both parties 
to increase their preference revelation as the negotiation completes. Under a combi­
natorial auction mechanism, the auctioneer would attempt to bind all parties at each 
stage, thus denying each both the opportunity to revise their offers but also to adjust 
their preferences, for example about who they will deal with. 
8.3 Economics provides the rationale 
Returning to our discussion of desirable economic parameters from section 2.2, we 
see that our ﬁnancial market requires us to take not only well deﬁned concepts such as 
Pareto optimality into account when performing resource allocation but also the need 
for Social Welfare functions to be taken into account (in this case, the social welfare 
preferences for a banker would be trustworthiness and credit rating of the other party), 
and in this application context, these social welfare functions, and the ability to vary 
them rapidly, is potentially more important than some of the ﬁscal elements of the deal. 
It is these fundamental economic characteristics of markets, such as Arrow’s impossi­
bility theorem [Arr50], a theorem which enables us to characterise social welfare and 
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gives a number of criteria which essentially shows that it is impossible to please every­
body, that give us properties that mean a centralised combinatorial auction approach 
will not meet all of the future resource allocation needs and that an MDA approach to 
resource allocation is necessary for solving many of the example real world problems 
discussed from ﬁnancial markets to train schedule exception handling. 
We have shown, through a unique empirical analysis, that it will work and that whilst 
there are trade offs, most notably with regards the ﬁscal performance of the market, 
there are signiﬁcant gains to be had from the use of a decentralised system with im­
proved utilisation, throughput and time. 
Whilst this is a Computer Science thesis, it is only when we set this work in the context 
of economic markets that we can truly understand the challenge that we will need to 
provide solutions for, with the next set of our computing technologies. 
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Chapter 9 
Future Work and Directions 
Our work has produced a comparison of two methods of performing bundle-oriented 
resource allocation with a view to understanding which approach is suitable for a given 
set of circumstances. This leads us to consider ﬁrstly, the approaches applicability for 
other, alternate situations and secondly, how we might improve our MDA implemen­
tation to maximise its utility in future. 
9.1 Capability or Capacity? 
Our objective in this thesis has been to answer the question: “Given a speciﬁc set of 
resources, allocation needs and network topology/geography (i.e centralised or decen­
tralised) what is the most appropriate way to process the data and produce a set of 
resource allocations?” In the context of computer grid resource management, there is 
a supplementary question—Do we want capability or capacity computing? 
Capability computing is deﬁned as the provision of extremely high performance com­
puting resources in order to handle the most difﬁcult number crunching problems. 
Capacity computing deals with situations that have less extreme technical challenges 
but which require great quantities of computation resources. 
The question posed above is still asked today by many users of large computing re­
sources as we have not yet found a ubiquitous solution. Most large computing infras­
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tructures are still built for speciﬁc purposes, whether they are simple AMD/Intel based 
clusters such as the University of Bath’s Aquila system or most of the entrants on 
the Top500 list (e.g. IBM PowerCell or BlueGene systems and the Cray XT4 series). 
We see long commissioning times, leading edge processing developments and large 
budgets, with such systems usually seen installed in Universities, Research Centres 
and National Government computing facilities. The scheduling for large computing 
clusters is often done by hand, or using simple schedulers like PBS that divide jobs 
up on a ﬁrst come ﬁrst served basis, but the approach is problematic as it does not 
handle contention well with (i) an insufﬁcient mix of capability and capacity users, 
(ii) management of resources at insufﬁcient levels of granularity (e.g. operating in 
whole compute nodes) and (iii) failing to permit a very wide range of users concurrent 
access. 
As an example of the problems seen on a low end cluster, the Aquila service is de­
signed so that each job is assigned to one single CPU node (a quad-core processor 
with 8 GB of RAM). However, there are few nodes (approximately 80) and as a sys­
tem used by many as their ﬁrst interaction with cluster computing users ﬁnd it difﬁcult 
to program an algorithm that can continually exploit a full compute node. Therefore, 
the Aquila system rarely runs at full capacity and a review of usage on clusters such 
as the National Grid Service (a capacity service), or the HecTor Super Computer (a 
capability service) shows that achieving 100% utilisation can be difﬁcult. 
More commercially available clusters provide a different approach to the capacity 
computing need. Systems such as Amazon’s EC2 system, RackSpace’s Mosso or the 
3Tera Applogic System allow users to purchase CPU hours on demand and operate 
clusters of virtual machines in the US and Europe. These work on a ﬂat pricing basis 
but use service level controls to ensure that they can provision sufﬁcient CPU units to 
cope with all possible demands. 
We also ﬁnd that the commercial clusters provide different approaches to service provi­
sion, allowing users to deploy entire virtual machines with custom software, where as 
most academically led clusters provide speciﬁc software running directly on physical 
computers optimised for the task. The former approach provides capacity computing, 
the latter focuses more on capability. 
The mixture of controls, usage and over-provisioning of these systems has ensured 
that administrators have not yet discovered the need to implement just in time pric­
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ing, however it is self evident that this will become necessary in the future. The move 
in the internet hosting industry towards virtualisation and cloud computing has ab­
stracted the operating system environment from the computer’s physical metal so that 
virtual machines can be moved around supported by hypervisors with resources real­
located as required. New versions of various opensource and commercial tools, in­
cluding Xen, VMware and others are providing the ability for a service provider to 
deliver a virtualised computational resource service, where the user pays for what they 
use, rather than what they reserve. This just-in-time CPU resource delivery paradigm 
cannot inﬁnitely be satisﬁed through provisioning large datacentres in the American 
mid-west and as globalisation continues to progress operators will begin to see sig­
niﬁcant peaks in capacity during business hours and the corresponding under usage 
overnight that will cause them to want to incentivise customers to spread their usage 
out more linearly. Similarly, the use of large amounts of computing power in academic 
and research circles will become normal, with undergraduate classes in physical and 
life sciences producing ever more complex models and whether the currency used is 
one with ﬁscal value or not, the need for a common metric for job scheduling and 
prioritisation cannot be under-estimated. 
Our work has shown that the two approaches considered, the Combinatorial Auction 
and the Multiple Distributed Auction system are able to provide solutions to these 
challenges. The Combinatorial Auction, with its complete information about all pref­
erences and single-shot allocation solver seems ideal for capability computing environ­
ments where workloads (particularly for super-computers) can be planned in advance 
and are not frequently changed. The MDA, on the other hand, is more suited to man­
aging resources on capacity computing clusters, where loads change frequently with a 
continual stream of previously unknown jobs arriving and a much wider range of user 
and usage types. 
In order to build and evaluate these two approaches to solving the problem of resource 
allocation in the thesis we necessarily focused on economic theories and the challenges 
of performing an empirical analysis. It is therefore appropriate to ask the question of 
how would we adapt this work so that it can be used in the scenarios described and 
what would be the areas of work to focus on next? 
157

9.2 Other NP-Hard Problems 
The D-CIS Lab at Thales has identiﬁed two areas of work which demonstrate applica­
tions of Agent systems being used to help NP-Hard problems in the real world, they 
call this paradigm “Actor-Agent Communities”. Firstly, they have provided decision 
support software to help manage interruptions to train schedules in the Netherlands 
railway system and secondly to environmental impact decision making in Rotterdam 
Harbour. 
Railway scheduling is a subject that has been long studied and with recent advances 
in computing power, heuristic development and search algorithms it is common place 
to ﬁnd computer systems utilised in the production of initial railway schedules. How­
ever, the problem of managing the railway schedule in the event of a disruption to the 
network is currently unsolved. The Dutch railway system has over 5000 trains daily 
and 1000 driver duties per day, with an average of 10 disruptions per route, per day, 
equating to 450 trains a day with delays, of which 10 are cancelled. 
The major issue is that time tables are typically developed to maximise usage of staff 
and rolling stock resources and that in the event of a blockage or disruption we ﬁnd 
that drivers and their rolling stock are subsequently not available (in the right place at 
the right time) to begin the next service they are scheduled to operate. In most railway 
networks there is often surplus rolling stock and delivery of trains to support schedule 
interruptions is often not a great problem. Drivers however are in much shorter supply 
and it is rarely possible to arrange an entirely spare driver at short notice. Therefore, 
problems can only be resolved by rescheduling drivers, often swapping duties and 
requesting that overtime is worked. This work is currently completed by humans but 
researchers at D-CIS have observed that the human response often ﬁxes the current 
problem but does not fully manage the knock on effects of the disruption, a situation 
which the D-CIS team have begun to address through their use of intelligent systems 
and prototype solutions have indicated that they can provide decision support tools to 
allow the problem to be resolved in a marginally faster time frame than that which was 
achieved by human planners, but additionally, they are able to ensure that the solution 
does not create knock on effects later in the schedule. 
How could our work on multiple distributed auctions help further the developments of 
the D-CIS lab in reﬁning their solution to this problem? Firstly, the train rescheduling 
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problem can be characterised as an NP-Hard problem with complex heuristics which 
requires search to produce a solution. However, when managing the crisis of train 
schedule interruption it is potentially more important to provide a workable solution 
quickly than to provide the optimum solution (i.e. one with zero knock on effects to 
the schedule) because a single knock on effect in the future can be easily managed, 
where as a current disruption may generate much larger, immediate effects in the net­
work. Additionally, train drivers are known to be ﬂexible and can be incentivised to 
implement sub-optimal solutions quickly, for example, through incentives in their pay 
and working conditions. Our work has shown that in applications where the optimal 
outcome is not necessary, a satisﬁcing solution can be obtained through the use of 
MDAs and given further work it would be possible to identify the speciﬁc characteris­
tics of different types of service interruptions such that the train scheduling tool could 
choose between using (i) previously memoised solutions, (ii) optimal rescheduling so­
lutions, potentially determinable for small disruption problems, or (iii) a less optimal, 
but satisfactory solution, determined through market based agent negotiation. 
The question of environmental decision support in Rotterdam Harbour is a problem to 
which we can similarly lend our expertise to improve the solution. The challenge in 
environmental management is the coordination of response across a very large number 
of different governmental agencies, all of whom have differing priorities and respon­
sibilities, but whom must play a coordinated role in responding to an environmental 
accident. The Rotterdam Harbour presents an excellent case study in the management 
of these types of problems as it is one of the worlds busiest shipping environments, 
with a thriving petrochemical industry, that is geographically situated in close prox­
imity to an area of high population density. The DIADEM system that the team at 
D-CIS have developed is an early prototype which begins to integrate the currently 
available sensor networks and human incident reports together with agent based logic 
to improve the distribution of information to the relevant authorities and enabling them 
to make higher quality decision in shorter times. 
The MDA approach to resource allocation contains a number of concepts which are 
likely to be relevant to the future development of this project. Most importantly, given 
an element of information, or an identiﬁed need for action, there will be considerable 
coordination effort required across the many involved agencies. By representing the 
available agency resources and desired actions using the Trading Agents model we can 
effectively encourage teams to work together through the use of our bundling technol­
ogy, recommending strategies for effective working which take into account and trade 
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off the many different constraints that will be imposed. 
9.3 Review of the MDA System 
We have outlined our implementation of a system of Multiple Distributed Auctions 
and the process of experiment and review has given us the opportunity to identify a 
number of areas where the system could be further improved. 
We adopted a stepwise approach to re-factoring our Repast based simulation into the 
distributed Agentscape environment. The beneﬁts of this approach were twofold, 
ﬁrstly, it was a fast process and secondly it allowed us to maintain the structural in­
tegrity of the market algorithms, thus ensuring that we had a valid basis for compari­
son. 
The major downside is that the original implementation was built with a number of the 
Repast concepts deeply embedded, most signiﬁcantly the “step” function and there­
fore the simulation was built on a cycle of (i) execute market, (ii) collect data. This 
approach has no impact on the market operation, but it massively increases the run 
time of the overall system because after each round of the market we sequentially poll 
all of the agents in the system to collect market data and statistics and in doing so, 
pause the market. 
We propose that the efﬁciency of the MDA system could be greatly improved through 
modiﬁcation so that statistical and accounting data is transmitted asynchronously to 
the Oracle outside of the regular trading process because then the markets could run 
continuously without interruption. 
9.3.1 Intelligence of the Traders 
The distributed market has a number of variables affecting its performance and un­
fortunately we could not thoroughly investigate them all but a potentially important 
factor is that of the intelligence and domain speciﬁc knowledge held by the market 
place traders. We focused on using Zero Intelligence traders using Dave Cliff’s ZI­
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Figure 9.1: Break Down of Time Spent in Decentralised System 
Plus strategy but work by participants in the Trading Agent Competition suggests that 
agents with domain speciﬁc expertise can produce economically superior results. For 
example, the MinneTAC agent participated in the Supply-Chain Trading Agent Com­
petition (TAC-SCM). This competition involves participating in two concurrent games. 
Firstly, agents must purchase raw goods before, secondly, selling their ﬁnished bundles 
of goods. Participants in the game need to choose a strategy which typically involves 
reacting to one market or the other and being customer or supply driven. The Min­
neTac team developed a complex decision making process described as an “Evaluator 
Chain” which encapsulated the logic used in reacting to the different market events. 
They experimented with the two strategies and found that whilst the Customer-Driven 
strategy was more proﬁtable overall, it had some signiﬁcant downsides, such as inabil­
ity to adapt to price ﬂuctuations in the supply market. The conclusion is that agents in 
the game cannot adopt a single strategy and that balance is required—shifting priorities 
as markets change. 
Additionally, awareness and knowledge of other strategies deployed in the market 
place, combined with a prediction model for customer demand was also found to be 
helpful. In computing, memoization is an optimization technique used primarily to 
speed up algorithms by remembering the answers to previously made function calls 
for common inputs, thus avoiding the need to repeat the calculation of results. We 
feel that this approach would allow traders to bid more quickly, with less computation 
required, on bundles for which they have bid on previously, providing particular per­
formance gains as the markets increase in size from thousands, to tens of thousands of 
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goods. 
9.3.2 Market Structure 
The TAC-Market Design Competition (TAC-MDC) looked at the effect of a more in­
telligent market place, whilst maintaining fairly simple traders. In TAC-MDC the 
competition organisers managed the traders and used well known strategies for trading 
in continuous double auctions (ZI, ZIP, GD and RE (Roth-Erev [NPT01])) but they 
allowed participants to develop the continuous double auctions in which traders im­
plemented by the competition organisers then took part in. The market operators made 
proﬁts by charging traders transactional based fees for activities such as registering 
in the market, placing shouts, requesting information on other traders and for mak­
ing bid/ask transactions. The competition organisers surveyed the techniques for the 
2007 game in [NCP+08] and concluded that variations in the pricing policy, as well 
as the matching and shout acceptance policy, could improve the fees earned by market 
managers and the proﬁtability of the market. 
Our MDA system uses a simple free-entry continuous double auction which matches 
shouts on a ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-served basis. We believe that given a more sophisticated 
market model, we should be able to inﬂuence the behaviour of the MDA system and 
further improve the market’s economic efﬁciencies. 
“Market Structure” encompasses both the economic makeup of the market, but also 
its linkages with the environment it controls and further work on MDA would need 
to be completed in order to make it compatible with the major capacity computing 
management systems Globus [Fos05] and GridBus [BB03]. In our MDA work we 
effectively traded goods through tokens that then enabled access to external providers 
of resources. In order to increase the future utility of MDA it would be beneﬁcial 
to implement direct links between the MDA system and the relevant grid computing 
resource and accounting systems, such as the GridBus project “GridBank” and the 
Globus project GRAM environment. Both of these projects adopt a similar application 
programming interface based approach which allows third party products to be built 
as “pluggable modules” that can then connect to the Grid management system and 
provide support for allocation decisions and resource management. 
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9.4 Conclusions on Future Work 
We believe that there is signiﬁcant scope for the work done so that MDA can be utilised 
in a number of practical resource allocation scenarios, such as decision support and 
railroad planning and we have given examples for how this might be achieved, both 
structurally, with improvements to the MDA and MDA-Agentscape environments and 
further integration with capacity computing resource management systems but also at 
the application level by looking at speciﬁc applications which have strong applicability 
to the technology and ideas we have developed. 
Central to the adoption of these ideas would also be the implementation of the iden­
tiﬁed improvements to the MDA and MDA-Agentscape, analysed in detail in Section 
4.6 which will bring further improvements in speed, efﬁciency and security of the 
multiple distributed auctions system. 
We are satisﬁed that the MDA system has the right balance between features and sim­
plicity to enable us to fully investigate this thesis without it becoming a software en­
gineering project. As the focus changed toward adoption, it would be important to 
ensure that a robust system for providing oversight was in place, principally to ensure 
traders acted within their ﬁnancial means and did not hoard resources, or unnecessarily 
sell them at a loss. 
Finally, the system works on a uniform trust model and there is potential for damage to 
be done if rogue agents were permitted to trade. We could increase the robustness and 
security frameworks in the system, for example, to include protocols and architectures 
derived from work by Franklin and Reiter [FR95] or Stubblebine and Syverson [SS99]. 
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